2010-06 · NASA ASRS report 894781
Dash 8 flight crew experienced a RUD PRESS Caution Light after departure and elected to return. Maintenance elected to defer the repair using MEL 27-12-1 but the crew was reluctant to accept the aircraft due to a history of hydraulic problems.
After departure during the initial climb out the RUD Press Caution Light illuminated. We opened the emergency checklist and performed the one action which was to maintain a speed not to exceed 200 KTS. After a brief discussion the Captain and I made the decision to return. We did not declare an emergency; but notified ATC that we were going to return for landing. After accomplishing a safe landing and deplaning the passengers Dispatch and Maintenance were called and the write up placed into the Log. We noticed that this airplane has a history in the past several days of hydraulic issues. The mechanic had not yet had a chance to inspect the airplane before dispatch called and informed them that the airplane would be MEL'd and returned to service. Because of the history with the airplane the captain and I asked for further guidance on the issue. The chief pilots should not be allowed to threaten pilots into flying aircraft. If at a later date and time a decision is made to revisit the situation and discuss disciplinary action then so be it. But when a safety of flight decision is being made the Chief Pilots should not be offering threats to force pilots to fly an aircraft that may not be safe. With all the circumstances involved in the situation the problem could have been air in the system; an ADC malfunction; an indication error or the rudder pressure regulator valve malfunctioning. With all of this uncertainty the crew was only trying to get reliable information on which to base a decision.
On climb out; we received a RUD PRES Caution Light. We elected to return to the field due to a couple of factors; 1. There was history of hydraulic leaks with a line that had been replaced two days prior. 2. It was an XA:45 flight to ZZZ and the only guidance the checklist provided was to remain below 200 KTS. We landed with no further incident. Also; the caution light extinguished as we slowed for the approach. We assumed this was because the light illuminated because the pressure did not switch to 900 PSI above 140 KTS and once we had slowed for the approach below 140 KTS; it was receiving 1500 PSI. Maintenance Control made the decision to utilize MEL 27-12-1. Although the MEL as stated applies to the RUD PRES light; I questioned the use of the MEL because of the history of the hydraulic leak two days prior and there was no attempt to trouble shoot why that may have happened. I had also questioned if there would be any controllability issues due to the fact the the rudder would be receiving 1500 PSI up to 200 KTS. I spoke with the Maintenance Controller for sometime and he said that that may have happened because of the work done; but there was no way of knowing unless they investigate it. At one point he even suggested it was a false indication because we had no other associated lights. I asked him what other lights would I have received but he didn't have an an answer. I still had concerns; so I spoke with a Dispatch Supervisor; who referred me to the Chief Pilots office. I spoke with both Chief Pilots; and after a conversation and their review of the history of the aircraft they were satisfied that the MEL was applied correctly therefore we were good to go. I expressed my opinion that further investigation would be more prudent; but they didn't see that way. I told them that I wanted to discuss this with my crew and told them I would call them back. We were interrupted by the gate wanting to know our status. Then a Chief Pilot called me back because evidently they had a meeting to attend. I didn't pick up so we could finish our discussion; then the Chief Pilot called the First Officer who explained his issues with the situation. Evidently he told the First Officer he was disappointed in our system knowledge and gave us 5 minutes to come to an answer. We elected to continue the trip. We ferried to ZZZ and did a round trip to ZZZ1 with the MEL. The light illuminated every time we went above 140 KTS and extinguished below 140 KTS consistent with what the caution light represents. I assume the unit that senses below 140 KTS and above 140 KTS failed in some wayAlthough I don't have a suggestion for preventing the RUD PRES light from illuminating as I have never seen this in the almost 10 years I have been here; I am disturbed by the lack of support and pressure from the Chief Pilots. I felt as though since the MEL applied; Maintenance; Dispatch; and the Chief Pilots were happy to sign it off and go. Had there been no recent hydraulic issues with the aircraft I may have agreed; but I felt since there was history it warranted a second look. As the PIC I was attempting to resolve any safety issues that I had. I have flown many aircraft with many types of MEL's in the last 9 1/2 years; I don't believe I should be pressured by the company to continue when I question an MEL.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.
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