ACR CAPTAIN PROVIDED A DETAILED REPORT REGARDING A HIGH SPEED ABORT CAUSED BY A BIRD STRIKE; LISTING; SHAKING; YAW AND ENGINE POWER LOSS PRIOR TO THE ABORT.

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ATTEMPTED TKOF ON RWY 17 AT ZZZ. THE FO WAS AT THE CTLS. HE HAD BEEN OBSERVING A BIRD SOAR ABOVE THE R SIDE OF THE RWY FAR AHEAD DURING MOST OF THE TKOF ROLL. IT BECAME APPARENT WHEN IT BEGAN TO TURN L; TOWARD THE RWY; THAT IT MIGHT BECOME A FACTOR TO US AS WE APCHED THE CRITICAL TKOF SPD ARENA. V1 WAS COMPUTED AT 137 KTS. BEFORE THE BIRD DOVE; I REMEMBER BEING ABOUT 10 KTS LESS THAN V1. THERE WAS ENOUGH TIME; WHICH IN HINDSIGHT SEEMS LIKE 1/2 A MIN; TO CHANGE THOUGHTS FROM 'IT WILL STAY ABOVE US;' TO 'UH OH; NOW WHAT IS PLAINLY A LARGE BIRD JUST PASSED BY ON OUR R;' TO 'IT LOOKS LIKE WE MISSED IT;' TO OBSERVING THE ACFT SHAKE; BEGIN TO YAW; AND SEEING ENG INSTS CONFIRM A PWR LOSS ON THE R ENG. I RECALL CALLING OUT 'ABORT;' THEN ACCOMPLISHED THE MANEUVER AUTOMATICALLY JUST AS WE TRAIN IN THE SIMULATOR. I DO NOT SPECIFICALLY RECALL VERBALIZING 'I HAVE THE ACFT;' BUT I DO KNOW THAT WE BOTH REVERTED TO THE ROLES AS WE TRAIN; FO IMMEDIATELY CALLED OUT 'SPOILERS UP;' AND ALL WAS WELL UNTIL WE APCHED TAXI SPD WHERE I THOUGHT I HAD KICKED OFF THE AUTOBRAKES AND ATTEMPTED TO SMOOTHLY TRANSITION TO TAXI SPD; BUT THE ACFT CONTINUED TO SLOW AGGRESSIVELY AND LURCHED ABRUPTLY AS; I SUSPECT; WE SLOWED BELOW 10 KTS AND POSSIBLY SKIDDED TO A HALT BEFORE I COULD DISARM THE AUTOBRAKES. FO WAS RIGHT ON THE PA EXPLAINING THE UNCOMFORTABLE STOP TO CALM THE PAX AS HE ASKED THEM TO STAY SEATED JUST LIKE WE BRIEFED WHEN WE BEGAN THE ROTATION. WE NOTIFIED TWR ABOUT THE BIRD; LET THEM KNOW THAT WE HAD PROBABLE ENG DAMAGE; VERIFIED THAT THE PAX REMAINED SEATED; CHKED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS; AND EXITED THE RWY. I CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE R ENG SHUTDOWN; EXPECTING THAT IT SUSTAINED DAMAGE. AFTER ASKING TWR IF THEY SAW ANYTHING UNUSUAL ON OUR R ENG (I THINK I ASKED ABOUT SMOKE SPECIFICALLY; AND GOT A NEGATIVE RESPONSE); I ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO TAXI BACK AS FAR AS XING RWY 16L BEFORE CONTACTING MAINT FOR THEIR DESIRES CONCERNING HOT BRAKES. AFTER COORDINATING WITH MAINT AND OPS; WE RETURNED TO THE TERMINAL AS GND CREWS PREPARED TO HANDLE THE HOT BRAKES AND PROBABLY IMPENDING FLAT TIRES. THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT ALSO MADE SEVERAL PAX-CALMING ANNOUNCEMENTS AS WE TAXIED IN. NO ONE WAS HURT. THERE WAS VISIBLE DAMAGE TO AT LEAST 3 FAN BLADES ON THE R ENG. SHORTLY AFTER PARKING; ALL MAINS DID GO FLAT. DURING OUR CREW DEBRIEF; THE FLT ATTENDANT WHO HAD BEEN SITTING IN THE AFT CABIN DESCRIBED WHAT SOUNDED LIKE REPEATED COMPRESSOR STALLS DURING THE ABORT. POINTS TO CONSIDER AFTER THE FACT AND LESSONS LEARNED: 1) IT IS AMAZING HOW QUICKLY THE MIND WORKS AS ONE CONSIDERED OPTIONS. JUST AFTER THE POINT WHERE I HAD DECIDED IT WOULD BE OK; WE WILL GO UNDER THE BIRD; IT DOVE DOWN. 2) THE BIRD DIVING GRABBED MY ATTN RIGHT AT THE DECISION POINT OF THE TKOF. 3) I DO NOT KNOW POSITIVELY; DUE TO ATTN TO THE BIRD; WHAT OUR PRECISE SPD WAS WHEN THE ENG LOST PWR; BUT SUSPECT BELOW V1. 4) WE COORDINATED VIA RADIO SEVERAL MINS PRIOR TO PARKING; WITH MAINT AND THE GND CREW; THROUGH RAMP CTL; CONCERNING THE HOT BRAKES PRIOR TO APCHING THE GATE AREA. HOWEVER; I WAS UNABLE TO STOP A RAMP WORKER FROM APCHING THE L MAIN WITH A SET OF CHOCKS AS WE PARKED. I EXPECTED THEM TO HAVE ONLY CHOCKED THE NOSE TIRE IN THIS CASE. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THEY WERE; IN FACT; INFORMED OF THE POSSIBLE DANGER BEFORE WE ARRIVED. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE PROC IS FOR GND CREWS IN DEALING WITH HOT BRAKES; BUT AFTER THIS EXPERIENCE WOULD NOT APCH THE GATE WITHOUT SOME POSITIVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE GND CREW HAS BEEN NOTIFIED TO STAY AWAY FROM THE MAIN GEAR AREA. 5) MY CONCERNS WERE BOTH FOR THE SAFETY OF THE GND CREW AND THE LIKELY POSSIBILITY OF BEING STRANDED FAR FROM THE TERMINAL WHEN THE FUSE PLUGS MELTED; BUT DID NOT WANT TO RELY ON THE FUSE PLUGS WORKING PROPERLY FOR EVERYONE'S SAFETY. IN HINDSIGHT; IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRUDENT TO HAVE PARKED AWAY FROM THE TERMINAL. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS CONVENIENT FOR EVERYONE INVOLVED; BUT ERRING ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION NEVER HURTS. I DO NOT KNOW THE ODDS OF FUSE PLUGSNOT WORKING AS DESIGNED; BUT TRUSTING THEM TO WORK IS A BIT LIKE TRUSTING THE SAFETY ON AN ARMED WEAPON. 6) DURING DEBRIEF; BTWN MAINT; CREW TRACKING; DUTY PLT; CHIEF PLT SUPPORT CTR; FAA; CALL TO TWR; AND OTHERS; I NEGLECTED TO PULL THE CVR CIRCUIT BREAKER. FO REALIZED THIS AS I WAS FILLING OUT RPTS MUCH LATER AND HE REFED OUR FOM. BY THIS TIME; I THINK 2 HRS HAD PASSED SO I DID NOT ATTEMPT TO PULL IT. IT SOUNDED LIKE THE FDR AND POSSIBLY CVR WERE BEING PULLED ALREADY IN CASE THE FAA WANTED AN INVESTIGATION DUE TO THE HIGH SPD NATURE OF THIS ABORT.