AN LJ24 CAPT; ON APCH TO PDX; LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; DEVIATING FROM NORMAL PROCS; RELYING ON HIS FO TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY GUIDANCE TO COMPLETE THE APCH.

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THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT WITH A NEW CAPT. THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY WITH STANDARD CALLOUTS; CHKLIST USAGE; ETC. THE ONLY UNUSUAL ASPECT WAS THE AUTOPLT; WHICH DIDN'T SEEM TO WANT TO TRACK A HDG. THE CAPT WAS FLYING; AND COMPENSATED BY MAKING CORRECTIONS USING THE MANUAL ROLL CTL KNOB. ON ARR AT PORTLAND; WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS TO JOIN THE LOC; TOLD TO DSND TO AND MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED; REDUCE SPD TO 170 KTS AND WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS. I ENTERED THE ALT IN THE ALERTER; READ BACK THE RESTRS AND CLRNC; AND OBTAINED CONCURRENCE FROM THE CAPT. HE DEPLOYED THE SPOILERS TO SLOW US; AND I PROCEEDED WITH THE CHKLIST. I HEARD THE ALT ALERTER CHIME AND SAW THAT WE WERE BELOW 4000 FT AND DSNDING. I CALLED 'ALT;' AND GOT NO RESPONSE. AIRSPD WAS STILL SLOWING. I CALLED FOR AIRSPD AND ALT; WITH NO RESPONSE. WE REACHED 3500 FT; WERE STILL SLOWING (150 KIAS; NO FLAPS; SPOILERS DEPLOYED; GEAR UP) AND DSCNT RATE SLOWED 1500 FPM DOWN. I PUT MY HAND ON THE THRUST LEVERS; GRABBED THE CTL COLUMN TO BACK IT UP; AND YELLED 'ALT! CLB; CLB; CLB!' I PUSHED THE PWR TO TKOF PWR; AND ATTEMPTED TO RETRACT THE SPOILERS. THE CAPT HELD HIS THUMB OVER THE SWITCH; PREVENTING ME FROM RETRACTING THE SPOILERS. HE RETARDED THE PWR TO FLT IDLE; AND CONTINUED TRIMMING UP. I AGAIN PUSHED THE PWR UP AND YELLED 'AIRSPD! YOU'RE SLOW! CLB; CLB; CLB!' FINALLY; THE CAPT RESPONDED 'OK; YOU DON'T NEED TO YELL;' AND HE STOPPED TRYING TO PULL THE THRUST LEVERS TO IDLE. HE BEGAN A CLB. HE CALLED FOR FLAPS 8 DEGS; AND THEN STATED THAT HE HAD NO GS. I LOOKED; AND SAW THAT HIS GS INDICATORS WERE BOTH FLAGGED. MINE WAS NOT. I TOLD HIM I HAD TUNED AND IDENTED; AND WAS STILL GETTING A GOOD IDENT ON BOTH SIDES. I INFORMED HIM I HAD A GS INDICATION ON MY SIDE. HE SAID HE WOULD JUST DSND USING THE LOC; AND TO BACK HIM UP. HE TOLD ME TO PUT THE NEXT ALT IN THE ALERTER AND TO GUIDE HIM ON THE GS. I TOLD HIM THE NEXT ALT WAS DECISION HT; WITH NO STEP-DOWN FIXES. I TOLD THE CAPT THAT I HAD A WEAK INDICATION. I SAID WE WERE NOW FULL DEFLECTION; AND SHOULD EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. WE WERE THEN ABOVE THE GS; FULLY DEFLECTED; AND HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO CORRECT WITH AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF DSCNT. I TOLD THE CAPT AGAIN WE WERE FULLY DEFLECTED; THAT I HAD A WEAK GS; AND THAT HE COULD FLY IT OFF MY SIDE. IT WAS EVIDENT HE WAS NOT GOING MISSED. I RECOMMENDED THE MISSED; THEN RECOMMENDED HE FLY MY INDICATION. I ALSO SUGGESTED I COULD CONTINUE THE APCH FROM MY SIDE; AS THE GS BEGAN COMING IN FROM BELOW AGAIN. AT THIS POINT WE BEGAN TO BREAK OUT AND PROCEEDED VISUALLY TO A LNDG. ON THE GND; THE CAPT BLAMED HIS INOP GS INDICATORS FOR HIS REASON ON GOING LOW; STATING HE DIDN'T KNOW WE WERE SUPPOSED TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED. I ASKED HIM WHERE HE PLANNED TO GO SINCE WE WEREN'T ESTABLISHED; WERE ONLY JUST GETTING THE LOC ALIVE; AND HE HAD NO GS INDICATION AND THE ALT ALERTER CLRLY WAS SET FOR 4000 FT. HE SAID HE FIGURED I WOULD DIRECT HIM IN GETTING DOWN. I TOLD HIM THAT'S HOW PEOPLE GET KILLED; AND THAT WE SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH. WE HAD AMPLE FUEL TO GO MISSED; AND I TOLD HIM THAT AS HE HAD ELECTED NOT TO BRIEF THE APCH; WE SHOULD HAVE GONE MISSED AND BRIEFED A LOC-ONLY APCH RATHER THAN TRYING TO MAKE IT UP AS HE WENT. (HIS BRIEFING ON THE APCH; WHEN I CALLED FOR IT AT THE START OF THE APCH CHKLIST; HAD BEEN 'WELL; I GUESS IT'S THE ILS; AND THEY'LL PROBABLY GIVE US VECTORS.') ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF A NEW CREW FLYING TOGETHER; BUT AS A MATTER OF GENERAL PRACTICE; A FULL BRIEFING SHOULD ALWAYS BE CONDUCTED. IT WASN'T. IT WAS A FAILING ON THE PART OF THE PIC TO PERFORM IT; AND A FAILING ON MY PART TO INSIST. I FAILED TO CATCH THE RAPID DECELERATION AND ALT LOSS BECAUSE I DIVERTED MY ATTN TO THE CHKLIST. A GOOD PLT KEEPS AN ACTIVE SCAN AND DOESN'T GET SIDE-TRACKED BY FIXATION; CHKLIST; ETC. I FAILED TO DO THAT. AN INDUSTRY-STANDARD PROC DURING AN APCH IS THE 2-CALL RULE. IF THE PNF MAKES A CALL TWICE WITH NO RESPONSE; THE PNF IS TO ASSUME INCAPACITATION AND TAKE CTL. WHILE I DIDPUSH THE PWR UP; GUARD THE YOKE; AND ATTEMPT TO RETRACT THE SPOILERS; I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE IN DOING SO; AND MORE ASSERTIVE. I SHOULD HAVE CLRLY STATED WHAT I WAS DOING AND WHY; AS I DID IT. I SHOULD HAVE INITIATED AND EXECUTED A MISSED APCH. I FAILED TO DO THAT. INSTEAD; I ALLOWED A CAPT WHO WAS CLRLY BEHIND THE AIRPLANE TO CONTINUE WITHOUT KNOWING THE CAUSE; THE CAPT'S PERSONALITY OR ABILITIES. IMC ON AN APCH IS NOT A GOOD TIME TO FIND OUT. YELLING COMMANDS AND TAKING CTL IS A VERY EXTREME MEASURE. IT DOESN'T BECOME NECESSARY OFTEN IN ONE'S CAREER -- IT'S A RARITY. IN THIS CASE; I DID NOT ACT DECISIVELY ENOUGH OR QUICKLY ENOUGH; BUT I CERTAINLY WILL IN THE FUTURE. I FLEW THE LEG HOME; THE APCH; AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT.