FLT CREW OF B737-500 CONTINUE UNSTABILIZED APCH TO TOUCHDOWN.

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ON APCH INTO PHX; WE WERE TOLD TO KEEP THE SPD UP WHILE TURNING BASE AND ONTO FINAL. FO WAS HOLDING 210 AS INSTRUCTED. IN THE TURN TO FINAL; I TOLD HIM HE WAS HIGH SO HE ASKED FOR THE GEAR. I LOWERED THE GEAR AND LOWERED FLAPS AND HE CALLED FOR A FLAPS 40 DEG LNDG. I SET THE 40 SPDS AND WE LOWERED THE FLAPS ON SCHEDULE. HE SLOWED TO APCH SPD AND WE WERE 2 DOTS HIGH. AT 1000 FT WE WERE ON SPD BUT HIGH AND HAD ABOUT 1200 FPM SINK. HE CALLED CORRECTING AND WE CONTINUED THE APCH. HE CORRECTED TO 1000 FPM SINK AND OUR AIM POINT WAS LONG. HE GOT A 'SINK RATE' CALL AND CORRECTED AROUND 300 FT. WE TOUCHED DOWN ABOUT 2500 FT DOWN THE RWY. ROLLOUT WAS UNEVENTFUL. WHY DIDN'T I SAY 'GO AROUND' EARLY? THERE ARE NO GOOD ANSWERS TO THIS. I SHOULD HAVE. THE FO IS A GOOD STICK AND I DIDN'T SEE IT AS DANGEROUS. I HAD SEEN THIS 100 TIMES IN MY CAREER. I KNEW WE HAD LOTS OF RWY. I KNEW IT WOULD COST 1500 LBS OF GAS TO GO AROUND. AGAIN; NONE OF THESE ARE GOOD REASONS. LESSONS LEARNED: I THOUGHT A LOT ABOUT THIS LATER IN THE EVENING. I REALIZED WHAT A HORRIBLE EXAMPLE I SET FOR THE FO. I LET HIM DOWN AND I LET MYSELF DOWN. WE BOTH FELT LIKE CRAP. HOW COULD I EXPECT HIM TO DIRECT A 'GAR' WHEN HE IS A CAPT AFTER I LET HIM SLIDE THIS TIME? I AM SURE IT WILL BE SOMEWHERE IN HIS MIND WHEN HE IS FACED WITH THE SAME SITUATION. WE TALKED ABOUT THIS AT LENGTH AND BOTH REALIZE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND. IT WOULD HAVE MADE THE APCH MUCH SAFER; MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE. I KNOW THERE IS NO STIGMA ATTACHED TO GOING AROUND. I KNOW THERE IS A STIGMA ATTACHED TO 'LETTING IT SLIDE.' I KNOW I WOULD HAVE SLEPT BETTER KNOWING THAT I DID IT BY THE BOOK. I KNOW I WON'T LET IT HAPPEN AGAIN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 101083: TEMPORARILY LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS DUE TO A PACK TRIP OFF LIGHT WHICH WAS HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROC. I HAD NEVER EXPERIENCED AIRPLANE PERFORMANCE IN THIS SITUATION AND CONTINUED TO EXPECT A STABILIZED APCH AT ANY MOMENT.