2011-09 · NASA ASRS report 968639
An air carrier flight crew reported a possible P56 incursion during departure from Runway 01 at DCA. New procedures and a lower than expected ceiling led to the deviation.
We were dispatched with an MEL item that rendered the VNAV inoperative. Heavy rains showers at departure time were moving through the DCA area. As we pushed back; a rain shower came over the field; but it stopped raining before our takeoff. At takeoff time; the weather was reported as 1;500 FT OVC with surface winds out of the east. No thunderstorms existed within three miles of the field; but a line of weather was west to northwest of DCA. At the gate prior to push back; we planned a departure on DCA Runway 01. We discussed the airline's specific departure procedure for both VMC and IMC. During that briefing (approximately 30 minutes before push back); the weather was good enough to follow the airline's specific VMC procedure and follow the river visually; and if VMC is lost; to follow the DCA XXX radial to 2.7 DME; then turn to intercept the DCA 328 radial. However; we did reiterate; in the pre-departure briefing that if we went IMC; we would pick up the appropriate radials and continue with the procedure based on the radials. In preparation for departure; we tuned the DCA VOR. The First Officer was pilot flying; so we put the XXX radial on the First Officer side; and we put the 328 radial on the Captain (pilot not flying) side. We set the heading indicator to 330. I selected ARC mode; but failed to notice that the pilot flying was still in map mode; and therefore unable to see the radials on his NAV display. There were many threats to this departure which we briefed. The runway is short and was reported wet. P56 needed to be avoided. Neither of us had flown the airline's new specific departure procedure utilizing the XXX radial to 2.7 DME. The aircraft was heavy. The VNAV was inoperative; requiring us to utilize an alternate climb out process on the Digital Flight Guidance Control panel which we don't often use. Heavy rain showers were in the departure area; requiring us to use the weather radar on departure. Neither of us has used this weather radar before (due to low time in this model aircraft). Although I thought we were thoroughly briefed for the departure; the pilot flying failed to select ARC mode when we were planning to use raw data to accomplish departure procedure. Therefore; he could not monitor the necessary radials. I failed to notice that mistake. I also incorrectly assumed; based on our pre-departure briefing that the First Officer was planning on intercepting the XXX radial RATHER than attempting to visually track the river. Neither of us comprehended the distraction that would be caused by simultaneously entering the unexpected cloud layer AND having to accomplish the 'alternate' clean up procedure on the Digital Flight Guidance Control Panel due to VNAV being inoperative. Although the airline's departure procedures discuss 'VMC procedure' and 'IMC procedure'; they do not talk about specific weather to define 'VMC' and 'IMC'. Since the weather was reported as 1;500 FT OVC; the pilot flying initiated the 'VMC' procedure and was planning to track the river visually; at least initially. I; on the other hand; knew that we would enter the clouds quickly on climb out; so I was expecting to turn to intercept the XXX radial without much concern for visually following the river. The combination of VNAV INOP; unexpected low ceilings at the departure end and an unfamiliar (new to us) airline departure procedure lead to our deviation. HOWEVER; it appears that intercepting the XXX radial set us up very close to P56 with little room for error. In the future; I will do the following to avoid this mistake.-Prior to takeoff; make sure we clarify with each other whether we are visually following the river; or turning to intercept the radial without concern for the river.-Assure both pilots are in ARC mode with the pilot flying on XXX course; and the heading bug on an appropriate heading to intercept.-If VNAV is inoperative; prior to takeoff (while taxiing); I will verbally review step-by-step the things that we need to accomplish to simultaneously clean up while intercepting the radial. I believe the airline should delete the use of the XXX radial and reinstate the airline's old procedures using the 328 radial. The current use of the XXX radial leaves little room for error; and it does not agree with the Commercial Chart Procedure; which still just talks about intercepting the 328 radial (with no mention of the XXX radial). If the airline insists on using the XXX radial; I think the airline should rewrite the airline-specific pages to include specific weather criteria. I suggest; when ceilings are below 3;000 FT; follow the IMC procedure. I think we should rewrite the 'IMC procedure' to eliminate the separate 'All Engine' category. The IMC procedure page should read; 'All Engine/Engine Out'. I suggest that when the weather is reported below 3;000 FT ceilings; the pilots should not plan on following the river visually at all. Instead; pilots should plan on immediately turning to intercept the XXX radial. Also; we should define the airline's 'IMC procedure' by a specific weather criteria; I suggest 'when weather is below 3;000 FT ceilings and/or below three miles visibility'. On our flight; because the weather at our departure was reported as VFR; we followed the 'VMC procedure'. But when we unexpectedly entered the clouds at 700 FT; we got behind in our attempt to track the XXX radial; which led to our deviation.
