What happened
During a night visual approach to a "Special Airport," the captain briefed the crew for a no go-around policy. During the descent, the approach became unstabilized as the airspeed decreased to the point of a stall. The aircraft struck the runway in a nose-high pitch attitude, impacting the aft fuselage before settling on its landing gear.
As the airspeed decayed, the first officer provided initial callouts regarding the low speed; however, these callouts ceased after the captain failed to respond to them. Following the landing, the aircraft taxied to the gate. A post-flight inspection was performed, but because it was limited to the main landing gear, the damage to the fuselage was not identified.
Findings
The investigation revealed that the captain's briefing regarding the prohibition of go-arounds was based on an incorrect understanding that no takeoffs were authorized on that runway during night or IMC conditions. While the first officer was aware this information was inaccurate, she did not challenge the captain's briefing.
Although both pilots had received Crew Resource Management (CRM) training—covering situational awareness, crew input, and assertiveness—as well as training regarding special use airports, these principles were not applied during the approach. The investigation noted a discrepancy in crew dynamics: the captain described the first officer as passive and quiet, while the first officer described the captain as defensive and resistant to criticism.
Furthermore, the captain's handling of the aircraft was found to be outside the parameters established in company manuals. While the pilots were both described as having good flying skills, the company manuals lacked a specific definition for stabilized approach criteria. Such criteria and the required actions for unstabilized approaches are defined in an FAA Advisory Circular dated August 10, 2000.