ORD LCL CTLR CHRONICLES BUSY COMPLEX TFC PERIOD RESULTING IN ACR GAR AND HIS OR HER NON COMPLIANCE WITH FAA DIRECTIVES CONCERNING TKOF PROCS.

Narrative

I WAS ASSIGNED S LC (POST #14); WORKING RWY 9R ARRS AND OCCASIONAL RWY 14R AND RWY 9R DEPS. I WAS ADVISED BY MY OPERATIONAL SUPVR THAT WE WERE TO INITIATE AN ARR/AIRSPACE CONFIGN CHANGE IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THE FAA FLT CHK TO RWY 27R; AND THE CITY OF CHICAGO'S REQUEST TO CLOSE RWY 9R FOR ROUTINE MAINT. THE NEW CONFIGN WAS ARRIVING RWY 32L; DEPARTING RWY 32R; AND LOW APCHS TO RWY 27R WITH THE FAA KING AIR. IN ADDITION; I WAS REASSIGNED TO ANOTHER OPERATING POS (#10) AND TOLD TO COMBINE THE 2 LC POS TO ONLY 1. AS I WAS OPENING POS #10; GND CTL TAXIED 8-9 ACFT TO RWY 32L AT T10 AND MULTIPLE ACFT TO RWY 32R; ARRS STARTED IN FOR RWY 32L; AND ACFT X CALLED INBOUND FOR RWY 27R. ALTHOUGH WE WERE ADVISED THAT ACFT X WOULD BE MAKING RECORDED RUNS TO RWY 27R; I WAS NEVER ADVISED WHAT HIS INTENTIONS WERE AFTER COMPLETING THE LOW APCH (R TFC; L TFC; DME ARC; VECTORS BACK TO FINAL; ETC). I WASTED SEVERAL MINS TRYING TO QUESTION ACFT X AS TO WHAT EXACTLY HIS PLANS WERE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO KEEP NORMAL OPS FLOWING. ACFT X INITIATED HIS SECOND RUN AND WAS VECTORED TO RWY 27R IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH ACR Y (A310) ON FINAL FOR RWY 32L. I DECIDED THAT SENDING ACR Y AROUND WAS NOT AN OPTION DUE TO A POSSIBLE FLY-OVER WITH ACFT X LOW APCH TO RWY 27R; SO INSTEAD I PULLED ACFT X OFF THE APCH TO BE VECTORED BACK TO THE FINAL. AS ACR Y ROLLED OUT ON RWY 32L; I TAXIED AN ACR Z (A310) INTO POS AT T10 WITH ACR W ON A 2.5 NM FINAL. WHEN ACR Y VACATED THE RWY; I CLRED ACR Z FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF WITH ACR W ON A 1 NM FINAL. IT APPEARED THAT I WOULD HAVE THE PROPER RWY SEPARATION; SO I COMMITTED MYSELF TO LETTING ACR W LAND. AS ACR W CROSSED THE THRESHOLD; I OBSERVED THE FLT CREW INITIATE A GAR AND ISSUED MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS. I CONTINUED TO DEPART ACFT FROM T10 WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE NORMAL DEP POINT FOR RWY 32L HAD NOW BECOME AN INTXN AT NIGHT ON THE PRIMARY ARR RWY. APPROX 15 MINS LATER; I CONDUCTED A POS RELIEF BRIEFING; DURING WHICH I REALIZED MY ERROR. UPON FINISHING MY BRIEFING; I INFORMED THE OPERATIONAL SUPVR WHAT HAD OCCURRED AND THE MISTAKE THAT I HAD MADE. ALTHOUGH ROUTINE; RWY/CONFIGN CHANGES ARE USUALLY CHAOTIC AND COMPLEX. ADD THAT TO A LACK OF NEEDED INFO; POOR PLANNING; AND PREOCCUPATION WITH OTHER SEPARATION ISSUES; IT'S EASY TO SEE THE CHAIN OF EVENTS UNFOLD. AS A FACILITY; WE SHOULD HAVE PRE-COORD WITH ACFT X HIS INTENTIONS PRIOR TO HIM ENTERING THE AIRSPACE. THE APCH CTLR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT VECTORED TIES TO RWY 27R AND RWY 32L DON'T WORK. WE SHOULD NOT HAVE CLOSED RWY 9R UNTIL THE ARR/DEP RUSH WAS FINISHED FOR THE NIGHT. WE COULD HAVE POSTPONED ACFT X RUNS ON RWY 27R UNTIL XA30 OR LATER TO ACCOMMODATE THE LAST OF THE EVENING RUSH. THE OPERATIONAL SUPVR COULD HAVE LEFT THE LCL CTL POS DE-COMBINED TO SPREAD OUT THE OVERALL WORKLOAD. THE GND CTLR SHOULD HAVE AVOIDED USING T10 FOR DEP WITH ARRS INBOUND FOR RWY 32L. I SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT THE DEP GAP I WAS TRYING TO HIT WITH ACR Z WASN'T THERE. I SHOULD NOT HAVE LET THE VARIOUS COMMENTS FROM THE FLT CREWS (WHAT'S OUR SEQUENCE? WHEN ARE WE GOING TO GO? HOW MUCH LONGER FOR US? ETC) FACTOR INTO MY DECISION MAKING. I SHOULD NOT HAVE LET MY INGRAINED ORD 'LET'S GET IT DONE' ATTITUDE AND EGO GET IN THE WAY OF GOOD DECISIONS. I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BREAK THE CHAIN AND I DIDN'T.