Casualties unknown

2005-08-04: Cirrus Design Corp. SR22 (N513CD) — Garrett L. Ermish — Orlando, FL

Orlando, FL, US

On August 4, 2005, a Cirrus Design Corp. SR22 (registration N513CD) operated by Garrett L. Ermish was involved in an aviation accident near Orlando, FL. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The manufacturer's defective wheel brake assembly design and a leaking wheel brake, resulting in an overheated brake assembly and a wheel fire during an aborted takeoff. This summary draws on records from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive.

Sourcesthe U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archivePrimary reportUpdated 1781061362Data APIEditorial standards

A pilot aborted takeoff after intermittent airspeed indication loss, then saw white smoke and flames from the right main landing gear wheel. Postaccident examination revealed heat-damaged brake components. Maintenance records showed prior brake issues.

Incident Sequence

The pilot, a commercial certificated pilot, was initiating an IFR cross-country personal flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91. During the takeoff roll, the pilot noted an intermittent loss of airspeed indication and aborted the takeoff. After exiting the runway, the airplane was stopped on a taxiway. The pilot shut off the engine and exited to check the pitot/static tube. Upon doing so, he smelled an odor and saw white smoke emanating from the right main landing gear tire wheel pant. He then heard a "poof" and observed flames engulf the right wheel.

Postaccident Examination

Postaccident examination of the right brake assembly revealed that the brake caliper was heat damaged, cracked, and deformed. The O-rings around the caliper pistons were thermally damaged. The airplane's nose wheel casters freely, and ground steering is accomplished by differential braking of the main landing gear wheels.

Pilot's Operating Handbook and Service Advisory

The airplane's Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) cautions pilots that when taxiing, they should use minimum power, and notes that excessive braking may result in overheated or damaged brakes. Two months before the accident, the manufacturer issued an Owner Service Advisory (OSA), which advised pilots to not ride the brakes, a practice that could produce excessive heat, premature brake wear, and the increased possibility of brake failure.

Maintenance History

The airplane's maintenance records contained several entries about the brake system. Eight months before the accident, the left brake pads were replaced, and the brake reservoir required servicing. Two weeks later, the right brake was reported as leaking, and the maintenance discrepancy noted in part: "Removed brake calipers, found O-rings on pistons to be excessively heated due to excessive brake usage, causing piston to blow out. Found linings with cracks and chips missing." Two months before the wheel fire, all brake linings were again replaced.

Post-Accident Manufacturer and FAA Actions

Following the accident, the manufacturer issued Service Bulletin SB2X-32-13, on December 15, 2005, which called for the installation of improved brake assemblies. On January 18, 2006, the manufacturer issued Mandatory Service Bulletin SB2X-32-14, which added temperature indicators on the brake assemblies, modified the wheel pant assemblies to provide access to the temperature indicators, and revised the airplane's POH. On February 9, 2006, the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB), CE-06-30, which recommended compliance with the manufacturer's service bulletins.

Investigation report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive. Original record: https://carol.ntsb.gov/event/20050823X01300. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), United States.