A FLT OF 4 F16'S EXPERIENCE A SPILLOUT FROM A RESTR AREA WHEN THE LEAD PLT FAILS TO TAKE THE WINDS ALOFT INTO CONSIDERATION DURING A JOIN-UP TURN OFF FREQ WITH ZMA; FL.

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ON JAN/FRI/02; AS FLT LEAD OF 3 F16'S WITH A 4TH F16 ATTEMPTING TO REJOIN; I DECIDED TO HOLD IN THE S EXTENSION OF R2901 TO FACILITATE THE REJOIN. THE WINDS AT ALT WERE 300 DEGS AT 100 KTS. WHILE HOLDING; I FAILED TO TAKE THE STRONG NW WIND INTO ACCOUNT AND STRAYED 3-5 NM S OF THE CONFINES OF R2901. WHILE IN A TURN BACK N TOWARD R2901; WE VISUALLY ACQUIRED AN AIRBUS AND MANEUVERED SO AS TO REMAIN 2-3 NM LATERALLY AND 1000 FT VERTLY FROM THE AIRBUS. UPON RETURNING TO BASE; I CALLED ZMA TO GIVE DETAILS AND EXPRESS MY APOLOGY FOR PRESENTING ATC WITH A PERCEIVED POTENTIAL CONFLICT. I FURTHER EXPLAINED THE CAUSE OF MY ERROR (TOO LAZY OF A TURN WITH STRONG WINDS) AND ASKED FOR INFO REGARDING THE AIRBUS PLT'S DEST TO ATTEMPT CONTACT WITH HIM AND PERSONALLY APOLOGIZE. THROUGH THIS EXPERIENCE; I HAVE RELEARNED FIRST HAND THE VALUE OF 'AVIATE' (TAKE WINDS INTO ACCOUNT EVEN DURING A BENIGN PORTION FO THE FLT); 'NAVIGATE' (KNOW YOUR WHEREABOUTS AT ALL TIMES); AND 'COMMUNICATE' (LET SOMEONE KNOW THE SIT ASAP!).