MD88 FLT CREW PERFORMS AN UNSTABILIZED VISUAL APCH TO A RWY LOCATED IN A HIGH TERRAIN AREA DURING NIGHT VMC. GPWS 'TOO LOW GEAR' AND 'SINK RATE' ALERTS SOUNDED.

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I AM VERY EXPERIENCED AS AN MD88 FO; AND AM VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE PERFORMANCE ENVELOPE OF THE ACFT. ON ARR TO XXX; VISUALS TO RWY 26 WERE IN USE. WE REQUESTED RWY 8 BECAUSE IT HAS AN ILS AND ARRIVES FROM OVER LOWER TERRAIN. ATC SAID THEY WERE UNABLE DUE TO TFC. THIS IS NOT A POSSIBLE DAY/VMC; BUT IS A HUGE ISSUE AT NIGHT EVEN VMC (WE ALSO ASKED IF RWY 3 AT ONE POINT). THERE IS TERRAIN UP TO 10678 FT STARTING 7 MI TO THE E OF THE FIELD. THERE ARE ALSO NOISE ABATEMENT CONCERNS LISTED IN OUR PROCS. THE MSA IN THAT AREA IS 11900 FT. WE WERE VECTORED TO DOWNWIND AT 9000 FT (MVA) BUT COULD NOT SEE THE FIELD DUE TO THE CITY LIGHTS. IT WAS ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT. ATC KEPT ASKING IF WE HAD IT AND I COULD SEE THE ARPT. THE CAPT SAID HE SAW IT AND I CALLED THE FIELD IN SIGHT. (APCH DID OFFER TO LET US GET VECTORS TO A L DOWNWIND; WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE DONE; BUT THE CAPT DID NOT WANT TO.) WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH AND THE CAPT; AS PER HIS CUSTOM; DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES. HE WENT TO IDLE AND STARTED TO DSND; PATTERN ALT WOULD BE AROUND 6900 FT AND HE STARTED A BASE TURN WITH SLATS EXTENDED; 240 KIAS OR SO AND IDLE. IN THE TURN HE ASKED ME IF I HAD THE FIELD. I LOOKED OUT; TOLD HIM HE WAS HIGH AND TO TURN R (TOWARD THE FIELD) AS WE WERE CLOSE TO TERRAIN AND COULDN'T SEE IT. WE WERE VERY HIGH ON THE VASI'S AND FAST. WE SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND THEN. I LOOKED BACK INSIDE AND SAW THE SPD DROPPING THROUGH 140 KIAS; WELL BELOW MANEUVER SPD. I TOLD HIM HE WAS SLOW AND NEEDED POWER NOW. HE ADVANCED THE THROTTLES; CALLED FOR FLAPS 23 DEGS AND POINTED THE NOSE MAYBE 10 DEGS MORE LOW. WE WERE COMPLETELY UNSTABLE THROUGHOUT THIS. I WAS CONCERNED WITH A STALL DUE TO THE LOW SPD; AND THEN WE GOT THE 'LNDG GEAR' AURAL WARNING OF THE GPWS WHICH COULD MEAN WE WERE CLOSE TO TERRAIN WITH NO GEAR DOWN OR WE HAD THE FLAPS IN A LNDG CONFIGN WITHOUT GEAR DOWN. THE CAPT (WHILE STILL HAND FLYING) REACHES OVER AND STARTS MESSING WITH THE FLAP HANDLE. OF COURSE I WAS NOW CONCERNED THAT WE WERE GETTING THE WARNING DUE TO RAPIDLY RISING TERRAIN BELOW US. I TOLD HIM TO TURN R TOWARD THE FIELD NOW; AND HE DID. I ALSO TOLD HIM TO LEVEL OFF OR CLB (I DON'T REALLY RECALL WHAT I SAID; IT ALL HAPPENED VERY FAST). WE GOT ALIGNED ON FINAL VERY; VERY HIGH AND HE CALLED THE GEAR DOWN AND THE FLAPS 40 DEGS. WE WERE HIGH AND AROUND 180 KIAS. I SAID 'THIS ISN'T GOING TO WORK' AND HE DID NOTHING EXCEPT DIVE TO ATTEMPT TO GET ON GLIDE PATH. I SAID 'LET'S GO AROUND' AND HE SAID 'NO; THIS IS GOING TO WORK OUT.' I SHOULD HAVE PROBABLY BEEN MORE EMPHATIC IN RETROSPECT; BUT 2 THINGS MADE ME ACCEPT THE APCH AS IT WAS: THE RWY WAS DRY AND WX VMC; AND THE RWY IS 13793 FT LONG. ALSO; I HAVE SEEN SEVERAL MAX PERFORMANCE DSCNTS AND LNDGS IN MY PAST EXPERIENCE IN THE DC9. THERE WAS NO REASON FOR US TO PUSH THIS POS. WE GOT THE 'SINK RATE' GPWS CONTINUOUSLY DURING THE FINAL APCH. WE NEVER CAME CLOSE TO STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA.