CAPT OF A B767 FEELS THERE IS A CONTRADICTION BTWN COMPANY POLICY AND MEL ACCEPTABILITY OF EICAS WARNING MESSAGES AND THEIR EFFECT ON CONTINUING TKOFS.

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DURING TKOF ROLL AT APPROX 63-65 KIAS; THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT/AURAL SOUNDED/ILLUMINATED; AND TKOF WAS ABORTED PRIOR TO 70 KIAS. THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A R ENG HPSOV WARNING EICAS. THE TWR WAS NOTIFIED; THE ACFT STOPPED UNEVENTFULLY AND TAXIED CLR OF RWY 27L. WE ASKED PERMISSION TO TAXI CLR OF THE OUTBOUND TXWY TO ENSURE ALL SYS WERE ACCEPTABLE FOR CONTINUED SAFE OP OF FLT. THE BRAKE COOLING CHART ONLY SHOWED THE NEED FOR AN APPROX 5 MIN COOLING PERIOD. ALL OTHER INDICATIONS APPEARED NORMAL; HOWEVER; I DECIDED THAT I WOULD LIKE TO QUICKLY CONFER WITH FLT CTL AND MAINT TO ENSURE THAT THEY CONCURRED WITH MY ANALYSIS. BOTH CONCURRED; AND AFTER ANOTHER REVIEW OF NOTES IN MEL AND MAINT MANUAL PROCS FOR SECURING OF HPSOV; ALL PARTIES FELT CONFIDENT THAT THE VALVE WAS SAFELY SECURED AND ANY DUPLICATE INDICATIONS THAT MIGHT OCCUR WOULD BE ACCEPTED ON SUBSEQUENT TKOF. WE CONTINUED BACK TO RWY 27L. DEP WAS NORMAL EXCEPT FOR RE-ILLUMINATION OF MASTER CAUTION/HPSOV WARNING MESSAGE AT APPROX 65 KIAS AGAIN; WHICH WAS ACCEPTED DUE TO THE EXPLICIT NOTATION IN THE MEL OPERATIONAL INFO THAT THIS ENG HPSOV LIGHT COULD RECUR AT LOW AND/OR HIGH THRUST SETTINGS DURING FLT. R ENG HPSOV MESSAGE REMAINED DISPLAYED FOR THE ENTIRE FLT UNTIL DSCNT INTO EMA THROUGH APPROX 3000 FT. THEN MASTER CAUTION LIGHT/AURAL/EICAS CYCLED ON AND OFF CONTINUOUSLY DURING ENTIRE APCH AND LNDG PHASE. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY DISTRACTING AND INTERRUPTED THE STERILE COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. WERE THERE TO HAVE BEEN MARGINAL WX ISSUES VICE CAVOK CONDITIONS AT EMA; THIS COULD HAVE BEEN VERY DISRUPTIVE TO THE CREW'S CONCENTRATION AND COM WITH ATC. THIS IS AN OUTSTANDING MECHANICAL ISSUE THAT HAS BEEN NOTED 3 SEPARATE TIMES IN THE 2 LOGBOOKS ALONE THAT WERE ACCESSIBLE TO MY CREW AND ME. THE LIGHTS/WARNINGS OCCURRED AT A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT WHEREIN WE BRIEF/TRAIN THAT ANY INDICATIONS THAT OCCUR PRIOR TO 80 KIAS WILL CAUSE THE CREW TO AUTOMATICALLY REJECT THE TKOF. I FEEL THE REJECT SITUATION WAS HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL COMPANY TRAINING POLICIES AND PROCS. THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICTED DECISION-MAKING IN THE COCKPIT DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT ARISES WHEN A CAPT MUST DETERMINE WHETHER TO FOLLOW FAA AND COMPANY POLICIES AND PROCS WHICH SPECIFICALLY CALL FOR THE REJECTION OF TKOF FOR ANY MASTER CAUTION EVENT -- OR TO FOLLOW ACFT LOGBOOK NOTATIONS REGARDING A FREQUENT AND UNRESOLVED MECHANICAL INCIDENT WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT RECUR.