MD88 ABORTS TKOF WHEN EPR INDICATOR FAILS. DISPUTE OVER PROPER TECHNIQUE ENSUES BTWN CAPT AND FO.

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THE FLT WAS ROUTINELY DISPATCHED FROM THE GATE AND ALL CHKLISTS AND PROCS WERE ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PROCS. IT WAS MY LEG AND DURING THE TKOF BRIEFING I STATED THAT WE WOULD BE USING RWY 28L BECAUSE; AT 10000 FT LONG; IT WAS LONGER THAN RWY 28R (8000 FT AVAILABLE) AND THE TAXI DISTANCE FROM THE SPOT WHERE WE WOULD DEICE WAS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME. THE CAPT SAID HE WANTED TO USE RWY 28R BUT GAVE NO OPERATIONAL REASON WHY. THE ACFT WT AND BAL SUMMARY DATA SUPPORTED EITHER RWY. AFTER DEICING; WE COMPLETED THE REMAINING CHKLISTS AND WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. I ASSUMED CTL OF THE ACFT ON THE ROLL AS THE CAPT COMPLETED THE ALIGNMENT AND I ADVANCED THE THROTTLES TOWARDS TKOF PWR. I IMMEDIATELY NOTICED THAT THE #2 ENG EPR GAUGE ARC BUG DID NOT MOVE AND THE DIGITAL DISPLAY WAS FROZEN AT 1.06. THE OTHER ENG INSTS ON BOTH THE #1 AND #2 ENGS INDICATED PROPERLY AND THERE WAS NO ADVERSE YAW AS BOTH ENGS ACCELERATED TO NEAR TKOF THRUST. I VERBALIZED THE INDICATOR MALFUNCTION. THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND. BECAUSE THE ENGAGEMENT PARAMETERS WERE OUT OF LIMITS; I DID NOT CALL FOR 'AUTOTHROTTLES ON.' FOR BACKGND INFO; IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT NORMALLY DURING AN MD88 AUTOTHROTTLE TKOF; THERE IS A CALL OF 'EPR XX' AFTER THEY ARE ENGAGED FOLLOWED BY AT 60 KIAS 'CLAMP.' KNOWING THAT I WOULD NOT GET THOSE CALLS WITHOUT THE AUTOTHROTTLES ON; I AGAIN VERBALIZED THE EPR INDICATOR MALFUNCTION. THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND. UPON REACHING 80 KIAS THE CAPT DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED CALL OF '80 KTS; ENG INSTS CHKED.' I THEN STATED '80 KIAS; ENG INSTS NOT CHKED. CHK OUT THE #2 EPR GAUGE. DO YOU WANT TO CONTINUE THE TKOF; CAPT?' AT THAT TIME THE CAPT STATED 'I HAVE THE ACFT' AND RETARDED THE THROTTLES TO IDLE. HE DID NOT VERBALIZE 'ABORT' AS REQUIRED BY COMPANY OPS SPECS. I THEN VISUALLY VERIFIED HE WAS ON THE CTLS; RELINQUISHED CTL OF THE ACFT; AND NOTED THE AIRSPD; IT WAS APPROX 85 KIAS AT THIS TIME. NOTE THAT DIGITAL FDR INFO LATER VERIFIED THE ACFT REACHED A MAX AIRSPD OF 87 KIAS DURING THE SEQUENCE. THE CAPT DID NOT DEPLOY THE THRUST REVERSERS AS PER THE COMPANY OPS SPECS REJECTED TKOF PROC. FOR THIS REASON; THE SPOILERS DID NOT DEPLOY AND THE REJECTED TKOF BRAKES DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENGAGE. I THEN REACHED TO MANUALLY DEPLOY THE SPOILERS. THE CAPT PREVENTED MY HAND FROM ACTUATING THEM AND SAID 'NO. WE DON'T NEED THEM.' HE THEN BEGAN GRADUAL BRAKING. I TOLD HIM THAT THE REJECTED TKOF PROC CALLS FOR SPOILERS AND REVERSE THRUST AND THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT PROPERLY CONFIGURED. THE CAPT IGNORED ME AND CONTINUED TO BRAKE GRADUALLY IN IDLE THRUST. I MONITORED RWY REMAINING AND OUR DECELERATION RATE. I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE FACT THAT REJECTED TKOF PROCS WERE NOT BEING USED; THE RATE OF DECELERATION OR THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT PROPERLY CONFIGURED FOR THE REJECTED TKOF. I CONSIDERED OVERRIDING THE CAPT BY INITIATING HARDER BRAKING FROM MY SIDE AND AGAIN