FLT CREW OF CL65 NEARLY PENETRATE P-56 DUE TO IMPROPERLY CONFIGURED VOR RECEIVERS.

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WE DEPARTED REAGAN NATIONAL; ASSIGNED RWY 1; P-56 AVOIDANCE PROC. THE P-56 AVOIDANCE PROC REQUIRES AN INTERCEPT AND TRACK OUTBOUND ON THE 328 DEG RADIAL OFF THE DCA VOR. PRIOR TO PUSHBACK; THE RADIOS WERE SET UP IN ERROR; WHERE IDCA WAS IN THE PRIMARY AND DCA WAS IN THE STANDBY. AFTER TKOF; AND CLBING THROUGH APPROX 400 FT AGL; A L TURN WAS INITIATED TO A HEADING OF 330 DEGS. THE NAVAID WAS INDICATING THAT WE WERE FAR W OFF COURSE; (FULL SCALE). I FELT THIS WAS A NORMAL INDICATION SINCE WE ROTATED AND BEGAN OUR TURN AT OR BEFORE XING THE DCA VOR; AND THAT WE WERE INSIDE OR W OF THE 328 DEG RADIAL. AS WE CLBED OUT; I STARTED A GRADUAL TURN TO A HEADING OF APPROX 340 DEGS; TO INTERCEPT THE 328 DEG RADIAL. AS WE CONTINUED TO CLB OUT ON THE 340 DEG HEADING; ATC QUERIED US AS TO WHAT HEADING WE WERE ON. WE ADVISED THEM 'THREE-FORTY.' ATC THEN ASKED WHY WE WERE ON THAT HEADING. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT I NOTICED IDCA HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY SELECTED; AND DCA WAS STILL IN STANDBY. I BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE TURN TO THE L TO AVOID P-56. I BELIEVE THAT AT THE TIME ATC WAS INQUIRING ABOUT OUR HEADING; WE WERE HEADING TOWARD THE NAVAL OBSERVATORY; UNTIL IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN. I BELIEVE WE DID NOT PENETRATE P-56. A MAJOR FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT WAS DUE TO THE CLOSENESS IN STATION IDENTIFIERS BTWN THE LOC FOR RWY 1; AND THE DCA VOR; (IDCA; DCA). I WOULD HIGHLY RECOMMEND RENAMING POSSIBLY THE LOC IDENTIFIER SO AS TO DIFFERENTIATE IT FROM THE VOR; (FOR EXAMPLE; IREA). ANOTHER FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WERE THE WINDS ALOFT. THEY WERE INDICATING APPROX 20-25 KTS OUT OF THE W. NO CORRECTION WAS GIVEN TO THIS; SINCE WE WERE RECEIVING ERRONEOUS NAV INFO. LASTLY; PLT ERROR IN SETTING UP DEP NAV RADIOS. WHILE I WAS SETTING UP THE RADIO; I KNEW I HAD THE DCA VOR DIALED IN; AND I SAW 'DCA' AS THE SELECTED NAVAID; HOWEVER I DIDN'T NOTICE THE 'I' IN FRONT OF IT. I NEVER XFERRED THE STANDBY DCA FREQ TO THE PRIMARY NAV POS; THUS IT REMAINED IN THE STANDBY POS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 600726: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE BOTH PLTS' COMPLACENCY AND A LONG DAY OF WORK. PREVENTIVE ACTIONS COULD INCLUDE LESS PLT COMPLACENCY; BETTER INST SET-UP AND XCHK; AND BETTER CREW COORD.