WDB ACFT FLIES AT ALT TOO HIGH FOR WT; BEGINS A STALL. CAPT DECLARES EMER AND DSNDS TO A LOWER ALT TO AVOID A DEEP STALL.

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AT XX13Z; AUG YY 1996; I HAD TO EXERCISE MY EMER AUTH AS CAPT OF ACR; INITIATING A DSCNT FROM FL350 WITHOUT CLRNC FROM LCL ATC (JIDDAH; SAUDI; ARABIA) IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE ACFT FROM ENTERING A DEEP STALL CONDITION. A L TURN WAS INITIATED BY MY FO; WHO WAS FLYING THE ACFT; INTO CLR AIRSPACE (IE; NO RESTRS OR AIRWAYS OR NAV FIXES) AS WE STARTED THE DSCNT FROM FL350. THERE WAS TFC AT FL280 AND FL310 TRAVELING IN THE SAME DIRECTION. WE HAD BOTH OF THESE ACFT IN SIGHT; BOTH BEFORE AND DURING THE TURN. THERE WAS NO CONFLICT. AS WE REVERSED DIRECTION IN THE DSCNT OFF TRACK; THOSE 2 ACFT CONTINUED ON COURSE AND WERE 3 MINS AHEAD AS WE REGAINED COURSE AT FL260. 1) THE PROB AROSE DUE TO A QUERY FROM BAHRAIN ATC ASKING IF I COULD CLB TO AND MAINTAIN FL350 BY A CERTAIN FIX; SIBLI; WHICH WAS 18 MINS AHEAD. SINCE I WAS AT FL260 AND HAD TFC RIGHT BEHIND ME ON MY RTE OF FLT FOR THE NEXT 3 HRS AT FL280 AND FL310; I OF COURSE HAD A STRONG DESIRE TO CLB. I ASKED MY FE HOW MUCH WT OVER OPTIMUM WE WOULD BE AT FL350 AND WAS TOLD 10000 LBS. BASED ON THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMP AND MY EXPERIENCE WITH THE ACFT; I KNEW WE WOULD BE ABLE TO CLB AND MAINTAIN FL350. WE THEN CROSSED SIBLI AT FL350; WHICH WAS IN BAHRAIN AIRSPACE; AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER ENTERED SAUDI AIRSPACE; AT WHICH TIME I WAS GIVEN A RERTE BY THE SAUDI CTLR WHICH I COULDN'T UNDERSTAND. HE BECAME QUITE BELLIGERENT AND UNPROFESSIONAL AT THAT POINT; EVEN ASKING IF I HAD MY ENRTE CHART ONBOARD. AT THAT POINT MY FO BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT THE AIRSPD WAS FALLING OFF AND I SAW THAT WE HAD 5 DEGS OF NOSE UP PITCH. I THEN REALIZED BY LOOKING AT THE FUEL TOTALIZER THAT WE WERE APPROX 30000 LBS OVER OPTIMUM FOR OUR FLT LEVEL AND TEMP. I REQUESTED A L TURN OFF COURSE AND A DSCNT AND WAS REFUSED BY ATC WITH THE QUERY FROM THE CTLR OF 'WHY' IN A BELLIGERENT MANNER. AT THIS TIME WE FLEW THE ACFT FOR AS LONG AS WE COULD AT ALT ON COURSE; WITH REPEATED REQUESTS FOR A L TURN AWAY FROM TFC AND A LOWER ALT; ALL OF WHICH WERE DENIED. AT THIS TIME THE EVENTS IN PARAGRAPH #1 TRANSPIRED. 2) CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT WERE: STRESS; BROUGHT UPON ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS BY SPENDING THE PREVIOUS 6 HRS PARKED ON A RAMP IN THE DESERT; WITH 125 DEGS HEAT AND NO APU FOR COOLING OF ACFT OR CREW MEMBERS; VARIOUS AND SUNDRY ELECTRICAL EQUIP AND INST MALFUNCTIONS; DUE TO NO COOLING; WERE DEALT WITH AS THEY AROSE. AN EARLY DEP WAS CANCELED DUE TO ATC. A 10 HR DUTY DAY PRIOR TO THIS DEP IN THE CONDITIONS MENTIONED WAS ALSO A FACTOR. ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS WERE PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY DRAINED BY THE EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS 10 HRS; WHICH LED TO MISINTERP OF PRINTED CHARTS WHILE BEING YELLED AT IN A BELLIGERENT MANNER BY SAUDI CTLRS. 3) CTLR'S ACTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AS SOMEWHAT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE CREW MEMBER'S CTL; OTHER THAN RECOGNIZING THE FACT YOU ARE OPERATING IN A DEBILITATED CONDITION UNDER THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES. RECOGNIZE THAT EVEN IF ATC IS YELLING IN AN ALMOST UNINTELLIGIBLE LANGUAGE; DO NOT RUSH; TAKE YOUR TIME; AND WORK TOGETHER AS A CREW. 4) I BELIEVE THE ABOVE NARRATIVE ADDRESSES THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS; SPECIFICALLY THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT HUMAN PERFORMANCE; AND BY DEFAULT THE PERCEPTIONS; JUDGEMENTS; AND DECISIONS THAT LED TO ACTIONS OR INACTIONS.