FLT IS DISPATCHED WITH INOP NAVAIDS ALONG RTE. DISPATCHER IS UNABLE TO CONTACT CREW.

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CFR 14 PART 121 SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT A FLT MAY NOT BE DISPATCHED OVER A RTE UNLESS ALL THE NAV AND COM FACILITIES REQUIRED FOR SAFE OP ARE IN SATISFACTORY WORKING CONDITION (SEE 121.121 AND 121.609). DURING THE DAYLIGHT HRS OF SUN/XA/06; CLRLY THE SINGLE MOST CONSPICUOUS WX PHENOMENON E OF THE ROCKIES WAS THE LINE OF PRECIP EXTENDING FROM NORTHERN WISCONSIN TO CENTRAL IOWA. AMONG THE FLTS UNDER MY OPERATIONAL CTL WAS A SEGMENT FROM DETROIT; MICHIGAN; TO CENTRAL WISCONSIN. BECAUSE OF THE WX IN THE WAUSAU-STEVENS POINT AREA; I HAD RTED THE FLT UP TO ESCANABA SO AS TO ENABLE AN APCH TO CWA FROM THE NE IN THE HOPE OF KEEPING IT 'BEHIND' THE HEAVIEST PRECIP AND REDUCING THE RISK OF AN INADVERTENT ENCOUNTER WITH AN EMBEDDED TSTM. WHILE THE DTW TO CWA FLT WAS ALOFT; I CHKED THE METAR FOR CWA AND NOTED THAT THE CEILING HAD DROPPED TO 700 FT BROKEN. NOTHING SUGGESTING SUCH A POSSIBILITY HAD BEEN IN THE FORECAST; AND NEITHER COMPOSITE NOR NEXRAD RADAR DISPLAYS PROVIDED ANY SIGN OF REDEVELOPING ACTIVITY. I CHKED THE WX AT NEARBY ARPTS; AND DETERMINED THAT ADDING RHINELANDER (RHI) WOULD SATISFY THE ALTERNATE ARPT REQUIREMENT. HOWEVER; WHEN I ATTEMPTED TO COMMUNICATE THIS AMENDMENT TO THE FLT'S RELEASE; I WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT THE CREW! INITIALLY; I TRIED THE FLT OVER OUR COM. NO JOY. I ALSO ATTEMPTED TO REACH THE CREW ON RHI; GRB; AND LOGICALLY ENOUGH; CWA -- ALL TO NO AVAIL. OUR AIRLINE RECENTLY SWITCHED TO COMRDO OUT OF SAN FRANCISCO; AND I DIALED THEM UP FOR ASSISTANCE; GIVING THE OPERATOR THERE THE FLT'S LOCATION (40 NM W OF TVC) AND ALT (14000 FT IS WHAT I RECALL). NO LUCK THERE; EITHER. BECAUSE THE RPTED VISIBILITY WAS 10 SM AND THE WINDS LESS THAN 10 KTS; I DECIDED A LNDG IN CWA WAS VIRTUALLY ASSURED; AND TURNED MY ATTN TO MY OTHER FLTS. I RECHKED ON THIS FLT A FEW MINS LATER; AND IT APPEARED TO BE ON FINAL APCH INTO CWA. HOWEVER; IT WENT MISSED -- WITHOUT RPTING THIS TO DISPATCH -- AND I ENDED UP CALLING THE TWR IN CWA TO FIND OUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I ALSO PASSED ONLY THE AMENDMENT WITH RHI NOW THE ALTERNATE -- IMPORTANT NOW; SINCE THERE WAS SUDDENLY A FAIR PROBABILITY THIS FLT WOULD HAVE TO GO THERE. ACCORDING TO BOTH THE PIC AND A TWR CAB CREW MEMBER AT CWA; UNFORECAST WINDS; SCUD; AND LOWERING BASES HAD COMBINED TO MAKE AN ILS PROBLEMATIC (DUE TO A TAILWIND IN EXCESS OF 10 KTS) AND A CIRCLE TO LAND ILLEGAL (OUR OPS SPECS REQUIRES 1500 FT AND 3 MI -- WE HAD THE VISIBILITY; BUT THE RPTED CEILING DURING THIS EPISODE NEVER CLBED ABOVE 1400 FT). EVENTUALLY; I WAS ABLE TO REACH THE FLT CREW DIRECTLY; UPDATE THEM ON THE WX IN RHI; AND CONFIRM IT AS THE DESIGNATED ALTERNATE. THAT PLANE LANDED IN RHI WITH 1000 LBS FUEL ON BOARD (NORMAL RESERVE ON THE SF340 IS 800 LBS). HOWEVER; FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST 1/2 HR; I HAD NO EFFECTIVE DIRECT COM WITH THIS CREW WHILE THEY WERE ALOFT. DURING THIS SAME DUTY PERIOD; I HAD ATC-MANDATED RERTES -- A 'WX' FLT TO PIA WHERE BOTH ROUTING AND FUEL UPDATES WERE NEVER COMPLETELY UPDATED; AND A FLT THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A REVENUE OP; OR COULD HAVE BEEN A REPOSITIONING EFFORT -- NOBODY SEEMED TO KNOW FOR SURE. WHILE NONE OF THESE FLTS WERE CHALLENGED BY ANYTHING MORE THREATENING THAN AN OVERFLOWING LAVATORY; THE CHRONIC UNRELIABILITY OF COMPANY COMS FACILITIES -- EVEN WITH COMRDO FOR BACK-UP -- WILL EVENTUALLY BITE US.