Accident Sequence
The flight crew was conducting a straight-in ILS approach during instrument meteorological conditions with reported cloud ceilings about 100 feet above the decision height. During descent into the terminal area and initial approach, tailwinds of up to 100 knots were affecting the flight, and the crew reported feeling rushed because of the high ground speed. The crew established the airplane on the approach course at the proper speed and altitude but did not perform a complete approach briefing.
The first officer (FO), who had very little instrument approach experience in the CRJ-200, was the pilot flying. Prior to making visual contact with the runway, the FO disengaged the autopilot and flight director but only mentioned the autopilot in his verbal callout. At the time, there was no prohibition against making a raw data approach to minimums in the Air Wisconsin (AWAC) flight manual.
The airplane subsequently drifted left of course and above the glidepath. As it deviated from the approach course, the flight was outside stabilized approach criteria. As the airplane descended beneath the ceiling, both pilots noticed the deviation and misalignment with the runway.
Captain's Intervention and Miscommunication
At this point, the captain offered to take over control of the airplane and salvage the landing instead of abandoning the approach and executing a missed approach. At the time of the accident, AWAC procedures provided crews latitude in determining when a go-around was necessary.
As the captain took control, the FO misunderstood a statement by the captain and reduced power to idle without the captain’s knowledge. The airplane developed a high sink rate and during the flare likely stalled, impacting the runway at a high vertical rate. The forces developed during the flare and touchdown exceeded the certified limit loads of the landing gear, and the gear support trunnion fractured as intended. There was no evidence of any pre-existing damage to the gear components, and the fracture and gear separation occurred as designed.
Training and Oversight Issues
Postaccident interviews revealed training and oversight concerns. The FAA aircrew program manager discussed circumstances of some AWAC new-hire pilots who did not successfully complete initial training. Specifically, AWAC had changed simulator time requirements for these pilots because they had completed a type rating course before starting AWAC’s training. AWAC determined these pilots needed fewer simulator hours, but according to the FAA official, they had high initial operating experience (IOE) times and “weren’t getting it, so [AWAC] let them go.” A captain and CL-65 flight instructor stated that constraints with simulator time required all pilots to complete training within scheduled time. The director of flight training noted that the simulator, at full utilization, provided 600 hours of training per month, but the company needed 1,000 hours. The amount of IOE provided to new-hire FOs had significantly increased because AWAC had not revised its simulator training to accommodate pilots with little or no jet experience. As a result, IOE was routinely extended beyond the FAA’s requirement. Since many simulator scenarios cannot be accomplished in an airplane, particularly during passenger-carrying flights, IOE is not an adequate substitute for simulator training.
Additionally, new-hire FOs who completed AWAC’s initial training were subject to a 1-year probation period, but unlike other Part 121 operators, AWAC did not effectively assess probationary pilots. The accident FO’s training and checkrides did not reveal his weaknesses with automation, pacing, and crew coordination, leaving him unprepared for the approach. Captains did not produce trip reports after flying with FOs, and meetings to discuss probationary FO progress were no longer held because base managers were “too busy.” Thus, two potential methods to identify FO weaknesses were not used.
Because first officers hired by AWAC in the 2 years preceding this accident had decreased levels of experience, they would have benefited from additional training and oversight. However, AWAC’s training program was ineffective because it did not accommodate these needs.
The FAA’s Principal Operations Inspector (POI) was based in Des Plaines, Illinois, but AWAC’s training center was in Charlotte, North Carolina. The POI stated that providing oversight was difficult because of required travel. Due to limited on-site oversight, the FAA did not identify the shortcomings of AWAC’s program in preparing less experienced FOs for flying in high-performance jet airplanes.