AN MD80 ACR FLC EXPERIENCES ICE DAMAGE TO BOTH ENGS WHEN THEY IGNORE CONDITIONS HIGHLY FAVORABLE TO THE FORMATION OF 'ICE 9' AND DO NOT PERFORM AN ICE CHK OF THE UPPER INBOARD WING SURFACES. THE FLC HAS A SERIES OF COMPRESSOR STALLS FROM THE R ENG AT 3500 FT ON CLBOUT; BUT THEY DECIDE TO CONTINUE THE FLT AT REDUCED SPD TO THEIR DEST.

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THE CAPT REQUESTED THAT I FLY THE FIRST LEG TO ORD; THEN WE WOULD ALTERNATE LEGS FOR THE REST OF THE DAY. I PROCEEDED TO THE ACFT AT THE GATE AND CONDUCTED THE INTERIOR COCKPIT PREFLT. I REVIEWED THE ACFT LOGBOOK UPON MY ENTRY TO THE COCKPIT. OTHER THAN THE R ENG AVM PLACARDED INOP IN THE MEL SECTION; THERE WERE NO OPEN LOGBOOK DISCREPANCIES. THE ACFT; AN MD80; HAD ARRIVED FROM SEATTLE ABOUT 30 MINS PRIOR TO MY ARR ON THE PLANE. I COPIED STL ATIS INFO. I NOTED THE TEMP AND DEWPOINT SPREAD; ALSO NOTING THE 'RAIN AND MIST' WITH 300 FT OF OVCST WITH 2 1/2 MI OF VISIBILITY. I CALCULATED THE PERFORMANCE DATA AND NOTED THE REQUIREMENT FOR FULL TKOF THRUST WITH ENG ANTI-ICE ON DUE TO TEMP/DEWPOINT SPREAD; PRECIP; AND OVCST. THE CAPT ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND WE DISCUSSED THE CURRENT WX; RWY; THE NEED FOR A CLR ICE CHK FROM MAINT; THE DEP CLRNC AND POINTS OF SAFETY INCLUDING ENG AND WING ANTI-ICE AS REQUIREMENTS. HE INDICATED THAT THERE WAS ONLY SOME LIGHT FROST ON THE BOTTOM OF THE WINGS WITH 1 OR 2 FROZEN RIVULETS OF MELTED ICE. THE CAPT AND THE CHIEF PLT DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR AN ICE CHK. THE CAPT STATED TO THE CHIEF PLT THAT HE HAD PERFORMED THE OUTSIDE PREFLT AND HAD CAREFULLY INSPECTED THE WINGS NOTING THAT THERE WAS ONLY A LITTLE FROST AND 1 OR 2 FROZEN RIVULETS OF MELTED ICE. THE CHIEF PLT INFORMED THE CAPT THAT THE PRECIP WAS ONLY RAIN. I HEARD THE CHIEF PLT SAY SOMETHING TO THE CAPT THAT CONTAINED THE WORDS 'ICE CHK' AND UNDERSTOOD THE CAPT TO CONCUR WITH THE CHIEF PLT. SIMULTANEOUSLY; THE GND MECH ONCE AGAIN STARTED TO CALL THE CAPT ON THE INTERPHONE CLRING US TO PRESSURIZE HYDS AND INDICATED THE ACFT WAS READY FOR PUSHBACK. CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED THIS CALL FROM THE MECH. THERE WAS SOME MORE DISCUSSION OF THE ACTUAL ALLOWABLE TOLERANCES FOR THE ICE CHK. THE CHIEF PLT CLRLY STATED THAT UP TO 1/8 INCH OF FROST WAS ALLOWABLE ON THE BOTTOM OF THE WING. AT THIS POINT; I BELIEVE THE CRM TRAINING ALLOWED THE CAPT TO SLIP MOMENTARILY INTO A SUBORDINATE ROLE AS OPPOSED TO THAT OF COMMAND. THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE CHIEF PLT SEEMED TO ASSURE THE CAPT THAT THE WX AND THE CONDITION OF THE WINGS DID NOT WARRANT DEICING. THE CAPT SEEMED CONVINCED THAT THE WINGS WERE CLEAN AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A SATISFACTORY CLR ICE CHK WERE MET. UP TO THIS POINT I WAS IN TOTAL AGREEMENT WITH THE CAPT WITH THE INFO PRESENTED THAT THE ACFT DID NOT REQUIRE DEICING. THE CHIEF PLT LED US TO BELIEVE THAT THE WX WOULD NOT WARRANT DEICING. I WAS COMFORTABLE OF THE INFO; GIVEN THAT I HAD NOT PERFORMED THE EXTERIOR PREFLT. I HEARD NO STATEMENT FROM THE MECH THAT WE NEEDED DEICING OR THAT HE HAD COMPLETED AN ICE CHK; ALTHOUGH I OVERHEARD THE CAPT ASK HIM DIRECTLY TO INSPECT THE WINGS ON THE INTERPHONE. THE CAPT TURNED ON THE WING ANTI-ICE SYS PASSING THROUGH 800 FT WITH VISIBLE MOISTURE AND A RAM AIR TEMP OF APPROX 4 DEGS C. FLAPS AND SLATS