ACR LGT ENGINE MALFUNCTION OR TKOF ABORTED. LATER OPERATING UNDER 3 ENGINE FERRY PERMIT CREW OPERATED ENGINE CAUSING ADDED DAMAGE.

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ON 9/WED/88; AT APPROX XA30; TKOF WAS ABORTED BY THE CAPT DUE TO #4 ENG MALFUNCTION. SINCE I WEAR EARPLUGS AND WAS CONCENTRATING ON AN UPCOMING AIRSPD CALL; I DIDN'T SEE THE FLUCTUATIONS NOR HEAR THE ENG BANGING. AFTER CLRED THE RWY WE RAN UP THE ENG IN A TROUBLE SHOOTING ENDEAVOR ONLY TO CONFIRM THAT THERE WAS A VISIBLE FLAME CONCURRENT WITH THE BANGING FROM #4 TAILPIPE; ACCOMPANIED WITH COCKPIT INSTRUMENT GAUGE FLUCTUATIONS AT HIGH (ABOVE 90%) RPM. IN ADDITION TO THE 3-M CREW; AN FAA INSPECTOR WAS ABOARD. THE FAA MAN HUNG AROUND TO WATCH THE F/E MAKE THE APPROPRIATE LOGBOOK ENTRY. THE F/E AND I THEN INSPECTED THE COMPRESSOR AND TURBINE (ACTUALLY I HELD A RATHER RICKETY BOARDING LADDER STABLE AND TURNED THE PROP; WHILE THE F/E LOOKED FOR DAMAGE--THINGS LOOKED OK TO HIM; THOUGH SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION AT GSO REVEALED LAST STAGE COMPRESSOR BLADE DAMAGE). UPON RETURN FROM OUR INSPECTION TRANSPORTATION WAS WAITING. I LEFT THE OTHER 2 CREWMEMBERS; INFORMING THEM I'D MAKE SURE THEY HAD A BED. ABOUT AN HOUR LATER THEY SHOWED UP AT THE MOTEL WITH WORDS TO THE EFFECT OF 'WE'RE GOING TO GSO AFTER THE PLANE IS UNLOADED'!! THE 'Z-MONSTER' THEN CAPTURED MY TIRED; 53 YR OLD BODY. THE PHONE RANG. A COMPANY EMPLOYEE; TEMPORARILY IN BDL TO RAMROD THE OPERATION; INFORMED ME THE PLANE WAS OFF LOADED AND WHAT TIME COULD WE GO. I CALLED THE CAPT AND THE F/E. WE MET IN THE LOBBY AND LEFT FOR THE ACFT. SOMEWHERE BTWN THIS TIME AND STARTING ENGS; THE BUBBLE WAS LOST; FOR INSTEAD OF THE 3 ENG FERRY (#4 FEATHERED); WE MADE A NORMAL TKOF WITH REDUCED PWR ON #4 AT XJ40 ON 9/THURS/88. SOME BACKGROUND INFO MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THIS SITUATION. THE COMPANY HAS; FOR SEVERAL YRS; HAD IN THEIR EMPLOY PUERTO RICAN CREWS WHOSE NATIVE LANGUAGE IS SPANISH. FOR VARIOUS REASONS; REAL/IMAGINED; THEY ARE PERCEIVED BY SOME TO NOT MATCH UP TO ENGLISH SPEAKING CREWS. MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH THESE 2 PARTICULAR CREW MEMBERS SERVES TO REINFORCE THAT FEELING. THE CAPT; ON LNDG AT BDL; WAS 25-30 KTS FAST OVER THE FENCE AND T/D WAS 1/3-1/2 WAY DOWN THE RWY. ON ANOTHER FLT HE WHEEL-BARROWED THE ACFT. THE F/O HAD FUEL STARVED AN ENG ON YET ANOTHER FLT. SO WHEN IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT #4 ENG BE UTILIZED; I REMEMBER FAVORABLY ENDORSING THE IDEA WITH 'SOME PWR IS BETTER THAN NO PWR.' DID MY SUBCONSCIOUS TELL ME NOT TO RIDE THROUGH A 3 ENG TKOF WITH THESE 2? SINCE THE COMPANY HAD BEEN KNOWN TO SUPPORT RULE BENDING; DID THEY TELL THE CAPT SOMETHING THAT HE CHOSE NOT TO SHARE WITH ME?? SAD TO SAY; BUT I REALLY DON'T KNOW HOW THIS EVENT OCCURRED! THE COMPANY IS UPSET ABOUT ADDITIONAL ENG DAMAGE AND LORD ONLY KNOWS HOW MANY FAR'S WERE BUSTED!! AFTER 30 YRS OF FLYING (20; MIL); HAD SOMEONE TOLD ME 3 ENG FERRY; I WOULD NOT; WITH WANTON DISREGARD FOR THE CONSEQUENCES; HAVE DONE OTHERWISE. I DON'T THINK I WAS EVER INFORMED THAT '3 ENG IT' WAS TO HAPPEN. IN LATER DISCUSSIONS THE F/E SAID OTHERWISE. THE CAPT WAS RATHER MUM AFTER TELLING ME AT ONE POINT HE WOULD HAVE KEPT GOING HAD THE FEDS NOT BEEN ABOARD. IRONICALLY; SOME DETAILS ARE CLEAR AS A BELL AND OTHERS NONEXISTENT. WHAT ABOUT THE LOGBOOK ENTRY? IT NEVER CROSSED MY MIND. BESIDES; ANY SERIOUS DISCREPANCIES RATE A SEPARATE PIECE OF PAPER PASSED TO THE NEXT CREW/MAINT; PARTICULARLY AWAY FROM HOME. I BELIEVE COM (OR LACK OF IT) PLAYED A GREAT ROLE IN CREATING THIS PROB; BUT BEYOND THAT; I'M STUMPED!! NORMALLY; I WOULD HAVE BEEN INVOLVED/OVERHEARD THE DISCUSSION WITH GSO; BUT BECAUSE I WAS SECURING ACCOMMODATIONS; I REMOVED MYSELF FROM THAT FACET.