FLL WORKER REPORTS RUNWAY INCURSION ON TO RUNWAY 13 WHILE INSPECTING RUNWAY 9L FOR TIRE DEBRIS AT NIGHT.

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I WAS ON DUTY AS RAMP 1; AND RECEIVED A CALL ON THE COMPANY CELL PHONE FROM THE FLL TWR OF POSSIBLE DEBRIS ON RWY 9L DUE TO A TIRE MALFUNCTION. I RESPONDED AND REQUESTED PERMISSION TO ENTER THE MOVEMENT AREA. UPON OBTAINING ATC GND CLRNC; I REPOSITIONED TO TXWY CONNECTOR B3 HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 9L. THE TWR CTLR THEN CLRED ME TO INSPECT RWY 9L AND DIRECTED ME TO HOLD SHORT OF INTERSECTING RWY 13. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC. I PROCEEDED ONTO RWY 9L WBOUND; COMMENCING FROM THE CTRLINE IN A SHALLOW 'S' PATTERN TO COVER AS MUCH AREA AS POSSIBLE IN NIGHT TIME CONDITIONS. AT THIS POINT I RECEIVED A RADIO MESSAGE ON THE PROPRIETY CHANNEL CONFIRMING THAT THERE INDEED HAD BEEN A MAIN TIRE 'BLOWOUT.' SHORTLY THEREAFTER; DURING THE INSPECTION; I WAS ADVISED BY THE TWR CTLR THAT I HAD CROSSED RWY 13. I EXITED RWY 9L ON TXWY E; HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 13 ON TXWY C FACING E. THE FLL TWR CTLR THEN ASKED 'WHAT ARE YOUR INTENTIONS?' I RESPONDED BY REQUEST TO INSPECT RWY 9L EBOUND. ATC CLRED ME TO CROSS RWY 13 AND REINSPECT RWY 9L. I CROSSED RWY 13 AND INSPECTED RWY 9L. I EXITED RWY 9L AT TXWY Q. I THEN CALLED THE GND CTL; AND SPOKE TO THE TWR SUPVR TO CONFIRM THAT AN UNAUTH MOVEMENT ACROSS AN ACTIVE RWY HAD INDEED TRANSPIRED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) VEHICLE OPERATOR FIXATED ON ACCOMPLISHING TASKS (TUNNEL VISION) DURING AN INCIDENT/EMER. ALSO; LIMITED PERSONNEL STAFFING RESOURCES BY ARPT OPERATOR. 2) INSPECTING RWY ENVIRONMENT AREA IN DARK (VERY LIMITED ILLUMINATION) TRYING TO FIND SMALL TIRE DEBRIS. 3) PROCEDURAL CHANGE WAS MADE BY ATC/TWR FROM ONES NORMALLY USED. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME A CLRNC TO INSPECT A MAIN RWY 9L WAS ISSUED WHERE A RESTR TO HOLD SHORT FOR THE INTERSECTING RWY (13-31). NORMALLY THE ENTIRE RWY IS CLRED FOR INSPECTION. 4) LIMITED VISUAL CUES. HOLD SHORT SIGNS AT INTXNS AT LEAST 500 FT (APART) POSITIONED ALONG RWY SAFETY AREA. 5) RWY INTXN HOLD POS SIGNS ANGLED AWAY FROM CTRLINE AND VEHICLE OPERATOR. 6) ACTIVATION OF AN INTERSECTING AND SECONDARY RWY WITHOUT PRIOR INSPECTION BY OPS PERSONNEL. (POTENTIAL HAZARD) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) VEHICLE OPERATOR: SITUATIONAL/GEOGRAPHICAL/CLRNC AWARENESS. PRIORITIZE TASKS TO COMPLY WITH DIRECTIVES. 2) VEHICLE INSTALLED GPS ADVISORY LOCATION MAPS AND WARNING DEVICE. 3) BETTER AWARENESS OF HUMAN FACTORS/ISSUES BY ATC (GND/TWR). PERSONNEL SHOULD MONITOR MOVEMENTS MORE CLOSELY; ESPECIALLY DURING ALERT INCIDENTS AND BE COGNIZANT THAT CONFUSING OR NON HABITUAL CLRNCS/DIRECTIVES OR COMS MAY HAMPER WORKING CONDITIONS FOR GND PERSONNEL. 4) IN PAVEMENT GUARD LIGHTS; IN PAVEMENT HOLD SHORT LIGHTS; ETC. 5) INCREASE ARPT OPERATOR PERSONNEL STAFFING. 6) STANDARDIZED ALTERNATE RWY OPS PROTOCOL DURING INCIDENTS. 7) PERIODIC RWY INCURSION ASSESSMENT MEETINGS FOR OPS; ATC AND AIRLINE DEPTS.