INSTRUCTOR WITH PLT TRAINING FOR IFR AND ON APCH AT NON TWR ARPT HAS CLOSE PROX WITH MD80 ON APCH FROM WRONG SIDE OF FIELD. MISSED APCH IS EXECUTED ON HEARING POS OF MD80; THEN ACFT SIGHTED.

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AT XA00; C182 RPTED ON CTAF ENTERING SE SEGMENT OF DME 14 ARC; PLANNING ILS-DME RWY 2 APCH DRO. BEECH 1900 RESPONDED ON TXWY FOR RWY 20 DEP FOR FMN; AWAITING IFR CLRNC; HOLDING SHORT. AT XA03; C182 ON CTAF RPTING HINDE INTXN INBOUND; 14 MI FINAL FOR RWY 2 DRO. BEECH 1900 REPLIED STILL WAITING AND HOLDING SHORT. AT XA05; CITATION ON CTAF; ASKING UNICOM FOR FIELD ADVISORY. UNICOM GAVE ASOS FREQ; ADVISED PLT OPTION ON RWYS AND SAID HAD HEARD C182 ON FINAL RWY 2 AND BEECH 1900 HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 20. AFTER A MOMENT CITATION CAME BACK; PLANNING L BASE FOR RWY 20; 15 MINS OUT TO SE; THEN A BRIEF QUERY WITH UNICOM REGARDING RENTAL CAR. AT XA07; C182 ON CTAF; RPTING IRISS OM; 7.4 MI FINAL RWY 2 DRO. BEECH 1900 REPLIED STILL HOLDING SHORT RWY 20. CITATION ADVISED 10 MINS TO SE. AT XA08; MD80 ON CTAF; ADVISED 5 MI R BASE RWY 2 DRO; ANY OTHER ACFT PLEASE ADVISE. C182 RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY (CFII) THAT WE WERE ON 5 MI FINAL FOR RWY 2; NO CONTACT; DID MD80 HAVE VISUAL? PIC OF C182 REMOVED FOGGLES AND COMMENCED IMMEDIATE L TURN OUT OF ILS; TELLING CFII TO ADVISE MD80 THAT WE WERE VACATING THE APCH TO THE NW UNTIL VISUAL CONTACT MADE. MD80 ADVISED NO VISUAL CONTACT ON C182. VISUAL CONTACT MADE BY C182 WHEN TURNED AWAY FROM ILS; APPROX 10 SECONDS LATER; 1 MI. MD80 PROBABLY WOULD HAVE DSNDED ONTO C182 FROM REAR. AT XA10; C182 CIRCLED AND REJOINED THE GLIDE PATH; HOWEVER; DID NOT RESUME INST TRAINING; BECAUSE OF PROBS AHEAD ON GND. MD80'S TAIL WAS STILL HANGING OUT ON END OF RWY 2 ON THE OTHER END. C182 ON CTAF ADVISED 7 MI FINAL RWY 2 DRO FULL STOP. AT XA11; BEECH 1900 ON CTAF ADVISED MD80 THAT HE WOULD TAXI BACK TO TERMINAL; AS THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT ROOM FOR MD80 TO PASS ON TXWY AND MD80 HAD TURNED ONTO TXWY BEFORE LOOKING FOR TFC AWAITING DEP. C182 SLOWED TO MINIMUM SPD WHILE WAITING FOR MD80 TO CLR RWY 2. AT XA12; C182 ON CTAF ADVISED SHORT FINAL RWY 2 DRO FULL STOP AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT; TURNED OFF AT MID-FIELD; ADVISED ON CTAF CLR OF ACTIVE. CITATION ADVISED 5 MINS OUT; WOULD NOW OVERFLY FIELD; ENTER L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 2 DRO FULL STOP. AT XA13; BEECH 1900 ON CTAF ADVISED TAKING RWY 20 DRO FOR STRAIGHT OUT DEP FMN. C182 THEN SHUT DOWN SO NO FURTHER CTAF HEARD. AT XA15; CITATION LANDED RWY 2 DRO WITHOUT INCIDENT. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF PIC OF C182: DRO HAS NO TWR; ONLY CTAF. RADAR COVERAGE IS NOT AVAILABLE BELOW 1600 FT AGL; WELL ABOVE THE PATTERN AND THE APCHS. MANY TRAINING FLTS PER DAY OCCUR; DUE TO THE PROX OF FLT SCHOOL AT FMN AND DURANGO FBO ON FIELD. MANY OF THESE TRAINING FLTS FLY THE PUBLISHED APCHS AND THE MISSED; RESULTING IN OCCUPIED AIRSPACE AS FAR AS 14 MI OUT AND TYPICALLY UP TO 10000 FT MSL. C182 HAD ASKED FOR A POP-UP TRAINING CLRNC