A SUBTLE ENG FLAMEOUT CAUSED BY A FAILED FUEL PUMP DURING APCH TO ZZZZ; FO; RESULTS IN A SUCCESSFUL LNDG; BUT HOW THE SIT WAS HANDLED IS QUESTIONED AND CRITIQUED BY THE PF.

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ENG FAILURE ON FINAL APCH AT ZZZZ; FO. TO BEGIN; I WILL STATE THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL FLT EVENTS OCCURRING WITHIN A BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME; AND THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFUSION REGARDING WHAT PROB WE MAY HAVE HAD AND WHAT EVENTS WERE OCCURRING. HAVING SAID THIS; EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND ACTIONS TAKEN MAY HAVE A CERTAIN LEVEL OF UNINTENDED INACCURACY. THE DAY BEFORE; I CLRED MYSELF FROM THE SICK LIST. BECAUSE I FELT PRETTY GOOD THE PAST DAY AFTER COMING DOWN WITH THE 'SNIFFLES.' FLT WAS PROGRESSING NORMALLY WITH LITTLE OR NOTHING TO INDICATE WE HAD A PROB. ON DSCNT; I DID NOTICE A BIT OF EAR BLOCKAGE BUT WAS ABLE TO CLR IT; AND NO ADVERSE EFFECTS REMAINED. THE CAPT AND I HAD DISCUSSED LNDG RWY; WHICH IS BASICALLY SOP BOTH THE CAPT AND I WERE QUITE FAMILIAR WITH ZZZZ; FO; HAVING FLOWN IN OFTEN AND FREQUENTLY. WE HAD COMPLETED THE DSCNT CHKLIST AND DONE MOST OF THE LNDG CHKLIST INCLUDING PUTTING THE AUTOBRAKES TO 2. ON VECTORS WITH ZZZZ APCH; WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED; AND WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 10 APCH AT APPROX 2 MI FROM THE OM; WE WERE ADVISED TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES; RETARDED THE THROTTLES TO IDLE; AND EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKES; WHILE THE CAPT DOUBLECHKED THE FREQ ASSIGNED WITH THAT ON THE APCH PLATE. I HAD REQUESTED FLAPS 1 DEG AND RECEIVED IT. THE CAPT CONTACTED TWR AND REQUESTED RWY FOR LNDG. AT THIS A FEW THINGS HAPPENED AT ONCE. WE CROSSED OM; I REQUESTED FLAPS 5 DEGS; THE CAPT NOTICED THAT THE L ENG OIL PRESSURE INDICATOR HAD TURNED RED; AND POINTED IT OUT TO ME; AND THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND. (I WILL STATE THAT WE BOTH HEARD CLRNC TO LAND; BUT NEITHER OF US KNEW WHICH RWY WE HAD ACTUALLY BEEN CLRED TO LAND ON; AND I FOR ONE; THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN CLRNC TO LAND ON RWY X.) AT THIS POINT; I THINK WE WERE TRYING TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB. BOTH OF US NOTICED THAT THE EPR; N1; AND EGT MATCHED; WHICH YOU WOULD EXPECT SINCE THEY WERE BOTH AT IDLE; BUT IT DIDN'T REALLY SINK IN THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE MATCHED. THE CAPT LATER STATED HE LOOKED FOR THE AMBER L ENG OIL PRESSURE ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT; BUT IT WAS NOT ILLUMINATED. THE CAPT STATED HE THOUGHT WE HAD AN INDICATOR MALFUNCTIONING. SIMULTANEOUSLY; I ADVANCED THE THROTTLES SLIGHTLY