TRYING TO DEPLOY THE SPOILERS AND THRUST REVERSERS. NOT LONG AFTER CONSIDERING THAT ACTION; PERHAPS A FEW SECONDS; I DETERMINED THAT THE ACFT WOULD STOP IN THE REMAINING RWY AND ELECTED NOT TO TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTION OR ATTEMPT TO ASSUME CTL OF THE ACFT FOR FEAR THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD COMPOUND THE SIT. AS WE WERE DECELERATING; THE CAPT SAID; AND I QUOTE; 'TELL THE TWR WE ARE DISCONTINUING THE TKOF.' I COMPLIED WITH HIS ORDER BUT; AFTER YRS OF PRACTICING ESTABLISHED PROC WHICH IS NOW INGRAINED HABIT; RADIOED TO TWR THAT WE WERE AND I QUOTE 'ABORTING THE TKOF.' I THEN MADE A PA TELLING THE PAX TO REMAIN SEATED AND TO STAND BY FOR INSTRUCTIONS. THE CAPT NEVER BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A COMPLETE STOP ON THE RWY. INSTEAD HE TAXIED CLR AT THE SECOND TO LAST TXWY (TXWY E5) AND STOPPED THE ACFT. I TOLD TWR THAT NO ASSISTANCE WAS REQUIRED AND THAT WE WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE GATE TO CHK OUT AN INDICATOR MALFUNCTION. TWR CLRED US TO PARKING. THE CAPT THEN PROCEEDED TO STRIKE THE THROTTLES REPEATEDLY AND ANGRILY SHOUTED AT ME BECAUSE I DID NOT SAY 'DISCONTINUING THE TKOF.' HE WENT ON TO SAY WORDS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FAA AND NTSB WOULD NOW BECOME INVOLVED WITH THE SIT SINCE I USED THE WORD 'ABORT.' THE CAPT THEN STARTED TO TAXI THE ACFT ONTO PARALLEL TXWY E. BECAUSE THE CAPT HAD NOT SPOKEN TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS YET; I CALLED TO ENSURE THAT PAX WERE NOT ONLY SEATED BUT ALSO HAD NOT ATTEMPTED TO EVAC USING THE OVERWING EMER EXITS. NOTE THAT THE MD88 HAS NO INDICATOR LIGHTS FOR THOSE DOORS AND AS SUCH; CREW COORD IS CRITICAL TO SAFETY. I ALSO MADE AN ADDITIONAL PA TO THE PAX AND BRIEFLY EXPLAINED THE REASON FOR THE ABORT. I REMINDED THEM TO REMAIN SEATED UNTIL THE 'FASTEN SEATBELT' SIGN WAS EXTINGUISHED AFTER PULLING IN TO THE GATE I THEN ASKED THE CAPT IF WE COULD CONSULT THE QRH FOR GUIDANCE. HE SAID NO. I THEN ASKED HIM IF I COULD CONSULT THE OPERATIONAL DATA MANUAL BRAKE ENERGY SECTION AND OBSERVE ANY LIMITATIONS. NOTE THAT THIS ACTION IS DIRECTED BY THE REJECTED TKOF PROC. HE SAID NO. I AGAIN STATED THAT REJECTED TKOF PROC CALLS FOR THAT; AND HE ANSWERED WITH 'RUN THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST.' HE ALSO TOLD ME TO MAKE NO MORE CALLS TO ATC; THE FLT ATTENDANTS; OR THE PAX WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING HIS PERMISSION. I COMPLIED WITH THE ORDER AND KEPT AN EYE ON THE BRAKE TEMP GAUGE. THE BRAKES STAYED BELOW 200 DEGS THROUGHOUT THE SUBSEQUENT OP AS WELL DURING THE TIME SPENT AT THE GATE. NOTE THAT AT TEMPS GREATER THAN 300 DEGS THE FUSE PLUGS MAY MELT. PEAK TEMPS ARE USUALLY REACHED 20-30 MINS AFTER THE EVENT. THE CAPT TAXIED INTO PARKING UNEVENTFULLY AND THE ACFT WAS SECURED USING NORMAL PROCS AND CHKLISTS. FLT DISPATCH CTL AND MAINT WERE NOTIFIED AND THE EVENT WAS ENTERED INTO THE ACFT LOGBOOK. