A MAINTENANCE CONTROLLER REPORTS ON THE USE OF THE NON-ESSENTIAL FUNCTION (NEF) LIST FOR DEFERRING A DAMAGED #3 LEADING EDGE SLAT ROD-END WIRES BRAIDED CONDUIT UNDER MEL CHAPTER 25-10 FOR A B737-500 AIRCRAFT.

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REF LOG PAGE #3 LEADING EDGE SLAT ROD END WIRES MISSING CONDUIT ON ANTI-ICE DUCT. I DON'T RECALL THE SPECIFICS; BUT I THINK A SMALL PORTION OF THE CONDUIT WAS DAMAGED/MISSING. I ASKED IF THE WIRES WERE SECURE. THEY WERE! AT THIS TIME I FELT A DEFERRAL FOR THE CONDUIT WAS OK AND APPROVED IT. I PLACED THIS ON A MAINT NOTE WITH REPLACEMENT PART LISTED. I DID NOT FEEL THERE WAS ANY PROB WITH THIS DEFERRAL AS THE NON ESSENTIAL FUNCTION LIST FOR MEL 25-10 SEEMED TO DEAL PRIMARILY WITH CABIN ITEMS AND DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ADDRESS MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS OUTSIDE THE CABIN. IT SEEMS THAT MEL 25-10 WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE APPROPRIATE IN DEALING WITH THIS MISSING CONDUIT; WHICH; IN OUR OPINION; 'HAD NO AFFECT ON THE SAFE OP OF THE ACFT.' I FIND THAT MEL 25-10 WOULD HAVE FIT BETTER THAN THE MAINT NOTE. IN CONVERSATION WITH THE MECH; WE FELT THAT THERE WAS NO 'SAFETY-OF-FLT CONCERN.' A PORTION OF THE CONDUIT HAD DETERIORATED. THE SLAT INDICATION SYS WAS SVCABLE AND FUNCTIONAL. AS FAR AS PREVENTING OCCURRENCES SUCH AS THIS IN THE FUTURE; I HAVE REVIEWED AND WILL REVIEW AGAIN; THE REQUIREMENTS OF NON ESSENTIAL FUNCTION ITEMS; MAINT NOTES AND THE PROCS MANUAL. IT IS MY JOB TO PROVIDE ACCURATE INFO TO THE MECHS. I ENDEAVOR EACH DAY TO BE AS CORRECT AND ACCURATE AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE WITH SAFETY FIRST. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE ISSUE OF USING THE NON-ESSENTIAL FUNCTION (NEF) LIST UNDER MEL CHAPTER 25-10 FOR A DAMAGED BRAIDED CONDUIT OF THE #3 LEADING EDGE SLAT INDICATION SYSTEM WAS RAISED BY A QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) AUDIT. QA BELIEVED THE BRAIDED CONDUIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEFERRED UNDER MEL CHAPTER 27-88. REPORTER STATED THE NEF LIST FLOWCHART; AS DESCRIBED IN THE FAA'S NEF PROGRAM; WOULD ALLOW FOR THE TYPE OF DEFERRAL THEY HAD ENCOUNTERED. REPORTER STATED THE PROBLEM WAS; MANY OF THE MAINTENANCE CONTROLLERS WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE APPROVED PROGRAM AND HAD NOT BEEN UTILIZING THE DEFERRAL PROCEDURE AVAILABLE TO THEM.