HIS ACCEPTANCE OF A LAST MINUTE RWY TURNAROUND AT LGA CAUSES A320 CAPTAIN TO CONSIDER THE WISDOM OF HIS RESPONSE.

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WE WERE FILED THE MILTON 3 ARR INTO LGA. PRIOR TO DSCNT; I HAD BRIEFED THE ARR AND THEN THE APCH. THE ATIS HAD THE WINDS AT ABOUT 180 DEGS AT 9 KTS. THE ATIS SAID ILS 22 WAS IN USE; AND THIS IS WHAT I BRIEFED. WHILE ON THE LAST SEGMENT OF THE ARR; AND AT ABOUT THE POINT WE EXPECTED TO GET VECTORS UP THE HUDSON RIVER FOR THE ILS TO RWY 22; WE WERE TOLD BY NEW YORK APCH THAT THE ARPT HAD JUST GIVEN THEM A 2 MIN NOTICE THE RWY CONFIGN HAD BEEN CHANGED TO THE EXPRESSWAY VISUAL 31. WE WERE CURRENTLY ONLY A COUPLE OF MINS AWAY FROM THE 2 TANKS THAT START THE APCH; DSNDING FROM 7000 FT TO 4000 FT. APCH CLRED US DOWN TO 2500 FT AND FOR THE EXPRESSWAY VISUAL 31. I QUICKLY STARTED SLOWING THE ACFT TO 180 KTS AND STARTED CONFIGURING. I TURNED TO PAGE FOR THE APCH TO REVIEW THE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE APCH. I HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY BASED IN THE NEW YORK DOMICILE AND WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE APCH; ALTHOUGH I HAD NOT FLOWN THE APCH IN SOME TIME. I DID NOT SEE THE TANKS BUT TALKED WITH THE FO AND POINTED OUT THE EXPRESSWAY AND WHERE WE WOULD TURN TOWARDS THE ARPT. THE FO GOT RWY 31 LOADED INTO THE FMGC AND I HAND FLEW THE APCH AS WE HAD; IN EFFECT; BEEN DUMPED INTO THE APCH AT THE LAST MIN. WHILE CONFIGURING AND SLOWING; I PROCEEDED TO FLY ALONG THE EXPRESSWAY AND STARTED MY L TURN TOWARDS THE RWY; GIVING MYSELF A LITTLE EXTRA SPACE INSTEAD OF TRYING TO TURN HARD INTO THE RWY AND CUTTING IN TOO CLOSE TO SHEA STADIUM. I ASKED THE FO IF HE HAD CONTACTED TWR AND HE DID AT THAT POINT. THE FO; AS I WAS TRYING TO LINE UP ON FINAL; STATED THAT THERE WAS A SOLID XWIND FROM THE L. THIS CAUSED ME TO OVERSHOOT FINAL BY A COUPLE HUNDRED FT; BUT WE STILL HAD ENOUGH ALT TO BANK BACK IN TOWARDS THE RWY AND GET THE ACFT ALIGNED WITH RWY 31. WE WERE SHOWING SLIGHTLY HIGH ON THE VASI'S AS WE CAME AROUND; WHICH IS WHERE I PREFERRED TO BE WITH ALL THE BUILDINGS BELOW US AND FROM PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF THE APCH INTO RWY 31. THE ACFT WAS SAFELY LANDED IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE ON SPD AND MEDIUM BRAKING WAS USED TO SLOW THE ACFT. IN RETROSPECT; I HAVE SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THIS APCH. FIRST; HAVING WHAT APPEARED TO BE LITTLE COORD BTWN NEW YORK APCH AND LGA ARPT PUT US IN A POS TO POTENTIALLY COMPROMISE SAFETY. IT SEEMS ABSURD THAT THEIR LACK OF COORD GETS DUMPED ONTO THE ARRIVING CREWS WHEN THERE HAD BEEN NO HEADS UP FOR THE CHANGE OR OPTIONS TO GET US THE PROPER SPACING/TIMING TO POS OUR ACFT. SECOND; IN HINDSIGHT; IT MAY HAVE BEEN BETTER FOR ME TO DECLINE THE APCH AND INSIST ON DELAY VECTORS TO GET BETTER PREPARED. BOTH THE FO AND I HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN BASED IN NEW YORK AND BOTH OF US HAVE EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE ON THE AIRBUS. THAT BEING SAID; I FELT THAT EVEN THOUGH WE KNEW THE AREA AROUND US; THE SHORT NOTICE CHANGE OF APCH AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN WORKLOAD TAXED EVEN AN EXPERIENCED CREW. I FELT THAT THE TWO OF US WORKED VERY WELL TOGETHER TO MAKE SURE EVERYTHING WAS COMPLETED AS PER SOP. HOWEVER; IT WAS IN A VERY HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT. I RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAD LITTLE ROOM FOR ERROR; AS EVEN THE OVERSHOOT DUE TO THE STRONG L XWIND; IF COMPOUNDED WITH ANYTHING ELSE; WOULD HAVE POTENTIALLY TASK SATURATED US. FROM THE LEARNING CURVE PERSPECTIVE; WITH 9 YRS OF FO TIME ON THE AIRBUS AND NOW 7 MONTHS OF CAPT EXPERIENCE ON THE AIRBUS; I RECOGNIZE THAT GIVEN THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES; IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRUDENT TO TAKE THE DELAY VECTORS INSTEAD OF COUNTING ON PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN THE LOCAL AREA. THE EXPERIENCE FACTOR IS BETTER LEFT TO ADD AN EXTRA MARGIN OF SAFETY THAN TO COMPENSATE FOR A LAST MIN; UNANTICIPATED AND UN-BRIEFED CHANGE.