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT I ATTEMPTED TO ENGAGE THE CAPT AFTERWARDS TO DEBRIEF THE REJECTED TKOF. JUST AS I HAVE DONE THROUGHOUT MY AVIATION CAREER; I WAS OPEN TO CANDID CONVERSATION AND HOPED TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE SO THAT I COULD MATURE AS AN AVIATOR. DURING THE DISCUSSION; THE CAPT SAID THAT THE DECISION NOT TO COMPLY WITH THE ESTABLISHED REJECTED TKOF PROCS WAS 'AT HIS DISCRETION' AND I WAS INCORRECT TO ATTEMPT TO DEPLOY THE SPOILERS. HE JUSTIFIED HIS EMPLOYMENT OF GRADUAL BRAKING AS A MEANS NOT TO INCONVENIENCE THE PAX BY 'THROWING THEM AGAINST THEIR SEATBELTS.' HE ALSO CRITICIZED MY COMS WITH ATC; THE FLT ATTENDANTS; AND THE PAX. TO HIS CREDIT; HE APOLOGIZED FOR LOSING HIS TEMPER IN THE COCKPIT. AFTER SOME REFLECTION ON THE EVENT; SELF-EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE; AND LISTENING TO THE CAPT'S JUSTIFICATION FOR NOT FOLLOWING ESTABLISHED PROCS; I MADE THE DECISION TO REMOVE MYSELF FROM THE ROTATION. DURING MORE THAN 15 YRS OF FLYING CREW ACFT; I HAVE NEVER HAD TO DO THIS. I WELL UNDERSTAND THE MULTIFACETED DYNAMICS OF THIS EVENT. IN THE BIGGER PICTURE; THIS WAS A REJECTED TKOF DUE TO AN ENG INST MALFUNCTION. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A LOW SPD ABORT. INSTEAD; FOR REASONS KNOWN ONLY TO THE CAPT; IT BECAME AN ABORT ABOVE 80 KTS. FURTHER; ESTABLISHED REJECTED TKOF PROCS WERE NOT FOLLOWED BY THE CAPT AND HE PHYSICALLY PREVENTED ME FROM EXECUTING MY FO DUTIES AS DIRECTED BY COMPANY PROC. TO OUR FAVOR; THE EVENT OCCURRED DURING DAY VMC ON A DRY RWY IN AN ACFT THAT WAS NOT AT MAX GROSS WT. HAD CONDITIONS BEEN LESS THAN OPTIMAL; THE OUTCOME MAY NOT HAVE BEEN AS FAVORABLE. IT SHOULD FURTHER BE NOTED THAT THIS EVENT OCCURRED DURING MY FIRST ROTATION SINCE COMPLETING RECURRENT TRAINING. I LEFT THERE WITH NOT ONLY A POSITIVE EVALUATION; BUT WITH CONFIDENCE IN MY PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE AS WELL AS MY ABILITY TO PERFORM EFFECTIVELY IN ANY EMER TO INCLUDE REJECTED TKOFS. RECOMMENDATIONS: THE CORE OF THIS EVENT IS A CRM ISSUE. THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN A SLOW SPD ABORT BELOW 40 KIAS DUE TO AN EPR GAUGE MALFUNCTION THAT THE FO SPOTTED AT THROTTLE UP. INSTEAD; IT BECAME A HIGH SPD ABORT WHEN THE CAPT FAILED TO MAKE A TIMELY ABORT DECISION. FURTHER; FOR REASONS ONLY KNOWN TO HIM; THE CAPT DELIBERATELY CHOSE NOT TO FOLLOW COMPANY PROC. HE ALSO VERBALLY AND PHYSICALLY PREVENTED THE FO FROM DOING HIS DUTIES DURING A REJECTED TKOF. DURING THE DEBRIEF; THE CAPT INCORRECTLY STATED THAT THE EMPLOYMENT OF THOSE PROCS IS AT HIS DISCRETION. COMPANY OPS SPECS ARE CLR: ANY REJECTED ABOVE 80 KIAS IS A HIGH SPD ABORT AND THE REJECTED TKOF PROC WILL BE USED. TO PREVENT THIS IN THE FUTURE; I RECOMMEND THAT THE INDUSTRY ESTABLISH MEMORY RECALL PROCS (IE; 'BOLD FACE') FOR REJECTED TKOFS ABOVE 80 KIAS. IN THE STRESS OF AN EMER; HABIT PATTERNS INGRAINED THROUGH TRAINING ARE WHAT SAVE THE DAY. ELIMINATING THE 'GRAY AREA' ELIMINATES INDECISION AS WELL AS MITIGATES POOR DECISIONS. THIS EVENT CLRLY STARTED OUTSIDE OF THE COCKPIT. THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE CORRESPONDENCE FROM SENIOR FLT OPS MGMNT HAS NOT BEEN TO STRESS OPERATIONAL SAFETY BUT RATHER ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEE PAY CUTS. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT; THE FUTURE OF THE SOLVENCY OF THE CARRIER IS VERY MUCH IN QUESTION. I BELIEVE THE PRESSURE OUTSIDE OF THE COCKPIT DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE ERRORS MADE INSIDE OF IT. MGMNT SHOULD BE SETTING THE TONE FOR SAFETY; NOT NEGOTIATING A CONCESSIONARY COMPENSATION PACKAGE DIRECTLY WITH THE LINE PLT VIA FLT OPS COMS CHANNELS.