What happened
The flight crew was performing a straight-in ILS approach under instrument meteorological conditions, with cloud ceilings approximately 10-foot above the decision height. The aircraft was experiencing tailwinds of up to 100 knots, which resulted in high ground speeds that caused the crew to feel rushed. While the CRJ-200 was established on the correct course, altitude, and speed, the crew failed to perform a complete approach briefing.
The first officer, who had limited experience with this aircraft type, disengaged the autopilot and flight director but only verbally communicated the autopilot disconnection. The aircraft subsequently drifted left of the course and above the glidepath, resulting in an unstabilized approach. As the aircraft descended below the ceiling, the pilots noticed the deviation.
The captain attempted to take control to salvage the landing rather than executing a missed approach. During this transition, the first officer misunderstood a statement from the captain and reduced power to idle without notifying him. This caused the aircraft to develop a high sink rate. During the flare, the aircraft likely stalled and impacted the runway with a high vertical rate. The impact forces exceeded the certified limits of the landing gear, causing the gear support trunnion to fracture.
There were no fatalities reported in this accident.
The investigation
The investigation examined the mechanical integrity of the landing gear and found no evidence of pre-existing damage; the gear separation occurred as designed due to the impact loads. Investigators also reviewed Air Wisconsin's training and oversight programs. It was noted that simulator time requirements for new-hire pilots had been reduced, and the company's reliance on increased initial operating experience (IOE) was not an adequate substitute for simulator training. Furthermore, the investigation found that the airline lacked effective methods to assess the performance of probationary first officers, as trip reports were not being produced and progress meetings had been discontinued.
Findings
- The first officer's training and checkrides failed to identify weaknesses in automation use, pacing, and crew coordination.
- The company's training program did not adequately accommodate the needs of less experienced first officers.
- Inadequate training and oversight contributed to the pilot's inability to properly execute the approach.