FLT CREW OF CRJ200 RECEIVE PNEUMATIC DUCT WARNING ON TKOF. PROC REQUIRES A LNDG AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. 2 UNSTABLE APCHS IN WINDSHEAR CONDITIONS CONVINCE THE CREW THAT ZZZ1 IS UNSUITABLE AND THEY PROCEED SAFELY TO ZZZ2.

Narrative

I WAS THE PF. WE DEPARTED RWY 9L OUT OF ZZZ1 WITHOUT INCIDENT. AFTER REACHING A CLEAN CONFIGN AND CALLING FOR 'CLB THRUST;' WE WERE PASSING 3000 FT. IT WAS AT THIS TIME WE RECEIVED THE INITIAL MASTER WARNING; TRIPLE CHIME; AURAL 'BLEED AIR DUCT;' AND THE EICAS WARNING MESSAGE 'L 14TH DUCT.' THE CAPT XFERRED THE RADIOS TO ME AND PROCEEDED WITH THE 'L OR R 14TH DUCT' CHKLIST IN THE CFM. WE LET ATC KNOW WE WERE HAVING PROBS AND WE WOULD KEEP THEM UPDATED. DURING THE CLB; THE CAPT WAS GOING THROUGH THE CHKLIST. THE CHKLIST STATED IF THE WARNING PERSISTS FOR 40 SECONDS (IT DID) TO CLOSE THE 14TH STAGE 'SOV' AND OPEN THE 14TH STAGE 'ISOL' VALVE. AFTER DOING BOTH ITEMS; THE WARNING WENT AWAY. THE CHKLIST THEN STATES TO LEAVE THE AFFECTED THRUST LEVER AT IDLE AND LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. THE CAPT LET DEP KNOW OF OUR EMER (L ENG AT IDLE) AND OUR INTENT TO RETURN TO THE ARPT. THE CAPT THEN WENT OFF COM #1 TO ADVISE OPS OF OUR RETURN TO THE ARPT. I WAS ACCEPTING RADAR VECTORS AND ALT CHANGES FROM DEP AND THEN APCH; ONCE BEING HANDED OFF TO THEM. I HAD AT SOME POINT ASKED FOR FLAPS 8 DEGS AND 20 DEGS. I WAS GIVEN A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT AND JOIN THE LOC. ONLY AFTER QUICKLY GETTING THE FREQ AND SETTING THE RWY 9R APCH INTO THE FMS DID I REALIZE HOW CLOSE TO THE ARPT WE WERE. I ACCEPTED AN APCH CLRNC THE SAME TIME THE CAPT WAS COMING BACK TO COM #1. I SAW THE GS MOVE BELOW US AND I ASKED FOR GEAR DOWN. I PUT THE AUTOPLT IN VERT SPD MODE AT 1.0 TO 1.3 IN AN ATTEMPT TO CATCH THE GS. I HAD PULLED THE R (OPERATING) ENG TO IDLE IN AN ATTEMPT TO CTL THE AIRSPD. EVEN WITH BOTH THRUST LEVERS AT IDLE; HOWEVER; THE SPD CONTINUED TO INCREASE. WE GOT THE OVERSPD CLACKER AT 230 KTS. A FEW MOMENTS LATER WE GOT THE GPWS AURAL WARNING 'TERRAIN; TERRAIN' AND 'GS.' UPON HEARING ALL THE WARNINGS; I TURNED THE AUTOPLT OFF AND STARTED PULLING UP. WE XFERRED THE CTLS AND AT THAT TIME THE RWY CAME INTO SIGHT. WE WERE ALREADY IN A POS WHERE A SAFE APCH COULD NOT BE MADE AND WE STARTED A GAR. THE CAPT AND I BOTH AGREED WE NEEDED MORE TIME FOR ANOTHER APCH. I TOLD TWR WE WOULD LIKE TO DO ANOTHER APCH; BUT WE NEEDED DELAY VECTORS TO COMPLETE CHKLISTS. AFTER THE 'MISSED APCH/GAR' CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED; I STATED TO APCH THAT WE WERE READY FOR THE APCH. THE CAPT FLEW THE RADAR VECTORS AND WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND GS WITH FLAPS 20 DEGS AND GEAR DOWN. