A B777-200 FLT CREW ON VISUAL APCH TO HNL EXECUTED AN UNSTABILIZED APCH.

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CLRED VISUAL APCH RWY 8L HNL. WX CLR; VISIBILITY GREATER THAN 10 MI. COMMERCIAL CHART PAGE FOR HNL SAYS TO INTERCEPT FINAL FOR RWY 8L AT 3000 FT. FO FLYING. TWR TOLD US TO TURN BASE OVER JOHN ROGERS ARPT (FORMERLY BARBERS POINT) APPROX A 7 MI FINAL AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT UNTIL ON FINAL (CONFIRMING THE COMMERCIAL CHART PAGE). EWABE; THE FAF; IS JUST INSIDE JOHN ROGERS ARPT AND HAS A XING ALT OF APPROX 1900 FT. ON DOWNWIND; I MENTIONED THIS ALT DISCREPANCY TO THE CREW. WE TURNED BASE ABEAM JOHN ROGERS. OVER JOHN ROGERS WE TURNED TO AN INTERCEPT HDG OF 050 DEGS (A BIT EARLY). BECAUSE OF THIS; IT TOOK EXTRA TIME AND DISTANCE TO INTERCEPT FINAL FOR RWY 8L AND WE HAD TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT. ABEAM EWABE; I CALLED OUT 'EWABE; WE ARE ABOUT 1000 FT HIGH.' (F5; 180 KTS) TO WHICH THE FO RESPONDED GEAR DOWN. AT THIS POINT I FELT THE FO UNDERSTOOD THE PROB AND WAS CORRECTING. BECAUSE I HAD ADVOCATED TWICE -- ONCE ON DOWNWIND AND ONCE OVER EWABE -- I FELT EVERYONE UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION AND IT WAS A NUISANCE TO ADVOCATE ANYMORE. IN HINDSIGHT; I CHKED OUT FOR THE REST OF THE APCH AND LNDG. AT NO POINT DID I FEEL UNSAFE; BUT I DID FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE. AT 500 FT; WE WERE 30K FAST WITH FLAPS 20 DEGS (FLAPS 30 DEGS PLANNED FOR LNDG). I WAS CONFUSED BY THE GPWS CALLOUT 'TOO LOW' WHEN WE WERE ON GS. FLAP HANDLE WAS POSITIONED TO 30 DEGS AT 500 FT; BUT THE FLAPS REACHED 30 DEGS AT ABOUT 250 FT. ONLY ONCE DID THE GPWS CALL OUT 'TOO LOW FLAPS.' DUE TO ALL OF THE DISTRS I DID NOT DO THE FINAL DSCNT CHKLIST. THIS APCH ENDED WITH A SMOOTH TOUCHDOWN; 1000 FT FROM THE ARR END OF RWY 8L; ON SPD. I BELIEVE THE PRIMARY CAUSE WAS THE FO'S SPATIAL DISORIENTATION; WHICH I BELIEVE WAS CAUSED BY FATIGUE AND A LACK OF RECENT LNDGS. (JUNIOR FO ON A WDB FLEET). THERE WERE MANY SECONDARY ISSUES. A TIGHT TURN-IN COMBINED WITH A 3000 FT RESTR FOR RWY 8L; THE RELIEF PLT WAS SILENT THROUGHOUT THE APCH AND LNDG. MY LACK OF ADVOCACY AFTER MY FIRST 2 ATTEMPTS. CAUSES FOR MY LACK OF ADVOCACY WERE: I HAVE FLOWN WITH THE FO BEFORE AND KNOW HE IS GOOD. IN MY MIND; AFTER THOSE 2 ATTEMPTS; I FELT LIKE ANY MORE WOULD BE A NUISANCE; ESPECIALLY WHEN I KNEW THE FO WAS GOOD. (MAYBE I DID NOT WANT TO HURT ANY FEELINGS?) NEXT TIME I'LL ADVOCATE UNTIL I'M AT THE GATE! ANOTHER SECONDARY CAUSE: IN SPITE OF ALL THE TRAINING; I STILL FELT A GAR WAS FOR WHEN I FELT UNSAFE. NOW I REALIZE THAT EVEN THOUGH I FELT SAFE WITH THE APCH AND LNDG WHILE I WAS IN THE MOMENT; LOOKING BACK; OUR PERFORMANCE WAS NOT TOO SAFE -- WE WERE 30K FAST AND NOT CONFIGURED AT 500 FT. I MISSED THE 1000 FT AND 500 FT CALLS. I DID NOT DO THE FINAL DSCNT CHKLIST. I DID NOT CALL 'AIRSPD;' I DID NOT CALL 'AIRSPD; GO AROUND.' IN SPITE OF ALL THESE ERRORS; HAD I MADE THE FINAL CALL OF 'AIRSPD; GO AROUND' AT 500 FT; THAT WOULD HAVE ERASED ALL OF OUR PREVIOUS ERRORS; LET US START OVER; AND WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS INCIDENT COMPLETELY!