WERE RETRACTED ON SPD SCHEDULE. AT APPROX 3500 FT MSL; WE FELT RATHER STRONG; REPEATED ENG AND AIRFRAME SHUDDERS. THE CAPT NOTED A R WING DEICE TEMP HIGH LIGHT. WE SUSPECTED POSSIBLE R ENG COMPRESSOR STALLS OR SOME SORT OF ENG BLEED AIR PROB. THE CAPT PLACED THE R BLEED SWITCH TO THE HP BLEED OFF POS. I PULLED THE PWR BACK AND THE STALLS AND SHUDDERING STOPPED. WE CONTINUED TO CLB AND EVALUATE THE PROB; ALTHOUGH AT A REDUCED PWR SETTING APPROX 1.65 EPR. BOTH ENG INDICATIONS WERE VERY SIMILAR AND WELL WITHIN NORMAL LIMITS. ONCE THE PWR WAS REDUCED THERE WERE NO ADDITIONAL ABNORMAL INDICATIONS OR VIBRATIONS. THE CAPT CONTACTED ATC AND INQUIRED ABOUT THE CURRENT WX IN STL AND ORD. HE ADVISED ATC OF OUR INTENTIONS TO FLY AT 250 KTS. THE CAPT DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO OUR DEST ORD. WING AND ENG ANTI-ICE WERE SECURED AS WE CLBED ABOVE THE OVCST AND OUT OF ICING CONDITIONS. WHEN WE STARTED OUR DSCNT INTO THE ORD TERMINAL AREA; WE RE-ENTERED ICING CONDITIONS AND HAD TO USE ANTI-ICE SYS. THERE WAS NO RECURRENCE OF ANY PROB. THE APCH WAS NORMAL AND WE BROKE OUT AT ABOUT 3300 FT MSL. WHEN FLAPS 40 DEGS WERE SELECTED AND THE ACFT SLOWED TO 160 KTS; THE COMPRESSOR STALLS AND SHUDDERING STARTED AGAIN. WHEN I REDUCED PWR ON THE R ENG; COMPRESSOR STALLS AND SHUDDERING CEASED. THE LNDG AND ROLLOUT WERE UNEVENTFUL. AFTER EXITING THE RWY; WE TAXIED TO THE GATE. POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED DAMAGE TO BOTH ENG COMPRESSOR SECTIONS; REQUIRING ENG CHANGES. THERE WAS A LAYER OF APPROX 1/4 INCH OF CLR ICE ON THE TOP OF PORTIONS OF THE L WING. THIS ICE COULD HAVE FORMED ANY TIME DURING THE FLT. DURING THE CLB AND DSCNT WE WERE IN ICING CONDITIONS. IT WAS RAINING SLOWLY BUT STEADILY AT STL; THEREFORE THE LAYER OF ICE COULD HAVE FORMED ANY TIME AFTER THE ACFT LEFT THE GATE UP UNTIL WE CLRED THE ICING CONDITIONS. I BELIEVE THAT THE MECH DID IN FACT PERFORM THE CLR ICE CHK AND RPTED A NEGATIVE REQUIREMENT TO DEICE THE ACFT WINGS. THIS SATISFIED THE CAPT AND WAS THE FINAL STEP IN REACHING THE DECISION TO TAKE OFF. FROM THE TIME THE MECH MAY HAVE PERFORMED THE CLR ICE CHK TO TKOF WAS APPROX 4-5 MINS OF TIME. THE ACFT HAD ARRIVED FROM A 3+ HR FLT FROM SEATTLE AND LANDED WITH APPROX 6000+ LBS OF FUEL IN EACH OF THE WING TANKS. THE COMPANY MD80 FLT HANDBOOK PROVIDES AN ALTERNATE FUELING PROC WHERE SUPERCOOLED FUEL IS XFERRED TO THE CTR TANK AND WARMER FUEL IS PUMPED INTO THE WING TANKS. THIS WAS NOT DONE. ANOTHER SOLUTION MAY BE TO REQUIRE AN ITEM ON THE AFTER STARTING ENGS CHKLIST TO CHALLENGE THE MECH TO INSPECT THE WINGS AND RPT THEIR CONDITION. OTHER AIRLINES HAVE HEATED WING BLANKETS INSTALLED ON THEIR MD80 FLEET. PERHAPS AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE REQUIREMENT FOR ALL MD80'S TO HAVE HEATED WING BLANKETS OR AT VERY MINIMUM ICE DETECTORS INSTALLED. THE FAA CERTIFICATED THIS MODEL ACFT AND KNOWS FULLY ABOUT THE POTENTIAL WING CLR ICE PROBS. IT IS THEIR NEGLIGENCE IN CERTIFYING THIS MODEL ACFT THAT ULTIMATELY BEARS SCRUTINY. WE AIR CREW HAVE TO DEAL WITH THEIR OVERSIGHT. GIVEN THE ECONOMICS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY; THIS OVERSIGHT MAY FORCE SOME FINANCIALLY TROUBLED AIRLINES INTO BANKRUPTCY. THE ALTERNATIVE IS FAR WORSE. AN EXPENSIVE RETROFIT OR MODIFICATION OF PROCS MAY PREVENT AT VERY LEAST; COSTLY ICE FOD DAMAGE TO ENGS; AND POSSIBLY PREVENT A FATAL ACCIDENT.