AND NOTICED THAT THE L ENG INDICATIONS DID NOT RESPOND. AT THE SAME TIME; I HAD BEEN STILL FLYING THE APCH AND BEGINNING A SLIGHT OFFSET TO THE R OF THE LOC IN ORDER TO MAKE A MORE GRADUAL TURN ONTO FINAL FOR RWY X; AND ASKED FOR THE GEAR TO BE EXTENDED; AND NOTED THAT THE CAPT PUT THE GEAR HANDLE DOWN AND I HEARD THE GEAR COMING DOWN. I WILL STATE; AT THIS TIME; I HAD NOT NOTICED ANY MASTER CAUTION (OR WARNING) LIGHT; NOR HAD I SEEN ANY EICAS MESSAGE INDICATIONS; INCLUDING 'L ENG SHUTDOWN' OR 'L ENG OIL PRESSURE;' OR ANY OTHER MESSAGES ONE WOULD ASSOCIATE WITH AN ENG FAILURE. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A LIGHT OR MESSAGE; BUT IF THERE WAS; NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I NOTED IT. THE CAPT AND I BEGAN A SHORT DISCUSSION REGARDING WHAT WE HAD; AND I ADVANCED AND RETARDED THE L THROTTLE AND HAD HIM LOOK AT THE ENG INDICATIONS. WE BOTH AGREED WE HAD AN ENG FAILURE. HE STATED WE SHOULD GO FLAPS 20 DEGS; WHICH I ASSUMED HE MEANT WE SHOULD SELECT FLAPS 20 DEGS AT THAT POINT; BUT IT ALSO CLICKED IN ME THAT WE WOULD DO A FLAPS 20 DEG APCH AND LNDG AS IS DICTATED IN THE QRH FOR A SINGLE ENG APCH/LNDG/GAR. I ASKED FOR FLAPS 20 DEGS; AND THE CAPT SELECTED IT. I ALSO NOTICED THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS MOVING INTO THE TKOF POS ON RWY X; THE RWY I THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON. I ASKED THE CAPT WHICH RWY WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON; AND HE QUERIED THE TWR. TWR REPLIED THAT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY Y. I BEGAN TO MANEUVER THE ACFT BACK TO RWY Y FINAL APCH COURSE; AND MENTIONED THAT I THOUGHT WE SHOULD DECLARE AN EMER. THE CAPT DID SO. NEITHER OF US DISCUSSED SWITCHING AND HAVING THE CAPT MAKE THE LNDG; AS IS REQUIRED AND I'M NOT SURE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRUDENT TO SWITCH CTLS AT THAT POINT. AT APPROX 400 FT; WE GOT AURAL WARNINGS OF 'TOO LOW; TERRAIN' OR SOMETHING. I RECOGNIZED THAT IT WAS DUE TO THE FLAPS BEING AT 20 DEGS INSTEAD OF 25 DEGS OR 30 DEGS; AND I SELECTED THE 'GND PROX FLAP OVERRIDE' SWITCH TO 'OVERRIDE.' I HAD PUT PWR UP SLIGHTLY ON THE GOOD ENG; IN ORDER TO HAVE SOME SPOOL UP IN THE EVENT OF A MISSED APCH; AND TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT TO BE IN A STABILIZED APCH BY 500 FT. BEING LIGHT; AND NOT STARTING THE EVOLUTION IN THE CLASSIC SIMULATOR TEXTBOOK SCENARIO (IE; AT 1 1/2 DOTS BELOW GS; GEAR DOWN AND FLAPS 20 DEGS) AND ADVANCING THE THROTTLES TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB; I ENDED UP XING THE THRESHOLD ON GS; BUT ABOUT VREF 30 +30. THE LNDG WAS FIRM AS I DID NOT WANT TO FLOAT; BUT THE REST OF THE LNDG AND ROLLOUT WERE NORMAL; AND WE CLRED THE RWY AND TAXIED TOWARD THE GATE. AS WE WERE TAXIING IN; I LOOKED DOWN AND NOTICED