B757 FLT CREW CONCERNED WITH NON-PRECISION APCH PROCS TO MGGT.

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THE FILING OF THIS REPORT IS A FINAL EFFORT AT TRYING TO GET SOME ATTN DIRECTED TOWARDS AN ISSUE THAT HAS REPEATEDLY BEEN IGNORED BY THE DEVELOPERS OF A PROGRAM AND UNNAMED OTHERS IN MGMNT. THIS ISSUE HAS A HIGH PROBABILITY; IN MY OPINION; AS AN ACCIDENT CONTRIBUTOR. WHEN THE FIRST COMPANY PROGRAM FOR GUATEMALA CAME OUT LATE LAST SPRING; THE PLTS WERE ASKED TO REVIEW IT AND PROVIDE FEEDBACK. I DID; HAVING BEEN FLYING THERE FOR SOME 15 YRS. THE SOLICITOR OF THE FEEDBACK; PLUS THE MGMNT THAT I CC'D MY FEEDBACK TO; ALL WERE VERY DISMISSIVE. A VERY SENIOR TYPE CHK AIRMAN AT THE TRAINING FACILITY; HOWEVER; THOUGHT THAT THIS ISSUE WARRANTS ATTN. THE ISSUE IS THIS -- NOWHERE IN OUR TRAINING TO FLY NON-PRECISION APCHS; EITHER ON THE LINE OR AT THE TRAINING FACILITY; ARE OPERATING PROCS COVERED FOR FLYING A STABILIZED NON PRECISION APCH THE LIKES OF THE VOR-DME RWY 19 TO GUATEMALA. I WILL ALSO POINT OUT; THAT THE ONLY VOR-DME INST APCH TO BOTH RWYS AT PROVIDENCIALES AND TO RWY 26 AT PUERTO PLATA ARE OF THE SAME TYPE AS THE RWY 19 APCH INTO GUATEMALA. THIS IS NOT AN ISSUE FOR B737'S. IT IS FOR B757 FLYING. SPECIFICALLY; I WAS FLYING INTO GUATEMALA LAST SPRING. WX WAS HORRENDOUS WITH WINDS FORCING THE USE OF THE VOR-DME TO RWY 19. IT BECAME APPARENT THAT NOWHERE IN THE CAPT'S TRAINING NOR MINE HAD WE BEEN SCHOOLED TO FLY A NON-PRECISION APCH WHERE OUR STABILIZED GLIDE PATH WOULD BEGIN SEVERAL MILES BEYOND THE FINAL APCH FIX. WE FLEW THE APCH THE OLD SCHOOL WAY (CAPT'S SUGGESTION); BLASTING DOWN TO THE MDA; LEVELING OFF AT SEVERAL HUNDRED FEET ABOVE THE GND; AND DROVE IN THROUGH HVY RAIN; SEVERE TURB; AND ZERO VISIBILITY. I WAS SERIOUSLY SCARED AND STARTED A GAR; BUT THE CAPT TOLD ME TO STICK WITH IT. WE EVENTUALLY BROKE OUT AND LANDED. AFTER REVIEWING THE COMPANY PROGRAM FOR FEEDBACK; IT BECAME OBVIOUS ABSOLUTELY NO ATTN WAS GIVEN TO THE ACTUAL MECHANICS OF THIS APCH. IF YOU FLY THE APCH AS DEPICTED IN COMPANY PROGRAM REFING ALTS AND VSI'S; YOU WILL BE IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF EVERYTHING TAUGHT US CONCERNING STABILIZED APCHS. THE COMPANY DEPICTION SHOWS DSCNT RATES VARYING FROM 1300 FPM TO 300 FPM AND LEVELOFFS; ALL FACTORS THAT THE COMPANY HAS MERCILESSLY POUNDED INTO OUR HEADS TO FORCE US INTO A GAR MODE. LOOKING AT THE APCH; ONE CAN EITHER FLY A 200 FPM DSCNT FROM THE FAF (AS DEPICTED) TO THE MDA; AND UPON REACHING THE VDP; CHANGE TO A 700-800 FPM DSCNT RATE FOR A NORMAL APCH TO LNDG; OR ONE CAN DSND TO THE MDA AT 1000-1200 FPM; LEVEL OFF; DRIVE TO THE VDP THEN INITIATE A DSCNT TO LNDG. IN BOTH OF THESE INSTANCES; TWO PARAMETERS OF WHAT'S ESTABLISHED AS A STABILIZED APCH BY 1000 FT AGL; STABILIZED PWR SETTING AND STABILIZED DSCNT RATE; ARE BEING VIOLATED. THE APCH PLATE ACTUALLY DEPICTS A POINT IN SPACE BEYOND THE FAF; AT WHICH A NORMAL CONSTANT RATE DSCNT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED RIGHT THROUGH THE VDP TO A NORMAL LNDG. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO MENTION OF THIS ANYWHERE IN THE COMPANY PRESENTATION WHICH I POINTED OUT. WE HAVE NEVER BEEN TRAINED TO USE THIS KIND OF POINT AND THE ARCHITECT OF THE PROGRAM IN FACT OPPOSED THE USE OF THIS POINT IN AN EMAIL TO ME. SO WITH NO GUIDANCE WHATSOEVER ON THIS PARTICULAR KIND OF APCH AND WITH NEW FO'S FLYING TO GUATEMALA QUALIFIED BECAUSE THEY WATCHED THE COMPANY PROGRAM AND CAPTS UNSURE HOW TO FLY THIS APCH; WE HAVE A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE COMPANY PROGRAM TEACHES THE FLT CREW TO FLY A CONSTANT RATE OF DSCNT TO THE VDP (VISUAL DSCNT POINT) OR MDA AND IF VISUAL CONTINUE TO LNDG. THE B757 DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO BUILD A PSEUDO GLIDE PATH ON THE FMC SUCH AS THE A320 OR B737-NG (NEW GENERATION) AND THE COMPANY TEACHES THE USE OF THE VS (VERT SPD MODE) TO MAINTAIN A 3 DEG GLIDE PATH AS DEPICTED ON THE APCH PLATE. THE COMPANY DOES NOT WANT THE FLT CREWS TO DO THE STANDARD 'DIVE AND DRIVE' USED FOR NON-PRECISION APCHS. THE RPTR FELT THAT SUCH APCHS AS THE VOR DME RWY 19 AT MGGT DID NOT FIT THE NORMAL PROFILE AS TAUGHT IN THE SIMULATOR AND THAT IT COULD BE A SAFETY OF FLT ITEM.