FIGHTER PILOT REPORTS MISSED APPROACH AFTER GS FAILURE WITH CEILING MUCH LOWER THAN REPORTED BY ATIS. MISSED APPROACH ALTITUDE IS EXCEEDED BY 1200 FEET.

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I WAS FLYING AS #1 OF A 2-SHIP XCOUNTRY RETURN MISSION WITH A STOPOVER AT ZZZ FOR FUEL. THE WX BRIEF RECEIVED AT DEP INDICATED FORECAST WX AT ZZZ FOR OUR ARR TO BE 5 MI IN MIST WITH CEILING BROKEN AT 900 FT. THE ATIS INDICATED THE WX HAD IMPROVED TO BROKEN AT 2200 FT; 3 MI VISIBILITY; WITH RWY 17 IN USE. BASED ON THIS ATIS; I SET UP THE NAVAIDS FOR THE ILS TO RWY 17 AND REVIEWED THE APCH WITH MY BACK-SEATER; WHO WAS ALSO AN EXPERIENCED PLT. APCHING THE FIELD; I RECEIVED VECTORS TO AVOID TSTMS AND WAS TOLD TO EXPECT AN ILS TO RWY 35. BASED ON THIS; I RETUNED THE NAVAIDS AND REBRIEFED THE NEW APCH. I INTERCEPTED THE FINAL APCH COURSE ABOUT 2 NM OUTSIDE OF THE FAF WITH A 35 DEG INTERCEPT ANGLE AND BEGAN THE APCH FROM A POS ABOVE THE GS. SHORTLY AFTER BEGINNING THE DSCNT; INSTS IN BOTH COCKPITS BEGAN TO SHOW ERRATIC INDICATIONS; ALTERNATING FROM FULL-SCALE DEFLECTION ABOVE TO FULL-SCALE DEFLECTION BELOW GS; OCCASIONALLY PAUSING NEAR THE MIDDLE. I ELECTED TO DISREGARD THE GS AND CONTINUE TO LOC MINIMUMS. HAVING MADE THIS DECISION; I ESTABLISHED A MODERATE DSCNT OF ABOUT 4-5 DEGS AND SHIFTED MY VISUAL SCAN TO THE OUTSIDE; EXPECTING TO BREAK OUT AT 2200 FT. I ACTUALLY BROKE OUT AT ABOUT 600 FT (JUST ABOVE LOC MINIMUMS); AND INSIDE OF THE VDP. ACTUAL OBSERVED WX WAS 600-700 FT OVCST; WITH 3-5 MI IN MIST; WET RWY. RATHER THAN ATTEMPT TO DUCK UNDER AND SALVAGE A BAD APCH; I ELECTED TO GO AROUND. I TOLD TWR THEN I WAS GOING MISSED APCH AND REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS FOR ANOTHER ILS ATTEMPT WHILE POSITIONING THE ACFT OVER THE RWY AT ABOUT 500 FT AGL. I WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT STOPPING DISTANCE FOR MY WINGMAN; WHO WAS HEAVIER THAN NORMAL; AND HAD TO LAND PAST A RAISED CABLE ALMOST 2000 FT DOWN A WET RWY. AFTER A DELAY; TWR SAID CALL SIGN SAY AGAIN. I REPEATED THAT I WAS GOING MISSED APCH AND REQUESTING RADAR VECTORS. AFTER THIS; TWR ASKED ME IF I COULD TAKE A TURN IN THE TWR PATTERN. I WASN'T SURE WHAT THEY MEANT; SINCE THE WX WAS OBVIOUSLY LESS THAN VFR; AND PROBABLY LESS THAN CIRCLING MINIMUMS (650 FT) AND ASSUMED THEY WERE INTENDING TO GIVE ME SHORT VECTORS WITHIN TWR AIRSPACE. I RESPONDED THAT I COULD; AND ASKED WHICH DIRECTION THEY WANTED ME TO TURN. THEY DID NOT RESPOND; AND AFTER A FEW SECONDS; I PROMPTED THEM WITH CALL SIGN. AT THIS TIME; A NEW CTLR CAME ON A DIFFERENT XMITTER (OBVIOUSLY A SUPVR) AND DIRECTED ME TO CONTACT DEP; GAVE ME THE FREQ AND TOLD ME TO EXPECT RADAR VECTORS. HE THEN REPEATED THE FREQ; AND AS I ENTERED THE NEW FREQ; TWR ATTEMPTED TO PASS CLBOUT INSTRUCTIONS TO ME; BUT ALL I HEARD WAS CLB AND MAINTAIN. I BEGAN THE MISSED APCH BY ESTABLISHING AN INTERCEPT TO THE RADIAL OUTBOUND; BUT DID NOT NOTE THE FINAL ALT FOR THE MISSED APCH; WHICH WAS 3000 FT. I WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF TWRS IN THE VICINITY (I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE LCL AREA); AND I MAINTAINED A GRADUAL CLB WHILE ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT DEP CTL AND CLRING MY FLT PATH WITH THE RADAR. I CALLED DEP 3 TIMES BEFORE MAKING CONTACT (THE RADIO HAD BEEN VERY BAD ALL DAY). THE FIRST CALL WAS UNANSWERED; THE SECOND CALL RECEIVED 2 PEOPLE CALLING AT ONCE. I BROKE OUT OF THE OVCST DECK AT 4200 FT AND LEVELED OFF WHILE I REVIEWED THE APCH PLATE TO DETERMINE EMER SAFE AND MISSED APCH ALTS. SEVERAL SECONDS AFTER MY 3RD RADIO CALL I FINALLY ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH DEP AND RECEIVED VECTORS. TWR HAD INDICATED THAT THERE WERE MEN AND EQUIP WORKING ON THE SIDE OF THE RWY DURING THE FIRST APCH; SO I ASKED MY WINGMAN IF HE HAD OBSERVED ANY PROBS WITH THE GS DURING HIS APCH FROM 2 MI TRAIL; AND HE STATED THAT IT SEEMED NORMAL TO HIM. NOT KNOWING WHAT THE PROB WAS; I ELECTED TO FLY A LOC APCH WHILE MONITORING THE GS INDICATIONS. I MONITORED THE GS ON THE SUBSEQUENT APCH; AND IT APPEARED TO OPERATE NORMALLY. I BROKE OUT OF THE WX AT ABOUT 500 FT. I HAD SEVERAL GOOD LESSONS LEARNED OUT OF THIS EXPERIENCE. FIRST; MANAGING EXPECTATIONS AND COMPLACENCY. DUE TO THE ATIS RPT; I EXPECTED A VERY EARLY BREAKOUT AND TRANSITION TO A VISUAL APCH. THIS LED ME TO ALLOW COMPLACENCY TO CREEP IN AND I FLEW A SLOPPY APCH WITH AN ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THE GS FROM ABOVE; WHICH IS NEVER A GOOD PLAN. SECOND; SINCE I EXPECTED THE WX TO BE BETTER THAN IT WAS; I NEVER CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF A MISSED APCH AND I DID NOT REVIEW THE MISSED APCH PROC BEFORE COMMENCING THE APCH. THIRD; I LET TWR TALK ME INTO A CHANGE OF GAME PLAN AFTER I HAD DECLARED MISSED APCH; WHICH CAUSED ME TO MISPRIORITIZE MY ATTN ON FIGURING OUT WHAT THEY WERE TRYING TO GET ME TO DO INSTEAD OF DETERMINING THE CORRECT MISSED APCH PROC. COM DIFFICULTIES; CONFUSING GS INDICATIONS; AND CONCERN ABOUT MY WINGMAN'S LNDG SITUATION ALL TOOK ATTN FROM MY PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF SAFELY FLYING AND NAVING THE AIRPLANE.