A DC10 FLC LANDED WITH SEVERAL PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS STILL STANDING. THE DSCNT AND APCH HAD BEEN SHORTENED BECAUSE THE FLC WAS CLRED DIRECT TO THE VOR AND THEN CLRED TO LAND E; AT LAX. THE FLC WAS UNAWARE THAT THE CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EXPERIENCING ANY DIFFICULTY PREPARING THE CABIN FOR LNDG.

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I WAS OPERATING AS CAPT ON A DC10 DEPARTING FROM HNL; ARRIVING LAX. APPARENTLY THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE NOT PREPARED FOR THE LNDG. THE REQUIRED CHIME FROM THE COCKPIT WAS PROVIDED. THE PROFILE OF THE ACFT WHICH INCLUDED DSNDING; FLAP EXTENSION; AND THE LNDG GEAR EXTENSION; INDICATED LNDG WAS IMMINENT. THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT GAVE THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND. NO ONE FROM THE CABIN CREW OF 8 FLT ATTENDANTS ALERTED THE COCKPIT THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED. ALL OF THE OPS IN THE COCKPIT WERE COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR COMPANY'S SOP'S. A PAX WAS IN A LAVATORY AND SOME FLT ATTENDANTS WERE STANDING ON LNDG. SOME OF THE PAX EMER EXITS WERE NOT COVERED BY FLT ATTENDANTS. WE (THE 3 PLTS) DID NOT LEARN OF THE CABIN SIT UNTIL WE WERE AT THE GATE AND THE ACFT HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY PARKED. THE PROB WAS CAUSED BY THE FLT ATTENDANTS NOT PERFORMING THEIR DUTIES ON SCHEDULE. THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED HAD THE FLT ATTENDANTS NOTIFIED THE FLT DECK ADVISING US THAT THE CABIN WAS NOT PREPARED FOR LNDG. NO ONE FROM THE CABIN CREW ALERTED THE COCKPIT. HAD WE KNOWN WE WOULD HAVE ABANDONED THE APCH AND BEEN VECTORED UNTIL THE CABIN WAS LEGALLY PREPARED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 332979: WE WERE 11 MINS EARLY INTO LAX BECAUSE WE WERE CLRED DIRECTLY TO LAX VOR FOR ARR; INSTEAD OF FLYING THE NORMAL SADDE 6 ARR. WE PROVIDED THE NORMAL PRELNDG SIGNAL (A DOUBLE CHIME 18 MI OUT). CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: AFTER ARR AT THE GATE AND THE PAX HAD DEPLANED; A HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY CONVERSATION DEVELOPED BTWN ONE OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND THE CAPT. A COMPANY INVESTIGATION ENSUED; AND THIS RPTR WAS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH COMPANY LAWYERS DURING A RELATED DEPOSITION. RPTR BELIEVES THAT THIS INCIDENT INVOLVED INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE; AND NOT COMPANY POLICY; PROCS; OR TRAINING. HE FEELS THAT THE AIRLINE'S CRM PROGRAMS ARE EXCELLENT; AND ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT WITNESS THE CAPT'S PREFLT BRIEFING; HE FEELS THAT THE CAPT WOULD HAVE PROMOTED A GOOD CABIN AND COCKPIT CREW RELATIONSHIP. DURING THE DSCNT; THE SO HAD MONITORED THE PA SYS AND HEARD THE FLT ATTENDANT GIVING THE LNDG PREPARATION BRIEFING. IT WAS AT THAT TIME THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS MUST HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THE CABIN WOULD NOT BE PREPARED FOR LNDG; BUT FAILED TO TELL THE COCKPIT. THIS RPTR STATES THAT HAD THE CABIN CREW CONVEYED THEIR PREDICAMENT; THE COCKPIT CREW CERTAINLY WOULD NOT HAVE MINDED FLYING AROUND -- 'WE GET PAID BY THE MIN; SO THERE WAS NO PRESSURE TO OPERATE IN CONFLICT TO SAFETY;' AND THE CTLRS WOULD NOT HAVE MINDED GIVING VECTORS TO THE ACR WITH THE LOW TFC VOLUME AT THAT TIME OF DAY. THIS FO GUESSES THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS SIMPLY MISTIMED THEIR BREAKFAST SVC; AND THAT THEY WERE FURTHER CUT SHORT WHEN THE ACR WAS CLRED DIRECT AND GIVEN A LNDG TO THE E.