PA28 INSTRUCTOR AND PLT WERE REQUIRED TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION DEPARTING BED ARPT.

Narrative

THIS WAS A TRAINING FLT (BFR) THAT WAS BEING CONDUCTED BY ME. MY STUDENT; A PVT-INST RATED PLT WAS FLYING THE AIRPLANE ON THE L SIDE. I WAS SEATED ON THE R. WE DEPARTED RWY 23 AT BEDFORD WITH THE INTENT TO HEAD TOWARDS OUR PRACTICE AREA NW OF THE FIELD 12 NM AWAY. WE MADE A NORMAL TKOF AND CLBOUT TO THE PRACTICE AREA. VISIBILITY WAS GOOD AT THE TIME; ALTHOUGH WE WERE FLYING INTO THE SUN. AS WE CONTINUED OUR CLBOUT THROUGH 2500 FT (ESTIMATED); MY STUDENT OBSERVED TFC OFF OF OUR L SIDE. MY STUDENT TOOK IMMEDIATE ACTION TURNING AND CLBING TO THE R. THE DASH 8 ACFT TURNED AWAY AND TO THEIR R. DURING OUR CLBOUT MY STUDENT AND I HAD OUR ATTN OUTSIDE THE AIRPLANE. HOWEVER; BECAUSE WE WERE CLBING AND THE DASH 8 WAS DSNDING AT HIGH SPD MY STUDENT WAS UNABLE TO SEE THE OTHER ACFT UNTIL IT WAS IN CLOSE PROX. MY STUDENT'S ACTIONS WERE IMMEDIATE AND DELIBERATE AND WE MADE A STEEP BANK AWAY FROM THE TFC. AT THE CLOSEST POINT I ESTIMATE OUR DISTANCE TO BE 500 FT FROM THE OTHER ACFT. THE DASH 8 SPD AT THE TIME HAS BEEN ESTIMATED BY ME TO BE IN EXCESS OF 150 KTS. OUR SPD AT THE TIME WAS BTWN 75 KTS AND 80 KTS. NO TA WAS NOTED BY ME TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO US BY THE TWR. WE WERE UNAWARE OF THE TFC CONFLICT UNTIL THE POINT WHEN WE SAW AND AVOIDED THE TFC. IN MY OPINION; THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS OR PRECAUTIONS THAT MY FLT COULD HAVE TAKEN; OR I COULD HAVE TAKEN TO AVOID THE SIT. I FEEL THAT DESPITE OUR EFFORTS TO SCAN FOR TFC; BECAUSE OF THE CLB ATTITUDE WE WERE IN; IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT US TO SEE THE TFC ANY SOONER; ESPECIALLY WITH THE DASH 8 DSNDING NOSE LOW AT HIGH VELOCITY.