A-69-002

Recommendation text

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: 1. Pilots, operators and regulatory agencies should renew emphasis on, and improve wherever possible, cockpit procedures, crew discipline and flight management. 2. Both the air carrier industry and the FAA should review policies procedures, practices, and training toward increasing crew efficiency and reducing distractions and nonessential crew functions during the approach and landing phase of a flight. 3. Crew functions not directly related to the approach and landing should be reduced or eliminated, especially during the last 1,000 feet of descent. 4. During the final approach, one pilot should maintain continuous vigilance of flight instruments inside the cockpit until positive visual reference is established. 5. During approaches where less than full precision facilities exist, there should be a requirement that during the last 1,000 feet of final approach, the pilot not flying call out altitude in 100-foot increments above airport elevation. 6. There should be a requirement to report indicated altitudes to air traffic control at various points in the approach procedure, such as the outbound procedure turn and at the outer marker position. 7. The aviation community should consider expediting development and installation of audible and visible altitude warning devices and the implementation of procedures for their use. 8. Altimetry systems should be reassessed with particular regard to their susceptibility to insidious interference by forms of precipitation. 9. The possibility of development of additional altitude warning systems, external to the aircraft, should be explored. One possibility is a high-intensity visual warning red light beam, projected up along and slightly below the desired approach glide slope, to warn of flight below the desired path. 10. Development is needed in the fields of radio/ radar, and inertial altimetry and CRT/microwave pictorial display approach aids as possible improved replacements for the barometric altimetry system in the near future. 11. Modified use of existing approach radar should be further studied with regard to its adaptability as a surveillance (accident prevention) tool for nonprecision instrument approaches (e.g., to monitor automatically and warn against the descent below desired glidepath of any aircraft in the final descent mode). 12. There should be increased surveillance and more frequent and more rigorous inspection and maintenance of altimetry systems by both the air carriers and the FAA. 13. Certification requirements and procedures should be reexamined to determine if there is a possibility of a single failure mode of nominally dual systems which, when combined with an already existent passive failure or inadequate cockpit procedures, can invalidate dual failure protection features.

Details

External links

• View on NTSB CAROL →