A-68-033
NTSB Safety Recommendation — Aviation
Recommendation text
WE WOULD, THEREFORE, RECOMMEND THAT THE FAA CONDUCT LONG TERM RADIO FREQUENCY MONITORING OF THE LEBANON VOR AREA FOR SIGNAL INTERFERENCE. THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT PRIORITY CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE INSTALLATION OF DUAL NAVIGATIONAL FACILITIES AT THOSE LOCATIONS WHERE A SINGLE FACILITY COULD EXHIBIT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TYPE FOUND DURING OUR INVESTIGATION OF THE LEBANON ACCIDENT. THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT A REVIEW BE MADE OF THE DESIGN CONCEPT OF THE WILCOX MODEL 806A RECEIVER AND ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH OTHER AIRBORNE INSTRUMENTATION AND GROUND STATION NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT TO ASSURE STANDARDS OF AIRWORTHINESS. FURTHERMORE, THE FACTS DISCLOSED DURING OUR INVESTIGATION OF THIS ACCIDENT INDICATE TO US THAT THIS COMPATIBILITY PROBLEM MAY BE GENERAL IN NATURE AND THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO REVIEWING ALL PERTINENT STANDARDS FOR COMPATIBILITY OF GROUND AND AIRBORNE NAVIGATION COMPONENTS. FAA SHOULD PROVIDE THE LEADERSHIP IN DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING AN INDUSTRYWIDE OPERATIONAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. IN MOVING TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE, WE WOULD HOPE THAT YOU WOULD GIVE EARLY ATTENTION TO INSURING A WIDER DISSEMINATION OF EXISTING OPERATIONAL INCIDENT DATA AMONG THE ELEMENTS OF YOUR ORGANIZATION. OUR FINAL RECOMMENDATION CONCERNS THE REEMPHASIS OF WHAT COCKPIT INDICATIONS CONSTITUTE POSITIVE STATION PASSAGE DURING A VOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH.
In plain language (FlightFinder summary)
The FAA is asked to conduct long-term radio frequency monitoring of the Lebanon VOR area for signal interference and to prioritize installing dual navigational facilities where a single facility might exhibit characteristics similar to those found in the Lebanon accident. It should review the Wilcox Model 806A receiver's design and compatibility with other airborne and ground navigation equipment to ensure airworthiness, and lead the development of an industrywide operational incident reporting system while widening dissemination of existing incident data. Additionally, the FAA should reemphasize what cockpit indications constitute positive station passage during a VOR instrument approach.
This plain-language summary is written by FlightFinder to explain the recommendation above. It is not the official wording — the verbatim NTSB text is quoted above.
Details
| Status | Closed - Acceptable Action |
|---|---|
| Mode | Aviation |
| Closed | Sep 16, 1969 |
| NTSB number | DCA69A0004 |
| Addressees | FAA |
External links
NTSB safety recommendations are advisory; addressees are not legally required to adopt them. Source: NTSB CAROL (public domain).