A J-4100 CAPT RPTED THAT HE VIOLATED A COMPANY RULE BY TAKING OFF; WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH MAINT AFTER AN ABORTED TKOF.

Narrative

I WAS THE PF FLYING THE ACFT THIS LEG. EARLY INTO THE TKOF ROLL ON RWY 16; WE RECEIVED A CONFIGN WARNING. I CALLED FOR THE ABORT AND BEGAN THE LOW-SPD ABORT PROCESS. WHILE ROLLING OUT; I PRESSED FORWARD ON THE FUEL CONDITION LEVERS TO CONFIRM THAT THEY HAD SLID BACK FROM 100 DEGS (FULL) POS. THIS IS A COMMON CAUSE OF CONFIG WARNINGS ON THE J41. ONCE CLR OF THE RWY; I INCREASED THE FRICTION CTL ON CONDITION LEVERS TO MAX TO INSURE THEY WOULDN'T SLIDE BACK AGAIN. WE NOTIFIED THE TWR AND REQUESTED TAXI TO RWY 16. WE CALLED OUR COMPANY OPS AND THERE WAS NO REPLY. WE SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO OUR DISPATCH AND ADVISED OF THE ABORT. ONCE IN OUR BASE; AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL SECOND TKOF; I RPTED THE ABORT TO THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE. THE CHIEF PLT WAS CONCERNED THAT I DID NOT FOLLOW A RECENTLY ISSUED FILE INSTRUCTING CREWS TO CONTACT DISPATCH AND MAINT BEFORE ATTEMPTING A SECOND TKOF; EVEN IN A NON-MAINT RELATED ABORT; SUCH AS A CONFIG ALERT. THERE IS A STATEMENT IN THE SAME FILE THAT SAYS 'SOMETIMES; MAINT MAY NEED TO DETERMINE IF AN ACFT SYS OPERATED OUTSIDE OF PARAMETERS.' AS THIS WAS A NORMAL SYS OP; I FELT NO NEED TO HAVE CONTACTED MAINT; AS THE CONFIGN SYS OPERATED CORRECTLY. ACCORDING TO THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE THE FAA HAS MANDATED THE NEW POST-ABORT DISPATCH-MAINT CONFERENCE PRIOR TO A SECOND TKOF.