CAPT OF AN MD82 LEVELED OFF AND TURNED FOR PRECAUTIONARY AVOIDANCE IN RESPONSE TO A TCASII ALERT.

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WE DEPARTED RSW ARPT AND FLEW THE ALICO 2 DEP. RSW DEP HANDED US OFF TO ZMA AND GAVE US A 360 DEG HDG AND TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 14000 FT. WE SHOULD ALSO LOOK FOR TFC AT 11-12 O'CLOCK; X MI SBOUND AT 15000 FT MSL; CLB WILL BE REF THAT TFC. THE CAPT AND I BOTH HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT AND HE INSTRUCTED ME TO 'CALL THE TFC' TO ZMA. ZMA THEN ISSUED US A CLB CLRNC TO SOME ALT 'AT OR ABOVE' FL230 REF THAT TFC. AS WE BEGAN A SLOW CLB WE BOTH HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE TFC AND I COMMENTED 'WE BETTER CLB SLOW OR WE'LL GET AN RA ON THIS GUY.' THE CAPT REPLIED 'YEAH; THAT'S WHY I'M CLBING SLOW.' HE WAS CLBING AT LESS THAN 500 FPM. AS THE TFC PASSED OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS; WE RECEIVED A TA. AS THE TFC PASSED OUR 9 O'CLOCK POS; WE RECEIVED AN RA TO MONITOR VERT CLB. EVEN THOUGH WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT AND KNEW THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT; THE CAPT TURNED THE ACFT 20 DEGS R AND LEVELED OR MAYBE EVEN SLIGHTLY DSNDED. FROM THE 'TA' TO THE 'CLR OF CONFLICT' MESSAGE WAS APPROX 20-30 SECONDS. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THIS AT LENGTH AFTER THE FLT AND STILL AGREED THAT WE ACTED APPROPRIATELY. THERE IS NO DIRECTION IN OUR GENERAL OPS MANUAL OR FLC OPERATING MANUAL STATING THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DEVIATE BASED ON A TA. THE RA DID NOT LAST LONG ENOUGH TO EVEN FACILITATE MORE OF A REACTION THAN WAS ACCOMPLISHED. IN RETROSPECT AND IN LOOKING TO THE FUTURE (I WILL BE IN CAPT UPGRADE IN A FEW MONTHS) I HAVE DECIDED NOT TO ACCEPT VISUAL CLBS OR DSCNTS; AS THIS PLACES TOO MUCH RESPONSIBILITY ON THE PLT. ALSO; I HAVE NO INTENTION OF ACCEPTING VISUAL APCHS BASED ON FOLLOWING ANOTHER ACFT.