CAPT RPT REGARDING A POORLY DESIGNED DEP PROC WHEN E120 BECOMES SINGLE ENG OP.

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RWY 17 AT SDF IS NEW CONSTRUCTION. DUE TO A TALL RADIO TWR ON THE DEP PATH; ABOUT 5 NM DOWNRANGE FROM THE RWY; TKOF WTS ARE DRAMATICALLY REDUCED IF A STRAIGHT-OUT DEP IS FLOWN AND ENG FAILURE OCCURS AT V1. BECAUSE OF THE LARGE WT PENALTY (READ: REVENUE) AN ALTERNATE PROC WAS DEVELOPED FOR TURBOPROP ACFT. COMPANY OFFICIALS; FAA AND SDF ARPT BOARD COOPERATED IN DESIGNING THE NEW PROC. THIS PROC REQUIRES A CREW TO INITIATE 'A 15 DEG BANKED CLBING L TURN; COMMENCED AT DO.5 IFKI ILS DME (111.95) TO A MAGNETIC HDG OF 325 DEGS. INTERCEPT AND TRACK OUTBOUND ON THE IPKI (BACK COURSE) LOC. THIS PROC VALID FOR ACFT WITH V2 LESS THAN 145 KIAS.' THE PROC IS HAZARDOUS AND PRESENTS IMMEDIATE DANGER TO CREWS OF TURBOPROP ACFT FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) THE PROC IS COMPLEX AND NO TRAINING IS PROVIDED. 2) THE PROC IS NOT NORMALLY FLOWN; IN FACT IT IS SPECIFICALLY PERMITTED ONLY DURING SINGLE ENG OPS. 3) IT WOULD ONLY BE REQUIRED AT HIGH OPERATING WTS. WHILE THE PROC IS WELL WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ACFT; REQUIRING SUCH MANEUVERING DURING CRITICAL ENG OUT CONDITIONS RISKS LOSS OF ACFT AND LIVES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES HE HAS DISCUSSED THIS WITH HIS COMPANY PROGRAM MANAGER; COMPANY SAFETY OFFICERS AND WITH ALPA. THE COMPANY RESPONSE HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTING. THEY INDICATE THAT WE HAVE TO OPERATE OUT OF SDF AND THE ARPT BOARD IS INTRANSIGENT ON ANY CHANGE OF THE PROC DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ARRIVING OR DEPARTING TFC ON OTHER RWYS. THE COMPANY HAS PUT A REPRESENTATIVE TO WORK ON FINDING SOME FORM OF DESIGN CHANGE BUT NOT MUCH LUCK SO FAR. ALPA IS DISCUSSING THE PROC DIRECTLY WITH THE COMPANY AND RPTR IS NOT AWARE OF HOW THINGS STAND THERE. MEANWHILE; RPTR IN HIS LINE CHKS IS SUGGESTING TO FLCS TO AVOID USE OF RWY 17 IF AT ALL POSSIBLE AND TO CONSIDER IT A DANGEROUS PROC. ANALYST SUGGESTED THE HOTLINE BUT RPTR IS A BIT RELUCTANT SINCE THE FAA WAS INVOLVED IN THE DESIGN OF THE PROC.