A-99-021
NTSB Safety Recommendation — Aviation
Recommendation text
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Convene an engineering test and evaluation board to conduct a failure analysis to identify potential failure modes, a component and subsystem test to isolate particular failure modes found during the failure analysis, and a full-scale integrated systems test of the Boeing 737 rudder actuation and control system to identify potential latent failures and validate operation of the system without regard to minimum certification standards and requirements in 14 Code of Federal Regulations part 25. Participants in the engineering test and evaluation board should include the FAA; NTSB technical advisors; the Boeing company; other appropriate manufacturers; and experts from other government agencies, the aviation industry, and academia. A test plan should be prepared that includes installation of original and redesigned Boeing 737 main rudder power control units and related equipment and exercises all potential factors that could initiate anomalous behavior (such as thermal effects, fluid contamination, maintenance errors, mechanical failure, system compliance, and structural flexure). The engineering board's work should be completed by March 31, 2000, and published by the FAA. (Supersedes Safety Recommendation A-96-107, A-96-109, A-96-112, and A-96-113)
In plain language (FlightFinder summary)
The FAA should assemble an engineering test and evaluation board to perform a failure analysis, component and subsystem tests, and a full-scale integrated systems test of the Boeing 737 rudder system, aiming to identify potential latent failures and validate operation beyond minimum certification standards. Participants must include the FAA, NTSB technical advisors, Boeing, other manufacturers, and experts from government, industry, and academia. A test plan should cover original and redesigned rudder power control units and factors like thermal effects, contamination, maintenance errors, mechanical failure, system compliance, and structural flexure, with completion and publication by March 31, 2000.
This plain-language summary is written by FlightFinder to explain the recommendation above. It is not the official wording — the verbatim NTSB text is quoted above.
Details
| Status | Closed - Acceptable Action |
|---|---|
| Mode | Aviation |
| Closed | Apr 25, 2001 |
| NTSB number | DCA94MA076 |
| Addressees | FAA |
External links
NTSB safety recommendations are advisory; addressees are not legally required to adopt them. Source: NTSB CAROL (public domain).