A GULFSTREAM IS FLOWN IN A RECKLESS MANNER DURING APCH INTO CARSON CITY; NV (O04). ACFT CONSISTENTLY FLOWN BELOW LNDG TARGET SPD RESULTING IN A HARD LNDG.

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I WAS COPLT ON GULFSTREAM XXXX ENRTE VFR FROM RNO TO O04 (CARSON CITY; NV). NO FLT PLAN WAS FILED AS THIS WAS A QUICK REPOS WHILE IN CONTACT WITH RENO DEP (IFR PLAN WAS ON FILE FOR SUBSEQUENT RETURN TO BJC). I AM FILING THIS FORM TO DOCUMENT THAT I WAS THE COPLT AND NOT FLYING THE ACFT. PLEASE SEE SEPARATE INCIDENT FORM FILED FOR ANOTHER INCIDENT ON SAME TRIP; WHICH ALSO RESULTED FROM LACK OF CRM SKILLS BY THE CAPT. I FILE THIS NOT TO INITIATE ACTION AGAINST THE CAPT; BUT TO PROTECT MYSELF AND TO DOCUMENT THE EVENTS. THE CAPT MADE AN APPROPRIATE 45 DEG R DOWNWIND ENTRY TO RWY 9 AT CARSON CITY. HOWEVER; I NOTICED HE WAS DRIFTING A BIT BELOW PATTERN ALT AND I MENTIONED TO HIM HE WAS GETTING LOW. HE CONTINUED THE APCH AND ON R BASE I CALLED TO HIM THAT HE WAS LOW AND 'AT REF.' THESE CALLS WERE FOLLOWED BY MY SOMEWHAT ADAMANT CALLS OF 'MINUS 5' THEN 'AIRSPD MINUS 10; PWR; GAR.' AT THAT POINT WE WERE AT ABOUT 300-400 FT AGL. SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE LAST CALL THE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED. AS I PUT MY HAND UP TO PUSH FORWARD THE PWR LEVERS; THE CAPT FINALLY STARTED ADDING PWR FOR WHAT I THOUGHT WAS A GAR. INSTEAD; HE TURNED TO A (BANK) 40 DEG R TURN AS HE OVERSHOT FINAL AND SAID (STICK SHAKER STILL GOING) 'THESE GULFSTREAMS WILL FLY THROUGH ANYTHING.' HE THEN KEPT THE PWR IN; GOT BACK TO A BETTER AIRSPD. (NOTE: HIS BUG WAS AT 121; WHICH WAS V1 FOR TKOF OUT OF RENO; EVEN THOUGH TWICE ON THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLISTS I HAD CONFIRMED VREF WAS 139; AND BOTH TIMES HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND SAID 'BUG SET.' I CAN'T SEE HIS AIRSPD BUG VERY WELL FROM WHERE I SIT.) ONCE IT WAS APPARENT HE WAS GOING TO CONTINUE TO FLY THE APCH; I AGAIN CONFIRMED VREF AT 139; AND HE AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGED THIS. NEXT I NOTICED ON FINAL THAT HE HAD KEPT THE EXTRA PWR IN AND WAS NOW GETTING HIGH. I TOLD HIM 'YOU'RE GETTING HIGH; GAR.' I FELT A GAR WAS NEEDED SINCE WE WERE LNDG AT MAX WT FOR THE CONDITIONS TO A 5900 FT RWY AT 4600 FT AGL. THE CAPT THEN; AS WE WERE NEARLY AT THE APCH THRESHOLD FULLY 250 FT ABOVE GND; RETARDED THE PWR LEVERS TO IDLE AND SAID 'WE CAN MAKE IT.' THE RATE OF DSCNT WAS ALARMING AND I SHOUTED 'SINK RATE' FOLLOWED BY 'FLARE!' THE IMPACT WAS IMPRESSIVE AND IT'S A TESTIMONIAL TO GRUMMAN/GULFSTREAM THAT WE DIDN'T DRIVE THE MAIN GEAR RIGHT THROUGH THE WINGS. ANY AIRLINE WOULD HAVE GNDED THE PLANE UNTIL A THOROUGH HARD LNDG INSPECTION WAS COMPLETED. I PERSONALLY SPENT A FULL 1/2 HR LOOKING IT OVER. WITHOUT QUESTION; THE APCH WAS CARELESS AND RECKLESS OP; AND IN CASE ANY OBSERVERS RPTED IT TO THE FAA I WANT TO DOCUMENT THE EVENTS. IT SEEMS THE CAPT IS ALMOST BRAGGING ABOUT THE HARD LNDG; WITH THE DISCLAIMER THAT IT WAS DUE TO 'MY' MISCOM ABOUT REF SPD. FIRST OFF; THAT IS NOT THE CASE. SECOND; A GAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN INITIATED TWICE. SHORT OF WRESTLING THE CAPT FOR CTL; I DID THE BEST I COULD TO COACH HIM THROUGH THE APCH AND LNDG. AS I MENTIONED IN THE OTHER INCIDENT RPTED FROM THIS TRIP; I HAVE TERMINATED MY RELATIONSHIP WITH THIS FLT DEPT. AGAIN; MY INTENT WITH BOTH RPTS IS TO DOCUMENT THE EVENTS AND NOT TO INITIATE ANY ACTION AGAINST THE CAPT.