FLT CREW OF ERJ ENCOUNTER RELUCTANCE BY MAINT CTLR TO ADDRESS MULTIPLE FLT SAFETY WARNING SYSTEM FAILURES. CAPT REFUSES ACFT WHEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF MEL REQUIREMENTS.

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WE WERE WAITING IN AN INDEFINITE HOLD FOR DEP DUE TO TSTMS WHEN WE GOT A 'RAD ALT 1 FAIL' ON EICAS ALONG WITH 'GPWS INOP' AND 'WINDSHEAR INOP.' AFTER LOOKING AT THE MEL AND QRH; I CONTACTED DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL. MAINT CTL TOLD ME THAT SINCE I HAD LEFT THE GATE I WAS ENRTE; AND TO WRITE IT UP AND IT WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN ZZZ2. HE HADN'T PULLED THE MEL BEFORE TELLING ME THIS. AFTER SOME PRODDING; HE DID READ THE MEL AND AGREED THAT MAINT NEEDED TO DEFER IT. HE STILL WOULD NOT SAY THAT WE NEEDED TO RETURN TO THE GATE. THE MAIN PROB WAS THE WINDSHEAR INOP. IT STATES TO AVOID WINDSHEAR; AND WE HAD TSTMS AND WINDSHEAR AT DEP AND AT DESTINATION. DISPATCH AGREED THAT WE COULDN'T CONTINUE WITH THIS DEFERRED; MAINT CTL DIDN'T AGREE. MAINT CTL COMMANDED ZZZ1 MAINT TO DEFER AND NOT REPLACE THE #1 RADIO ALTIMETER. AFTER DOING SO; MAINT CTL WANTED US TO DEPART AGAIN FOR ZZZ2. I REFUSED AND AGAIN CITED THE REASON WHY. DISPATCH CANCELLED THE FLT IN THE MEAN TIME; ENDING THE ARGUMENT. MAINT CTL THEN TRIED TO GIVE THE AIRPLANE TO A SECOND CREW (WHO STATED THE SAME PROB); AND A THIRD CREW. WHILE THE THIRD CREW WAS ARGUING WITH MAINT CTL; MAINT REPLACED THE RADIO ALTIMETER FIXING THE PROB. THE CHAIN HAD TO BE REPEATEDLY BROKEN. MAINT CTL DID ALL THEY COULD TO KEEP THE CHAIN OF EVENTS IN PLACE. THE WEAKNESS BEYOND MAINT CTL WAS THE MEL. FOR RADAR ALTIMETER #1 FAIL; IT NOTES THE ASSOCIATED FAILURES OF GPWS; NOT WINDSHEAR. THE TWO ARE TIED TOGETHER SO ONE MIGHT NOT THINK IT IS NECESSARY TO STATE THE WINDSHEAR. THIS CASE PROVES THE NEED. THE PRIMARY PROB IS MAINT CTL. FIRST THEY HAD A CANNED RESPONSE WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE BOOKS AND CONSIDERING THE SIT. THEN THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE NEED TO LOOK AT WINDSHEAR INOP AS A SEPARATE DEFERRAL. THEY WANTED TO SEND THE AIRPLANE OUT INCORRECTLY AND INADEQUATELY DEFERRED. THEN THEY TRIED TO PASS THE PROB ON. THIS IS MORE THAN A LEGALITY ISSUE; IT IS A SAFETY ISSUE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR ADVISED THAT THE COMPANY'S MAINT OPS CONSIDERS AN ACFT TO BE 'IN FLT' ONCE IT HAS LEFT THE GATE. HE ADVISES MAINT RESPONSE TO ANY RPTED ABNORMALITY ONCE THE ACFT HAS LEFT THE GATE IS TO 'FOLLOW THE PLT'S OPS HANDBOOK AND TO CONTACT US WHEN YOU ARE AT YOUR DEST.' THE RPTR STATED THE PRAGMATIC RESULT OF THIS PHILOSOPHY IS THE REFUSAL OF MAINT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AND TO ATTEMPT TO FORCE FLT CREWS TO CONTINUE TO THEIR DESTINATIONS WITH MECHANICAL IRREGULARITIES THEY MIGHT PERSONALLY CONSIDER TO BE UNACCEPTABLE. THIS HAPPENS EVEN; AS IN THIS CASE; WHEN THE ACFT IS PHYSICALLY STILL ON THE GND AT THE DEP STATION WHEN A DISQUALIFYING ANOMALY IS DISCOVERED BY THE FLT CREW. RPTR FINALLY STATED HE FELT THE FLT CREWS WERE UNDER SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE TO CONFORM TO THE INTENT OF THIS PHILOSOPHY. HE FEELS THAT THE INTENT IS TO MAKE THE COMPLETION OF THE FLT TO DEST THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION ONCE THE ACFT HAS LEFT THE GATE.