A B767-300 Captain expressed reservations about the content; format and efficacy of his airline's newly published QRH procedures when he managed a failure of the leading edge slats to deploy symmetrically for landing.

Narrative

While on a visual approach at approximately 1;300 Ft we got an LE Edge Slat Disagree EICAS message along with the Leading Edge Flaps light illuminated. We had been cleared to land and were configured with the Gear Down; Flaps 25. The First Officer was the Pilot Flying. I instructed the First Officer to maintain current configuration and speed and execute a missed approach. I told Tower we were 'Going Around' and they instructed us to fly Rwy Heading. I asked for a right turn as soon as they were able. This was due to a rain shower ahead. They complied and were very helpful through out. They gave us 4;000Ft and a south heading so we could work our problem. I accomplished all the checklists. After referring to the Abnormal Landing Distance and current surface wind data we elected to request [an appropriate runway] full length for our landing. I had previously announced to the passengers our go around and intentions for our return landing. I explained our situation to the purser and Flight Attendants and told them to expect a normal landing. I attempted contact with Dispatch however this proved unsuccessful. While on final for landing Runway 8L; I asked the Tower to 'roll the equipment' for us as a precaution. I canceled the emergency equipment after exiting the runway. We left the flaps in their current positions and taxied to the gate. There are a few points I would like to expand on at this point. First; due to past experiences; I have my own personal planned minimum arrival fuel for flights [operating this city pair] for both the 767 and 757. This proved to be very helpful in this situation. Our flight plan had us planned to land with 13;800 pounds of fuel; we landed with 8;600. Second; neither the First Officer nor myself have received meaningful simulator training with the new QRH procedures. I found this to be a significant factor in my comfort level and speed in which the information [was gathered and] actions were accomplished. Third; the QRH checklist instructed us to skip ahead to item #15. There was no item #15. Thinking I may have missed it; I gave the QRH to the First Officer to look over. He also could not locate item #15. Finally; there is some confusion on the proper approach speed to be used. In the notes of the checklist it states Vref20. So do you fly this speed regardless of wind and runway length or do you add the wind components for a Vapp speed. If not; why not? It should also be noted that the checklist; Item #2; states: 'choose one: indicated flap position greater than 20:use CURRENT (IE 25) flaps and VREF 20 for landing.' Further; in the checklist under Deferred Items; Approach Descent Checklist: 'Reference speeds: GW___flaps 20 VREF 20. set;' Is this confusing or what? Why would you state flaps 20 when they are not? I have come to the conclusion that it is possible the company--in its desire to attain an integrated SOP as soon as possible--has lost sight of safety. If you can remember back to the Apollo [disaster] and NASA's self audit; and the realization that nobody said 'Stop and look at what we are doing.' I think that time has come at our newly integrated airline to do just that.