TO DRO FROM NEAR FMN; BUT ZDV WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY. HAD CTR BEEN MORE ACCOMMODATING; C182 AND MD80 WOULD NEVER HAVE GOTTEN IN PROX. IT IS VERY TYPICAL FOR CTR TO ADVISE IFR TFC TO CONTACT CTAF ABOUT 5 MI OUT. THIS IS SIMPLY NOT ENOUGH TIME AT CATEGORY C OR D SPDS; ASSUMING THE MD80 HAD SLOWED TO THAT. THE MD80 HAD A SECOND PLT AND SECOND RADIO COMS AVAILABLE. PRESUMABLY; THESE RESOURCES WERE BEING USED INSTEAD ON THE COMPANY CHANNEL FOR BUSINESS PURPOSES. I OFFER THREE CRITICISMS. FIRST; CTAF SHOULD BE CONTACTED AT LEAST 30 MI OUT IN THE CASE OF A FAST APCH; AND MONITORED CONTINUOUSLY BY A COMPETENT FLT OFFICER WITH POS RPTS; EVEN WHILE STILL WITH CTR. THIS IS MORE TRUE ON A VFR OR MVFR DAY; AS TRAINING FREQUENTLY GOES ON UNDER A CLOUD LAYER. IN THE INTERESTS OF SAFETY; THE CARRIER SHOULD HOLD OFF ON COMPANY CHITCHAT TILL ON THE GND. SECONDLY; CTR COULD ADVISE THE IFR TFC TO CONTACT ON CTAF MUCH SOONER. 15 MI FOR CATEGORY A/B AND 30 MI FOR CATEGORY C/D WOULD HELP VFR TFC PREPARE TO ACCOMMODATE. LASTLY; THE CARRIER SHOULD NOT PERFORM NON STANDARD (IE; R BASE) PATTERNS; UNLESS PLENTY OF WARNING IS GIVEN ON CTAF. IT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR CARRIERS ON IFR WHO AREN'T WILLING TO ANNOUNCE THEIR INTENTIONS ON CTAF EARLY BE REQUIRED TO ENTER THE APCH FROM PUBLISHED IAF'S; AS THIS WILL STANDARDIZE THEIR APCH AND LNDG FOR EXISTING VFR TFC. A LAST OBSERVATION IS THE INCONVENIENCE TO ALL IMPOSED BY A DROP-IN 5 MI R BASE AT HIGH SPD. NORMALLY; WE BUG-SQUASHERS ARE HAPPY TO DO WHAT'S NECESSARY TO EXPEDITE THE COMMUTERS; CARRIERS AND BIZJETS. AFTER ALL; IT'S PRETTY EASY FOR US TO DO; WE ARE MUCH MORE MANEUVERABLE; AND WE ARE NOT ON AS TIGHT A SCHEDULE. BUT BECAUSE THE MD80 DID NOT COMMUNICATE EARLY ON; HE NEVER HEARD THAT THE BEECH 1900 WAS HOLDING SHORT ON THE TXWY AT THE OPPOSITE END. THE RWY ENDED UP BEING BLOCKED WHEN THE MD80 TURNED INTO THE TXWY AND FOUND THE BEECH 1900 DEAD AHEAD. THIS RESULTED IN A DELAY FOR THE BEECH 1900; WHO WAS FORCED TO TAXI BACK TO THE TERMINAL; AS WELL AS FOR THE PAX OF THE MD80. THE ACR'S COMPANY PROCS MANUALS CAN PROBABLY HANDLE ALL THE ISSUES IN THIS INCIDENT; AND IS LIKELY THE BEST FORUM; SINCE THE CARRIER'S PRESENCE HERE IS ONLY A FACTOR DURING SKI SEASON. PROCS PUT IN PLACE NOW CAN SURVIVE TO NEXT YR. PLTS SHOULD TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE FACT THAT EVEN THOUGH RADIOS ARE NOT REQUIRED HERE; THEY ARE A GOOD WAY TO IMPLEMENT AVOIDANCE. HEIGHTENED VIGILANCE IS NEEDED IN THE NON TWRED ENVIRONMENT. RIGHT OF WAY BELONGS TO THE PLANE AHEAD. PLTS NEED TO BE FURTHER REMINDED THAT AN IFR CLRNC; EVEN THOUGH FILED TO THE GND; DOES NOT GUARANTEE ANY SEPARATION ONCE YOU LEAVE 1800 FT OR THE CLOUDS; AND THAT THERE REALLY ARE NO BACKUP SYS LIKE AIR TFC RADAR TO PROVIDE SUCH. THE IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER IS THAT EACH PLT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SEEING AND BEING SEEN. CTAF IS JUST A TOOL THAT CAN HELP. ADEQUATE TIME AND SLOWER SPD GIVES EVERYONE TIME TO REACT. AND THE STANDARD TFC PATTERN HELPS AVOID NASTY SURPRISES.