I was the flying pilot on a flight departing from DCA on Runway 01. We were dispatched with an inoperative VNAV. Our clearance was to depart via the noise abatement procedure for Runway 01. My airline has its own procedure for this; which was recently changed and it was the first time the Captain and I had flown the procedure. There is a VMC procedure and an IMC procedure. I briefed the departure procedure for VMC and also briefed it for IMC as the weather got worse. We set the VOR course to the XXX degree radial from the DCA VOR. We planned to fly the VMC procedure; which is to turn left and follow the river and then intercept and track the DCA XXX degree radial outbound if we loose sight of the river. Once tracking the XXX degree radial the procedure is to fly to the 2.7 DME fix and then turn left to intercept the DCA 328 degree radial.After we took off from Runway 01; I turned left to follow the river. As I was about lined up with the river we entered the clouds at around 700 FT; which was well before I expected to loose sight of the river. The reported ceiling at the time of departure was 1;500 FT and the visibility was 10 SM. I continued to turn left towards an intercept heading to track outbound on the XXX degree radial. As I transitioned to the instruments my natural tendency was to fly the flight directors; which was giving me false information. In our normal takeoff sequence we select either heading; NAV; or VOR select at 400 FT. Since we were following the river at 400 FT; none of these were selected because they didn't apply at the time. This caused me to shallow out my bank. At about the same time we reached 1;000 FT where I called for climb power; flaps up; IAS 250 and speed bug to 250. This temporarily distracted me because this is an abnormal procedure for us due to the VNAV being inoperative. The Captain was monitoring the course and told me I had to come more to the left for the intercept. He indicated that I was about a dot to the right. We had set a 330 heading for the intercept but at this point had not set heading select. As I evaluated why the flight director was giving me false information I called for arming the VOR and continued to turn manually for the intercept. As we got on the XXX degree radial I noticed the speed bug was still at V2 and not 250; again due to the VNAV being inoperative and our focus on getting on course. As I focused on getting the speed bug set we passed the 2.7 DME fix. I noticed at about 3.5 DME and then I turned to intercept the 328 degree radial. Soon after that we were given a turn to 210 degree. After a thorough review of this event; I believe that the combination of the new departure procedure; the weather and the inoperative VNAV was a perfect setup for failure. I believe that just following the green page VFR procedure in marginal VFR conditions can set up this scenario to reoccur in the future and is most likely the reason this scenario has occurred several times in the last couple days. In our case; the situation was compounded by the fact that the actual weather was IFR and that we had to deal with inoperative equipment at a critical moment. As I found out from this event; it is imperative that you intercept the XXX degree radial as soon as possible. There is no room for error as this radial runs so close to the prohibited area.Because the weather was marginal VFR; I was led to follow the VFR procedure; which is to follow the river until losing sight of it; and then intercept and track outbound on the XXX degree radial. Following this procedure leaves you in a bad position when you enter IMC because you disregard the flight directors while you follow the river; so the flight directors are not set up for the transition. Even without the distractions that we had; this can be very distracting and misleading and at the very least cause a delay in getting on course. Again; there is no room for delay or error due to the close proximity of the course to the prohibited area. In the future if I have to follow this procedure in marginal VFR conditions I will plan to turn immediately to an intercept heading and disregard the river.To prevent other crews from falling into this trap I think that the IFR procedure on the company pages should be changed to both IFR and Marginal VFR. This will prevent crews from following the VFR procedure in marginal weather. It also concerns me that the new procedure takes you so close to the prohibited areas; which leaves no room for error. The old procedure to immediately intercept and track the DCA 328 degree radial kept you well away from it. I don't know the reason for the change; but if it could be changed back I think it would be beneficial. So many variables can cause small errors.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.
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