THE CTLR DESCRIBED PRIMARY AND BACKUP FREQ OUTAGE CAUSED BY FUSE FAILURE AT A REMOTE SITE WITH LIMITED LANDLINE CAPABILITIES.

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ZME SECTORS 4; 27; AND 35 WERE BUSY WORKING MODERATE TFC WHEN BOTH THE MAIN AND STANDBY FREQS FAILED. THE CTLRS TRIED TO SWITCH TO THE BACK-UP EMER COM (BUEC) FREQS. THE BUEC'S WOULD NOT ENGAGE. THE SUPVR THEN COMBINED THE SECTORS ONTO OTHER SECTORS THAT HAD WORKING FREQS. THE PROB WAS THAT THE WORKING SECTORS DID NOT HAVE ALL OF THE NEEDED LANDLINES TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SURROUNDING FACILITIES (ZKC; ZID). TO COMPOUND THE PROB; THE SUPVR(S) DID NOT KNOW HOW TO ASSIGN THE NEEDED LANDLINES. THIS; IN MY OPINION; IS DUE TO A LACK OF TRAINING ON THE VSCS EQUIP (VOICE SWITCHING COM EQUIP). FORTUNATELY THE CTLRS WERE ABLE TO RELAY CLRNCS THROUGH OTHER AIRPLANES TO BROADCAST ON THE FAILED FREQ FOR ALL ACFT TO CHANGE TO THE WORKING FREQ. NO LOSS OF SEPARATION OCCURRED. IT WAS DISCOVERED AFTER 2 1/2 HRS THAT A FUSE HAD BLOWN AT THE REMOTE COMS AIR GND (RCAG) SITE. THERE IS SUPPOSED TO BE REDUNDANCY SYS TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF FAILURE FROM HAPPENING. THE BUEC FREQS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE LOCATED AT A DIFFERENT LOCATION; AND I WAS TOLD THE REMOTE COM AIR GND SITES ARE OWNED AND MAINTAINED BY MCI AND THE BUEC SITE BY A COMPANY. THERE USED TO BE A FEW UNUSED FREQS AVAILABLE FOR USE; BUT THESE WERE TAKEN OUT TO SAVE MONEY. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE FAA PUTTING COST AHEAD OF SAFETY!