CONFUSION REIGNS SUPREME WHEN 2 ACR ACFT ARE TO BE INSPECTED BY THE FIRE DEPT AND THE FLC AND TWR REALIZE THAT THE CREW AND THE SFO TWR CANNOT COMMUNICATE WITH THE EMER GND EQUIP ON ANY FREQ. THE CFR CREWS WERE ALSO UNABLE TO IDENT THE POS OF THE #4 ENG ON THE B747.

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ACR FLT NRT-SFO; B747-200; VISUAL RWY 28L. EXCEPTIONALLY CLR; VERY COLD; SNOW CAPPED FOOTHILLS; SLIGHT TAILWIND. B777 SLIGHTLY AHEAD VISUAL RWY 28R. TOUCHDOWN NORMAL. #4 ENG WOULD NOT COME OUT OF REVERSE; SHUT IT DOWN. TAXIING OFF RWY 28L AT TXWY D L TURN ON TXWY B; GND CTL REMARKED OUR #4 ENG WAS SMOKING. ALSO ADVISED THE B777 THAT SMOKE APPEARED FROM EITHER THE L ENG OR L WHEEL WELL AREA. WE REQUESTED FIRE DEPT CHK OF ENG SINCE A VISUAL CHK/INSTS SHOWED NOTHING. THE B777 ALSO ASKED FOR AN INSPECTION OF THEIR ACFT. WE WERE STOPPED ON TXWY B BTWN TXWY D AND TXWY E; FACING E. THE B777 WAS STOPPED ON TXWY B BTWN TXWY D AND TXWY K; FACING W. WE COULD NOT SEE EACH OTHER. 6 OR 7 FIRE TRUCKS RESPONDED; PLUS MISC OTHER GND VEHICLES. FIRE DEPT DIDN'T KNOW WHICH ENG #4 IS ON A 4- ENG AIRPLANE. (OBVIOUSLY; THE ENG WASN'T SMOKING TOO BADLY!) THE B777 SMOKE WAS COMING FROM THE WHEEL/TIRES ON THE L SIDE EITHER FROM HYD FLUID OR DEICE FLUID. NO FLAME OR DENSE SMOKE. CONFUSION STARTED WHEN THERE WAS NO COMMON FREQ THAT THE TWR; 2 ACFT; AND FIRE/RESCUE EQUIP COULD TALK WITH OR TO EACH OTHER. TWR KEPT TRYING TO RELAY OUR REQUESTS AND QUESTIONS AND THE B777'S REQUESTS AND QUESTIONS TO THE FIRE DEPT PERSONNEL WHO DID NOT KNOW WHAT A #4 ENG WAS; NOR RESPOND TO THE TWR'S DIRECTIONS OR COMMENTS. THE TWR SEVERAL TIMES (ON 121.8) WAS ASKING 'DOES ANY OF THE FIRE/RESCUE EQUIP HEAR ME?' 'WILL SOMEONE ANSWER ME!' 'IS ANYONE ON FREQ?' SURE GAVE US CONFIDENCE! OBVIOUSLY WE HAD NO VISIBLE FLAME; NEITHER DID THE B777. I HOPE WITH VISIBLE FLAME OR DENSE SMOKE THESE QUESTIONS OF WHERE TO GO OR WHERE THE FIRE IS; IS A MOOT POINT. HOWEVER; WITHOUT VISIBLE CLUES AND NOT KNOWING THE BASIC PARTS OF AN AIRPLANE; WOULD THEY (FIRE/RESCUE) KNOW WHERE WE WANT AND NEED THE HELP? IF WE HAD A FORWARD PIT FIRE INDICATION; WOULD THEY KNOW WHICH CARGO DOOR TO ENTER? I ALWAYS THOUGHT IF I COULD GET MY BROKEN AIRPLANE TO THE RWY AND GET IT STOPPED; GET THE PAX OFF THE AIRPLANE; MY JOB WAS DONE AND I COULD RELY ON THE FIRE/RESCUE PERSONNEL TO DO THEIR JOB. THIS INCIDENT (GOOD WX; NO ARPT PROBS; 2 MINOR ACFT PROBS; 2 ACFT; AND A SLOW TIME AT SFO TFC WISE) DEMONSTRATES WE ALL NEED TO REVIEW FIRE/RESCUE PROCS. 1) WE NEED A COMMON FREQ SO WE CAN TALK DIRECTLY TO FIRE PERSONNEL. 2) FIRE PERSONNEL NEED TO KNOW THE BASIC PARTS OF THE ACFT AND ENTRY POINTS. 3) COMMON TERMINOLOGY! THERE IS A LOT OF DIFFERENCE BTWN 'SMOKE;' 'FLAME;' 'STEAM!' (WHAT WAS SMOKING ON OUR AIRPLANE WAS OUR #3 ENG!) 4) FIRE EQUIP NEEDS TO KNOW HOW TO CLR A TXWY ONCE THEY ARE DONE WITH INSPECTIONS. WE COULDN'T TAXI TO THE GATE BECAUSE THEY PARKED ALONG SIDE TXWY A. (WITH A B747 WE COULDN'T PROCEED PAST THEM.) NO COMMON FREQ TO GET THEM TO MOVE! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO STATED THAT THE PLT'S UNION; THE COMPANY; THE FIRE CHIEF AND THE FAA HAD BEEN NOTIFIED ABOUT THIS INCIDENT. THE FO ALSO HAS A REVIEW UNDERWAY ON THE COCKPIT TAPES. THE FAA HAS ISSUED AN ADVISORY CIRCULAR ON THE USE OF COMMON FREQS TO BE USED IN INSTANCES SUCH AS THIS. THE 'REST OF THE STORY' IS NOT YET 'NAILED DOWN.' THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME RADIO OR ELECTRICAL PROBS ON THE GND VEHICLES THAT ADDED TO THE CONFUSION.