AN ACR FLC CONTINUED ITS APCH EVEN THOUGH THE RVR WAS 1400 FT VERSUS 1800 FT REQUIRED. THE APCH AND LNDG WERE SUCCESSFUL. THE FLC WERE APPARENTLY OUTSIDE OF THE FAF WHEN THEY WERE NOTIFIED OF THE LOWER VISIBILITY.

Narrative

THE PROB AROSE WHILE IN APCH TO LNDG PHASE OF A FLT INTO HOUSTON HOBBY ARPT. AT APPROX 100 NM FROM FIELD; ATIS RPTED WX AS 700 FT SCATTERED AND 5 MI IN FOG. AN INST APCH WAS BRIEFED. APPROX 30 NM FROM FIELD; UPON CONTACTING APCH; THE APCH CTLR TOLD US THAT THE FIELD WAS IFR (1 1/2 MI FOG). THE APCH WAS REBRIEFED TO ALLOW THE CAPT TO MAKE THE LNDG. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN 2000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED; CLRED FOR ILS RWY 4 APCH. THE LOC WAS INTERCEPTED; GS WAS CAPTURED AND THE ACFT WAS CONFIGURED FOR LNDG. WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ. UPON CHK-IN THE TWR CTLR SAID 'RVR IS 1400 FT; SAY INTENTIONS.' THE CAPT STATED THAT WE WILL CONTINUE. THE TWR CTLR SAID; 'CLRED TO LAND.' WE BROKE OUT AT MINIMUMS AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. THE PROB IS THAT ALTHOUGH WE WERE WELL ESTABLISHED ON THE APCH; I AM NOT POSITIVE THAT WE WERE ON THE DEFINED FINAL SEGMENT. THIS IS BECAUSE TASK LOADING WAS QUITE HIGH AT THIS POINT. FATIGUE FROM A LONG DAY OF FLYING WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. PERSONALLY; I FEEL THAT I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE READY FOR THIS SIT AS THE WX WENT DOWN; IN TERMS OF MENTAL PREPARATION TO PREVENT THIS OVERLOADING AT A CRUCIAL TIME. POSSIBLY; ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR COULD HAVE BEEN A LACK OF COM BTWN TWR AND APCH. IF WE HAD BEEN GIVEN THE WX EARLIER; BY; SAY; APCH CTL; WE COULD HAVE JUST PROCEEDED TO OUR ALTERNATE AND SKIPPED THIS SIT ALTOGETHER. BUT THIS IS ONLY A POSSIBLE FACTOR; THE WX MAY HAVE BEEN DETERIORATING SO RAPIDLY THAT THEY WERE GIVING US THE BEST INFO POSSIBLE.