MD88 CREW TAXIED ONTO ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative

TAXIED ONTO RWY 23L; AN ACTIVE RWY; WITHOUT CLRNC. WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI FROM GATE TO RWY 23L. WE TAXIED FROM THE RAMP VIA TXWY A5 ONTO THE ACTIVE; INSTEAD OF RAMP TO TXWY A8 TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 23L. RDU GND CTL CALLED IT TO OUR ATTN AS THE ACFT NOSE CROSSED THE RWY BOUNDARY LINE. THE CAPT RECOGNIZED IT SIMULTANEOUSLY AS HE OBSERVED RWY RED CTRLINE LIGHTS. GND CTL THEN CLRED US TO BACK-TAXI FOR TKOF. APOLOGIES WERE MADE. THERE WAS NO OTHER TFC AND NO CONFLICTS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) FATIGUE. CAPT WAS FLYING THE MAX HRS WITHIN FAA RULES. HE FLEW 7 DAYS IN A ROW. THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF A 4 DAY TRIP. PREVIOUS LEG WAS DELAYED 1 HR DUE TO MAINT. SUBSEQUENTLY; CREW WAS RUSHING TO MAKE UP LOST TIME. 2) SPLITTING OF CREW DUTIES. FO WAS STARTING SECOND ENG UPON INITIAL TAXI AND DURING RWY INCURSION. TAXI SPD WAS NORMAL; BUT TIME AVAILABLE FROM RAMP TO TKOF WAS SHORT (NO OTHER ACFT AND NEAR APCH END). THIS IS NORMAL PROC; BUT DENIES ONE PLT AS BACKUP TO THE OTHER. 3) UNFAMILIAR ARPT AT NIGHT. CAPT MAY NOT HAVE FLOWN INTO RDU FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. ALSO; IT WAS NIGHT OPS. HIS IMPRESSION WAS; HE NEEDED TO EXIT THE RAMP AND JOIN THE PARALLEL TXWY WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE THE RWY ITSELF. THE CAPT POORLY REVIEWED THE ARPT DIAGRAM. 4) FO FAILED TO MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON CAPT'S TAXI WHILE BUSY STARTING THE SECOND ENG AND RUNNING GND CHKS. PREVENTIVE MEASURES: THIS WAS A CREW MISTAKE. WHEN ONE CREW MEMBER IS FATIGUED OR NOT AT 100%; THE ENTIRE CREW SHOULD SLOW DOWN PROCS AND CAREFULLY COMPLETE ALL STEPS.