CPR LTT UNAUTH RWY ENTRY.

Narrative

WHILE TAXIING VIA E TXWY TO RWY 2R TWR WAS ADVISED BY THE COPLT THAT WE WERE READY FOR TKOF. THE TWR CLRED US '...INTO POS AND HOLD;' FOLLOWED BY THE COMMENT FOR US TO 'HOLD SHORT...' AS THERE WAS AN ACFT ON A RIGHT BASE FOR LNDG. THE TWR'S COMMENTS WERE ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE COPLT UNAWARE THAT THE PIC HAD NOT HEARD THE 'HOLD SHORT...' PART OF THE INSTRUCTIONS. THEREFORE; THE PIC DID ENTER ONTO THE STOPWAY BEFORE HEARING AND SEEING THE LNDG ACFT (SMA TYPE) PASS OVERHEAD TO OUR RIGHT TOUCHING DOWN ON THE RWY THRESHOLD TO OUR RIGHT. REALIZING HIS ERROR; THE PIC TURNED BACK INTO THE TXWY INFORMING THE TWR THAT '...APPARENTLY I (PIC) HAD A COM FAILURE.' TWR THEN TOLD US TO PROCEED BACK INTO POS FOR TKOF WITH NO COMMENT RE: THE INCURSION. THE LNDG ACFT APPARENTLY WAS UNAWARE THAT THIS INCURSION OCCURRED. FOLLOWING OUR FLT (BNA-RDU-BNA) THE PIC DID DISCUSS THIS INCURSION; DUE TO HIS OVERSIGHT; WITH THE TWR CTLR RESPECTIVE SUPVRS AND AN FSDO REPRESENTATIVE AS THE PIC INVOLVED I BELIEVE THE MAIN CAUSE WAS A SUBCONSCIOUS COMPLACENCY AND OVERCONFIDENCE TOWARDS A ROUTINE FLT. ALLOWING MYSELF TO DIVERT MY ATTN AND TOTAL CONCENTRATION AWAY FROM PROPER COCKPIT MGMNT AND EXPECTED PROCS; IE; PROPERLY CLRING OUTSIDE THE ACFT PRIOR TO MOVING ONTO AN ACTIVE RWY; ALERT TO AND MONITOR ALL THAT IS HAPPENING AND SAID IN THE COCKPIT; BEING AN EXPERIENCED CREW; JUST DOING THAT WHICH WE KNOW. NOT TO LESSEN MY ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS INCIDENT OR TO CAST ANY BLAME ON ANOTHER. POSSIBLY; IF THE TWR'S ENDING COMMENTS TO 'HOLD SHORT' AFTER GIVING THE 'CLRED INTO POS...' HAD BEEN GIVEN WITH A STRONGER INFLECTION OR HAD ASKED FOR SPECIFIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BACK FROM US; IT MAY HAVE HELPED BRING THIS PLT OUT OF HIS MOMENTARY MINDSET. CERTAINLY THIS INCURSION HAD THE POTENTIAL FOR CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES AND WON'T BE FORGOTTEN BY THIS PLT.