THE FLC OF AN ACR MD80; SUPER 80; HIT THE WAKE OF A PRECEDING ACFT AND HAD TO MAKE A GAR FROM A SHORT FINAL APCH TO RWY 32 AT PIT.

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I UNDERSTOOD THAT WE HAD BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 28R AND BRIEFED FOR THAT APCH. EVENTUALLY I REALIZED THAT WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A RWY 32 APCH AND WE BEGAN TO SET UP FOR RWY 32. SPACING ON THE ACFT AHEAD WAS TIGHT AND WE ENCOUNTERED WAKE TURB ON SHORT FINAL. WE TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WERE GOING AROUND AND WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN RWY HEADING. WE WERE ASKED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT WITH 3 DIFFERENT ACFT AND EVENTUALLY LANDED ON RWY 28R. I AM CRITICAL OF MY PERFORMANCE IN THAT I WAS NOT PREPARED FOR THE PROPER APCH. BETTER COM WITH MY FO WOULD HAVE HELPED. I AM ALSO CRITICAL OF THE CTLRS DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE WERE SPACED TOO CLOSE TO THE ACFT AHEAD AND THAT THE TWR SEEMED UNPREPARED FOR OUR MISSED APCH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT OF THIS MD80; SUPER 80; SAID THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AND UNPREPARED FOR THE CLOSE-IN TURN TO RWY 32. THE LAST INFO THAT HE RECALLED RECEIVING WAS TO EXPECT RWY 28R. THEREFORE; HE WAS TOO FAST; TOO CLOSE IN TO RWY 32 AND NOT YET CONFIGURED OR SLOWED FOR THE APCH. HE COULD NOT RECALL THE TYPE OF ACFT THAT HE WAS TO FOLLOW; BUT HE DID REMEMBER THAT HE WAS TOO CLOSE TO IT. THE FLC STARTED THEIR GAR ABOUT 1 MI FROM THE RWY WITH THE OTHER ACFT STILL ON THE RWY. HE SAID THAT DURING THE INITIAL CLB THE ATCT LCL CTLR; AND LATER THE DEP CTLR; POINTED OUT AT LEAST 2 ACFT THAT THE CREW HAD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM WHILE ACCOMPLISHING THEIR OTHER DUTIES. THE RPTR CHARACTERIZED THE CTLRS AS BEING UNPREPARED FOR THIS CONTINGENCY.