AN ACR MD82 FLC HAS SMOKE ENTER THE ACFT FROM A BROKEN HYD LINE THAT SPRAYED ONTO AN ENG AFTER THE ACFT TURNED OFF OF THE RWY AFTER LNDG. THE FLC HAD THE SLIDES DISARMED AND THE DOORS OPENED TO REMOVE THE SMOKE AND THEN WERE TOWED TO THE GATE. MD82.

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WE HAD JUST TURNED OFF OF RWY 22L IN EWR WHEN THE CAPT STATED HE WAS HAVING TROUBLE STEERING AS HE TRIED TO TURN THE ACFT ONTO TXWY P. HE STOPPED THE ACFT AND NOTED THAT THE L HYD SYS INDICATED ZERO PRESSURE AND QTY. SIMULTANEOUSLY ONE OF THE CABIN ATTENDANTS CALLED TO RPT SMOKE IN THE CABIN. AT THAT TIME WE COULD SEE SMOKE COMING THROUGH THE DOOR GRILL OF THE COCKPIT. WE IMMEDIATELY OPENED THE COCKPIT WINDOWS AND SMOKE WAS NEVER A PROB IN THE COCKPIT. HOWEVER; UPON OPENING THE COCKPIT DOOR; THE CAPT RPTED THICK SMOKE AND POOR VISIBILITY IN THE CABIN. HE CALLED FOR THE CABIN SMOKE CHKLIST; HOWEVER; THERE WAS A DELAY IN RUNNING IT BECAUSE I FIRST HAD TROUBLE FINDING IT IN OUR QRH AND THEN HAD TROUBLE DECIDING WHICH TO USE SINCE ALL CHKLISTS SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED AIRBORNE PROBS. IN THE INTERIM; THE CAPT TURNED OFF THE APU AIR AND PACK SWITCHES AND I TURNED ON THE RAM AIR FAN. WE THEN STARTED THE PAX EVAC CHKLIST. WE SHUT THE ENGS DOWN; NOTIFIED THE TWR AND BEGAN TO EVALUATE THE SIT. THE LEAD CABIN ATTENDANT SUGGESTED OPENING THE ACFT DOORS. THE CAPT FELT THERE WAS NO FIRE AND DID NOT WANT TO EVAC. HE GAVE THE OK AND CONTINUED TO MONITOR THE SIT. HE FELT THE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE PROB WAS REMOVED AND; IN FACT; 30 SECONDS AFTER OPENING THE DOORS THE SMOKE HAD CLRED APPRECIABLY; SO THE NECESSITY OF DISARMING THE DOORS HAD BEEN OVERRIDDEN BY THE DANGERS INHERENT IN AN EMER EVAC. 2 MINS LATER THE SMOKE WAS COMPLETELY GONE AND WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TOWED TO THE GATE. THIS WAS A CLOSE SIT TO CALL. OUR COMPANY DOES NOT HAVE SPECIFIC PROCS FOR CLRING SMOKE ON THE GND; WHICH IS VERY DIFFERENT THEN CLRING IT IN THE AIR. OPENING THE ACFT DOORS SEEMED TO WORK FINE ONCE THE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE WAS ISOLATED AND REMOVED. HOWEVER; IT FORCED US TO DISARM THE DOORS. THIS IS NOT AN UNCOMMON OCCURRENCE AND SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY A CHKLIST THAT GIVES PROCS; CONSIDERATIONS; AND GUIDANCE TO HELP IN A VERY DIFFICULT DECISION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT THE HYD LEAK OCCURRED IN THE L ENG THRUST REVERSER RETURN LINE AND THE SMOKE FROM THE FLUID SPRAYING ONTO THE HOT ENG WAS INGESTED THROUGH THE AIR CONDITIONING SYS. THE ACFT WAS STOPPED AND THE DOOR SLIDES WERE DISARMED AND THE DOORS WERE OPENED TO CLR THE SMOKE AND FUMES; FORTUNATELY THE ACFT WAS IN A XWIND AT THE TIME. THIS FO SAID THAT A QUICK REACTION HANDBOOK WAS NOT OF MUCH ASSISTANCE SINCE ALL OF THE SMOKE REMOVAL PROCS WERE FOR INFLT; PRESSURIZED SITS. HE ALSO WAS WARY OF THE FAA CRITICIZING THEIR DECISION TO EVAC THE SMOKE RATHER THAN THE PAX AND DISARMING THE SLIDES WITH PAX ON BOARD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 351743: AFTER A NORMAL LNDG ON RWY 22L AT EWR; THE ACFT EXITED THE RWY ON HIGH SPD 'N.' I NOTICED THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING WAS DIFFICULT TO MOVE. A QUICK CHK REVEALED L HYD QTY AND PRESSURE LOSS.