A B737-800 FO MAKES AN EARLY TURN TO 030 DEGS FROM RWY 28L USING THE SFO 8 SID PROC FOR RWY 1R AT SFO; CA.

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THE FAVORED RWYS WERE 1L&R. ATIS AT XA51Z WAS INDICATING THAT RWYS 1L&R WERE BEING USED FOR DEP. WE AGAIN REVIEWED AND BRIEFED THE SFO 8 SID REF A RWY 1R DEP. AFTER RECEIVING THE FINAL WT AND BAL PAPERWORK; IT DID NOT CONTAIN THE NECESSARY INFO ALLOWING US TO UTILIZE RWYS 1L OR 1R. GND CTL WAS CALLED AND ADVISED WE WERE READY TO TAXI. THEY WERE ALSO ADVISED THAT WE WERE GOING TO REQUIRE RWYS 28L OR 28R DUE TO THE LACK OF PERFORMANCE DATA NECESSARY TO UTILIZE RWYS 1L&R. PRIOR TO TAXIING OUT; GND CTL REVISED THE INITIAL CLB ALT TO 3000 FT. NO HDG INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED AS WAS GIVEN TO ACFT THAT HAD DEPARTED JUST BEFORE US. WE CONTINUED ON RWY HDG UNTIL APPROX 1000 FT; NO OTHER AIR TFC WAS VISUALLY OBSERVED IN OUR PROJECTED FLT PATH AND A TURN TO A 030 DEG HDG WAS INITIATED. BAY DEP THEN INSTRUCTED US TO CONTINUE THE TURN TO A 050 DEG HDG UPON REACHING 10 NM. SINCE THIS WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE 030 DEG HDG THAT WAS BEING TURNED TO; BUT IN THE SAME GENERAL DIRECTION; NOTHING SEEMED AMISS. AT APPROX 2000 FT; BAY DEP REQUESTED THAT WE STOP THE TURN ON A 010 DEG HDG AND REISSUED THE 3000 FT CLB LIMIT. WE WERE ADVISED BY BAY DEP THAT IT APPEARED THAT WE HAD INITIATED THE TURN PREMATURELY. WE WERE REQUESTED TO CONTACT THE SFO TWR WATCH SUPVR AFTER ARRIVING IN SLC. I MENTIONED THAT I HAD FLOWN THE SFO 8 DEP MANY TIMES FROM BOTH RWY 28 AND RWY 1. AND ON A LARGE NUMBER OF OCCASIONS MADE THE TURN TO 030 DEGS RIGHT AFTER DEP. AFTER INITIATING THE TURN; ALL THE ATC INSTRUCTIONS APPEARED TO FIT INTO THE DEP PROC; INCLUDING THE REVISED ALT THAT WE WERE GIVEN FOR THE SFO 8 ALT LIMITATION. WITH CLR SKIES AND UNLIMITED VISIBILITY; AND NO OBSERVED TFC IN THE AREA OR TCASII ALERTS OR TFC SHOWN IN OUR VICINITY; THE TURN ON COURSE SEEMED CONSISTENT WITH THE SFO 8 DEP WE HAD BRIEFED. HE COMMENTED ON THE INITIAL INTXN (NORMM ON THE SFO VORTAC 281 DEG RADIAL) AS TO WHERE WE SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED ONTO PRIOR TO ANY TURNS. AGAIN; AFTER REVIEWING THE SFO 8 SID WHILE ON THE PHONE TO HIM; HIS OBSERVATION WAS; OF COURSE; CORRECT. AS IT APPEARS; WE CONDUCTED THE SFO 8 SID DEP PROCS FOR RWYS 1L&R WHILE ACTUALLY UTILIZING RWY 28L. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 505273: THE LOGBOOK HAD SEVERAL DIFFERENT MCO'S ALL OF WHICH REQUIRED TIME TO RESEARCH PRIOR TO DEP. ONE OF THE MCO'S HAD INDICATED THAT IT HAD EXPIRED. MAINT HAD TO BE CALLED TO HAVE THE PAPERWORK CHKED (ALTHOUGH SIGNED OFF; THE MCO STICKER HAD NOT BEEN REMOVED). THE ACFT REQUIRED DEICE DUE TO FUEL INDUCED ICE FORMATION ON THE R WING. THESE ITEMS WERE ACCOMPLISHED IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL PREFLT. UPON LOADING THE FMS; IT DID NOT ALLOW THE SELECTION OF RWY 1R WITH THE SFO 8 SID; ALTHOUGH THE SID DID ALLOW THIS RWY/DEP COMBINATION. THIS CREATED THE MINDSET OF EXECUTING THE DEP WITHOUT THE FMS. NO RWY DATA EXISTED FOR RWY 1R. THIS CAUSED THE RWY CHANGE AT A HIGH WORKLOAD TIME (PUSHBACK). THE FO HAD TAKEN HIS CHK RIDE MORE THAN 2 MONTHS AGO; YET HAD 65 HRS IN THE ACFT AND ONLY 65 HRS IN A CTL SEAT. THE CAPT WAS HIGHLY EXPERIENCED AND FAMILIAR WITH THE SFO AREA. THE FAILURE TO PROPERLY CONFIRM THE DEP AFTER A RWY CHANGE BEING INITIATED ON OUR PART OCCURRED AT A BUSY TIME (PUSHBACK). ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ITEMS IS THE SELF-IMPOSED URGENCY FACTOR THAT SEEMS TO OCCUR AT PUSHBACK TIME. IF IT IS TIME TO PUSH BACK AND A RWY /DEP CHANGE OR SOME OTHER CHANGE OCCURS THAT CHANGES INITIAL PLANNING; ONE MUST MAKE TIME TO CONFIRM ALL ASPECTS OF THE FLT UNTIL COMFORTABLE.