Casualties unknown

Engine Bearing Failure Prompts Takeoff Abort and Evacuation (N601AP)

Honolulu, HI, US

On February 9, 1998, a Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-51 (registration N601AP) operated by Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. was involved in an aviation accident near Honolulu, HI. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: the disintegration of the No. 6 bearing in the No. 2 engine which resulted in an aborted takeoff. In addition, the malfunction of the slide in the right forward service door was the result of a faulty seal in the inflation system. This summary draws on records from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive; 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archivePrimary reportUpdated 2026-06-10Data APIEditorial standards

During takeoff, a loud oscillating sound led to an aborted takeoff. Tower reported fire from the right engine. After stopping, crew initiated fire and evacuation checklists. The forward right service door's slide did not inflate; airstairs used. Inspection found disintegrated engine bearing cage.

Takeoff Abort

During the takeoff roll, the crew heard a loud oscillating sound and decided to abort the takeoff. The tower subsequently reported that fire was visible from the right engine. The aircraft was brought to a stop, and the crew initiated the engine fire and emergency evacuation checklists.

Evacuation

The forward right service door was opened, but the evacuation slide did not inflate. The airstairs were then deployed, and all occupants deplaned via the airstairs.

Inspection Findings

An inspection revealed that an engine bearing cage had disintegrated. The evacuation slide was later tested and functioned properly; however, its inflation bottle was found to be empty.

Bottle Pressure Check Confusion

The inflation bottle had not been checked on the day of the incident due to a change in the operations manual that caused confusion regarding responsibility for performing daily pressure checks. The manual states that it is the captain's responsibility to ensure the bottle is pressurized, but it is not an item on the preflight checklist. The flight crew believed maintenance personnel were performing the checks, while maintenance personnel thought the crews were checking the bottles. The bottles have a history of sometimes losing pressure over time.

Investigation report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive. Original record: https://carol.ntsb.gov/event/20001211X09566. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), United States.