B737-200 CAPT MADE 2 GAR'S DURING IOE FLT AT THE FIRST OF THE 5 SCHEDULED STOPS DUE TO FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS FROM THE CHK PLT.

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THIS EVENT OCCURRED DURING THE FINAL STAGES OF A PART 121 AIRLINE FLT FROM DEN TO ABQ. AS CAPT IN TRAINING ON MY VERY FIRST FLT OF IOE; I HAD A COMPANY CHK AIRMAN IN THE R SEAT; AND A NEW HIRE FO OBSERVER IN THE JUMPSEAT. OUR ACFT WAS IN THE FINAL STAGES OF THE ARR WHEN THIS EVENT BEGAN. APPROX 20 MI FROM THE ABQ ARPT; WE WERE CLRED BY ABQ APCH FROM OUR INTERMEDIATE STEP-DOWN ALT DOWN TO 8000 FT. I HAD PLANNED MY TOP-OF-DSCNT CAREFULLY; BUT APPARENTLY; WE HAD SIGNIFICANT TAILWINDS THROUGHOUT OUR DSCNT; MAKING IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE DSCNT RATE AND TO GRADUALLY SLOW OUR B737-200 ACFT. I HAD ALREADY EXTENDED LNDG GEAR TO CREATE DRAG TO ASSIST WHEN WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 8. SEEING WE WERE A BIT HIGH; I TURNED APPROX 20 DEGS S TO CREATE A SLIGHTLY ANGLING BASE LEG SO AS TO LOSE ALT; AT WHICH POINT MY CHK AIRMAN AGGRESSIVELY ASKED 'WHY ARE YOU TURNING AWAY FROM THE ARPT?' I RESPONDED BY TELLING HIM THAT WE WERE SLIGHTLY HIGH; BUT IN RETROSPECT I'M NOT SURE HE HEARD ME. I TURNED BACK TOWARD THE ARPT; AND CONTINUED TO SLOW THE ACFT TO A POINT WHERE WE COULD SAFELY EXTEND FLAPS TO 15 AND GET ONTO PROFILE. WE WERE 6 MI FROM THE RWY; PASSING THROUGH APPROX 8900 FT; APPROX 3500 FT ABOVE THE ARPT ELEVATION. BY 7000 FT; IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THIS APCH WAS NEVER GOING TO WORK. I STATED THIS FACT OUT LOUD; SAID I WAS GOING AROUND; AND ASKED MY CHK AIRMAN TO TELL ATC AND TO GET US A R TURN VECTOR BACK TO THE FINAL FOR RWY 8. HE DID NOT RESPOND RIGHT AWAY. I REPEATED MY REQUEST; TO WHICH HE REPLIED; 'HOW ABOUT A BASE TO RWY 3 INSTEAD?' AWARE THAT OUR FLT WAS LATE; I AGREED TO DO THIS; AND ASKED MY CHK AIRMAN TO LOOK OUTSIDE AND CALL MY BASE LEG TURN FOR RWY 3; SINCE HE COULD SEE THE RWY MUCH BETTER THAN I COULD. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 3. I ASKED MY CHK AIRMAN IF IT LOOKED GOOD TO START MY TURN. HE SAID YES. I BEGAN BANKING TOWARDS THE RWY; CONFIGURING FINAL FLAPS FOR LNDG; AND IN MY EFFORT TO LINE UP WITH THE RWY; INADVERTENTLY OVER BANKED THE ACFT SO THAT THE 'BANK ANGLE' ANNUNCIATOR SOUNDED. I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN CORRECTING; AND WITHIN SECONDS SAW THAT THIS WAS NOT GOING TO WORK. I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED ANOTHER GAR. WE WERE CLRED BACK UP TO 7000 FT; VECTORED BACK TO THE DOWNWIND FOR RWY 8; AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. IN NEARLY 20 YRS OF FLYING; I HAVE NEVER; EVER MANEUVERED AN ACFT WITH PAX ON BOARD IN A MANNER WHERE I EXCEEDED 30 DEGS OF BANK; AND THIS INCIDENT SHOCKED AND EMBARRASSED ME. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SIT; AND I AM RESOLVED TO NEVER ALLOW EVEN ONE OF THESE INFLUENCES TO CREEP INTO MY COCKPIT AGAIN. ONE FACT WAS THAT THIS WAS A HIGH-INTENSITY WORKLOAD; SHORT-HOP FLT; ESPECIALLY FOR A BRAND NEW CAPT. THE SECOND FACTOR WAS THAT BECAUSE THIS INITIAL FLT TO ABQ WAS 1 OF 5 LEGS TO BE FLOWN THAT DAY; I WAS ACUTELY AWARE OF THE NEED TO KEEP OUR FLT ON TIME. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THAT BECAUSE THE CHK AIRMAN AND FO JUMPSEAT OBSERVER WERE NEIGHBORS; THEY WERE CONTINUALLY TALKING ABOUT UNRELATED SUBJECTS; WITH THE CHK AIRMAN OCCASIONALLY MAKING SARCASTIC REMARKS ASKING ME WHY I WAS DOING CERTAIN THINGS. THE FINAL; AND I BELIEVE MOST INFLUENTIAL FACTOR WAS THAT THIS CHK AIRMAN CAN BE AN ENIGMATIC; INTIMIDATING CHARACTER AT TIMES. HE IS ZEALOUS ABOUT SAVING FUEL; BRAKES; AND OTHER ACFT ELEMENTS. HE CONSTANTLY PUSHES PEOPLE HE'S FLYING WITH TO ADOPT HIS NON-STANDARD TECHNIQUES IN ORDER TO 'ENHANCE HIS BONUS CHK' (FOR FUEL SAVINGS). I FEEL THIS CHK AIRMAN FOSTERED A COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT WHERE CRM PRINCIPLES WERE NOT ALLOWED TO BE APPLIED. I FEEL THESE FACTORS CREATED A SIGNIFICANT LEVEL OF DISTR. I WAS NOT AGGRESSIVE ENOUGH IN DEMANDING WHAT I WANTED DURING OUR FIRST MISSED APCH PROC. I FEEL MY EFFORTS TO PLEASE THIS CHK AIRMAN LED ME TO MOMENTARILY MANEUVER THE AIRPLANE IN A WAY THAT I HAVE NEVER EVER DONE IN 17 YRS OF SAFE FLYING. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL AGGRESSIVELY MONITOR MY DSCNT PROFILE SO AS TO ALWAYS BE IN A POS FOR A NORMAL LNDG ON ANY VISUAL APCH; AND THE INSTANT I SENSE I AM OFF PROFILE; I WILL AGGRESSIVELY ASK FOR SPECIFIC VECTORS FOR A MISSED APCH OR GAR THAT WILL GIVE ME PLENTY OF TIME TO RECONFIGURE AND EVALUATE THE APCH FOR ALL ASPECTS OF SAFETY.