THE LNDG CHKLIST HAD OPEN ITEMS! ALTHOUGH WE ACCOMPLISHED THE NECESSARY ITEMS; WE LANDED WITHOUT CONFIRMING GEAR; FLAPS; AND SPOILERS; AND I HAD SELECTED GND PROX FLAP OVERRIDE SWITCH TO 'OVERRIDE' WITHOUT FIRST CONFIRMING IT WITH THE CAPT. THINGS HAPPENED SO FAST; WERE SOMEWHAT CONFUSING. WE ACCOMPLISHED WHAT HAD NEEDED TO BE DONE; BUT DIDN'T DO OUR CHKLISTS. I ALSO NOTICED 'STATUS' ON THE LOWER EICAS SCREEN. I SELECTED THE STATUS PAGE; AND THERE WAS A MESSAGE 'L ENG LP PUMP;' WHICH I ASSUME MEANS L ENG LOW PRESSURE FUEL PUMP FAILED; AND THE ENG SIMPLY FLAMED OUT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION. UP TO THAT POINT; WE HAD NO IDEA WHY THE ENG FAILED; WHETHER IT WAS BIRD STRIKES INTO BOTH ENGS; CONTAMINATED FUEL; NO OIL IN THE L ENG; OR SOMETHING ELSE. SEVERAL QUESTIONS COME TO MIND: SHOULD I HAVE BEGUN SLOWING DOWN SOONER? IT REALLY WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN A DIFFICULT TRANSITION AND MANEUVER TO ACCOMPLISH UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS; BUT WE DIDN'T KNOW THINGS WERE GOING TO GO INTO EMER CONDITION ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. STILL; IF I HAD BEEN SLOWER; WE MIGHT HAVE HAD TIME TO ANALYZE AND BE MORE FIRMLY IN CTL OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING. ON THE OTHER HAND; IF THE OTHER ENG HAD FAILED AT THAT POINT; WE PROBABLY COULD HAVE DEAD-STICKED IT IN IF NECESSARY. SHOULD WE HAVE XFERRED CTL OF THE ACFT? WHY WEREN'T THERE MORE CLR ANNUNCIATIONS OF ENG FAILURE; OR WHY DIDN'T WE RECOGNIZE THEM? SHOULD WE HAVE GONE AROUND AND BETTER ANALYZED WHAT WE HAD AND THEN CONDUCTED A MORE STABILIZED ENG-OUT APCH AND LNDG; EVEN THOUGH THE RWY WAS STRAIGHT AHEAD IN CLEAR VIEW? WHY DID I NOT MAKE MYSELF MORE CLEAR WHEN I MENTIONED THAT I WAS SELECTING THE 'GND PROX FLAP OVERRIDE' SWITCH TO THE CAPT? I THINK I MENTIONED WHAT I WAS DOING; BUT DID NOT HEAR A RESPONSE FROM HIM. LATER; HE TOLD ME HE HADN'T HEARD ME MENTION IT; NOR DID HE NOTE I HAD DONE IT. IT COULD HAVE LED TO DIRE CONSEQUENCES. EVEN THOUGH WE WERE EXTREMELY BUSY AND DISTR AS WE WENT THROUGH 1000 FT; AND EVEN THOUGH WE ACCOMPLISHED THE ITEMS AS NECESSARY; WHY DIDN'T WE TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AND MAKE SURE THE LNDG CHKLIST WAS COMPLETE? WHAT WOULD THE CONSEQUENCES HAVE BEEN IF WE HADN'T GOTTEN THE GEAR AND FLAPS OUT; OR LANDED WITH SPD BRAKES EXTENDED? FINALLY; SHOULD WE HAVE GONE AROUND AND BETTER ANALYZED WHAT HAND THEN CONDUCTED OUR CHKLISTS AND A MORE STABILIZED ENG-OUT APCH AND LNDG; EVEN THOUGH THE RWY WAS STRAIGHT AHEAD AND IN CLR VIEW; AND WE DIDN'T HAVE A CLR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT EXACTLY HAD HAPPENED? WHICH OPTION HAD THE GREATER LIKELIHOOD OF DISASTER AND SEVERITY OF DISASTER; VERSUS THE LIKELIHOOD OF POSITIVE OUTCOME?