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH AND THEN HANDED OFF TO TWR. TWR CLRED US TO LAND; WE WERE ALSO NOTIFIED THAT THE 2 ACFT BEFORE US HAD GONE AROUND FOR WINDSHEAR WITH GAIN/LOSSES OF 20 KTS. SOON AFTER WE RECEIVED THE WINDSHEAR WARNING; AURAL 'WINDSHEAR; WINDSHEAR' AND ALPHA MARGIN ON THE PFD'S; A GAR WAS INITIATED. THE CAPT USED BOTH THRUST LEVERS ON THE GAR. WHEN I CALLED POSITIVE RATE; WE ONCE AGAIN GOT THE WINDSHEAR WARNING. THE AURAL 'BLEED AIR DUCT' WAS ALSO GOING OFF BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL 'DUCT' WARNING MESSAGE RETURNED. AFTER CLRING THE SECOND WINDSHEAR; THE CAPT REDUCED THE L THRUST LEVER TO IDLE AND THE WARNING WENT OUT. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO CLEAN UP THE ACFT. I CALLED TWR AND LET THEM KNOW OF OUR GAR DUE TO WINDSHEAR WITH FINAL GAINS AND LOSSES OF 30 KTS. WE BOTH AGREED THAT GOING TO ZZZ2 WOULD BE A BETTER CHOICE. WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO ZZZ2. APCH GAVE US RADAR VECTORS TO RWY 1R AND A SUCCESSFUL LNDG WAS MADE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 634421: I THEN NOTICED THAT MY FO WAS HAVING SOME PROBS WITH SPD CTL. THE THRUST LEVERS WERE AT IDLE AND THE AIRSPD WAS STILL INCREASING. UNABLE TO SLOW THE ACFT; WE RECEIVED THE OVERSPD CLACKER (230 KTS). MY FO SEEMED A LITTLE NERVOUS SO I ASKED IF SHE WANTED ME TO TAKE THE CTLS. SHE SAID YES AND WE ESTABLISHED A SMOOTH XFER OF CTLS USING STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY. AS I LOOK AT THE EVENTS OF THAT FLT; IT BECOMES VERY OBVIOUS THAT LACK OF CREW COM AND PLANNING PLAYED A HUGE PART IN THE PROBS THAT AROSE. I DID NOT PROPERLY CONVEY TO MY FO WHEN I WENT OFF OF RADIO #1 THAT WE WERE NOT TO ACCEPT AN APCH UNTIL WE HAD COMPLETED ALL PERTINENT CHKLISTS (INCLUDING A THOROUGH APCH BRIEF) AND WE BOTH WERE COMPLETELY READY TO START AN APCH. I THEN TRIED TO CATCH UP WITH MY FO RATHER THAN ASKING FOR A VECTOR OFF THE LOC TO HAVE MORE TIME. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT A STRONG URGE TO 'GET THE PLANE ON THE GND' CAUSED A POOR DECISION IN COMMENCING WHAT WAS ESSENTIALLY A SINGLE ENG APCH AT A TIME THAT POSSIBLE WINDSHEAR WAS PRESENT ON THE APCH. I BELIEVE THAT IF WE; AS A CREW; COMMUNICATED OUR INTENTIONS TO EACH OTHER BETTER AND SLOWED DOWN SUBSTANTIALLY (NOT LET NERVES OR ATC DECIDE WHEN WE WOULD GET THE PLANE ON THE GND); WE COULD HAVE MADE MUCH BETTER CHOICES AND AVOIDED PUTTING THE ACFT INTO SITS WHERE THE MARGIN FOR ERROR WAS GREATLY REDUCED.