PLT LANDS OFF RWY AT RAP AFTER BEING UNABLE TO CLB IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF.

Narrative

ON TKOF FROM THE RAPID CITY ARPT; THE ACFT COULD NOT DEVELOP ENOUGH LIFT AND LANDED ADJACENT TO THE RWY. NO ONE WAS INJURED AND THE ACFT SUSTAINED NO DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT. 1/2 HR BEFORE THE INCIDENT; I HAD LANDED ON A XING RWY TO THE ONE THAT I USED FOR TKOF. IT WAS SHORTER (3600 FT) BUT THE WINDS WERE ALIGNED DIRECTLY DOWN THE RWY. THE RPTS FROM THE TWR WERE THAT WINDS WERE OUT OF THE W AT 25-26 KTS. AFTER LNDG; AND TAKING ON FUEL AND 1 PAX FOR THE TRIP; WE TAXIED TO RWY 32. THE WINDS WERE PERPENDICULAR TO THE RWY. THE DENSITY ALT WAS A BIT OVER 5000 FT AND THE ACFT WAS WITHIN 100 LBS OF GROSS WT. ON ROLL; IT REQUIRED FULL AILERON AND FULL RUDDER DEFLECTION TOWARDS THE WIND TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL DOWN THE RWY. I ROTATED AT ABOUT 95 KTS AND LIFTED OFF SHORTLY AFTER THAT. IMMEDIATELY AFTER LIFTOFF THE ACFT STARTED TO DRIFT TO THE R PUSHING THE ACFT AWAY FROM THE RWY. IN ADDITION; THE ACFT WAS NOT ABLE TO GET OUT OF GND EFFECT. THE ACFT LANDED ADJACENT TO THE RWY AND ABOUT 2/3 OF THE WAY DOWN THE RWY. WHAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT WAS A COMBINATION OF 2 THINGS WITH AN OVERRIDING PRE-PLANNING ISSUE. THE 2 EVENTS THAT MAY HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE AT TKOF WERE: 1) APPROPRIATE TRANSITION FROM GND TO FLT CONDITIONS. IN VISITING WITH THE FAA FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT; THEY INDICATED THAT THE MARKS ON THE GND WHEN THE ACFT LANDED INDICATED THAT IT WAS TRAVELING STRAIGHT; DESPITE THE PERPENDICULAR WINDS. THIS MEANT THAT THE ACFT WAS SLIPPING THROUGH THE AIR AND WAS NOT DEVELOPING ENOUGH LIFT TO CARRY IT AWAY FROM THE SURFACE. I BELIEVE THAT AFTER TRANSITIONING TO FLT; I CONTINUED TO HOLD FULL RUDDER DEFLECTION IN AN ATTEMPT TO SLIP DOWN THE RWY RATHER THAN CRABBING INTO THE WIND. 2) ACCELERATING TO 'BLUE LINE' BEFORE TKOF. SPD COULD HAVE ALLOWED ME TO 'POP' OFF THE RWY GIVING ME AN ADDITIONAL MEASURE OF SAFETY. THE OBVIOUS PLANNING ISSUE WOULD HAVE BEEN TO ACCEPT THE SHORTER RWY GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF THE WINDS. WHAT I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS INCIDENT ARE 2 THINGS: 1) THE MOST IMPORTANT THING I LEARNED WAS THAT I DIDN'T TRANSITION FROM GND TO FLT CONDITIONS WHEN FACED WITH SIGNIFICANT XWINDS. FAILING TO 'KEEP THE BALL IN THE MIDDLE' AFTER I TRANSITIONED TO FLT CREATED; FOR ME; A 2 DAY FAA HEADACHE AND A FRIENDLY REMINDER THAT WX CAN BE UNFORGIVING DURING THOSE 'CRITICAL' MOMENTS IN FLT. 2) THE FAA IS NOT AN ADVOCATE FOR THE PVT PLT. THEIR APCH WAS TO FIND SOME WAY OF 'NAILING' ME WITH A VIOLATION. AFTER 2 DAYS OF INTERROGATION BY THE FAA; THEY FOUND THAT I WAS NON COMPLIANT WITH 1 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE FOR THE ACFT. COINCIDENT WITH THE DISCOVERY; WE HAD THE FBO CONDUCT THE NON COMPLIANT AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE INSPECTION; AND DISCOVERED NO PROB. ALTHOUGH THEIR INSPECTION DOES NOT EXCUSE ME FROM NON COMPLIANCE; THIS 1 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE REPRESENTED 3 PAGES OF OTHER AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES THAT WERE IN COMPLIANCE. I ERRED; BECAUSE I USED THE SVC BULLETIN RATHER THAN THE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE FOR INTERPING THE INTERVAL OF INSPECTION.