No fatalities

Landing Gear Collapse of Aero Commander 500-B at Cyril E. King Airport (N411FS)

Charlotte Amali, United States

On June 1, 2008, an AERO COMMANDER 500-B (registration N411FS) operated by Bevins Air Service, Inc. was involved in an aviation accident near Charlotte Amali. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The failure of maintenance personnel to identify inadequate clamping of the aluminum line during inspection, and the undetected fatigue cracking of the line which resulted in the loss of hydraulic fluid. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 2026-08-03Data APIEditorial standards

On June 1, 2008, an Aero Commander 500-B experienced left main landing gear collapse during landing roll after hydraulic system issues, resulting in substantial damage but no injuries.

Introduction

On June 1, 2008, at approximately 1250 Atlantic standard time, an Aero Commander 500-B, registration N411FS, sustained substantial damage when the left main landing gear collapsed during the landing roll at Cyril E. King Airport (TIST), Charlotte Amalie, U.S. Virgin Islands. The aircraft was registered to a private individual and operated by Bevins Air Service, Inc. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 non-scheduled, international, passenger flight from Cane Field (TDCF), Roseau, Dominica. The certificated commercial pilot and six passengers were not injured.

Sequence of Events

The flight originated from TDCF at approximately 1050. According to the pilot, after takeoff and while approximately 20 miles from the destination, the aircraft's hydraulic pressure, which actuates the landing gear and flaps, began to fluctuate. The pilot lowered the landing gear using the normal gear extension system, but the left main landing gear did not go into the down and locked position. He advised the control tower of the situation and attempted to extend the left main landing gear by bouncing the right main landing gear on the runway, but was unsuccessful. He departed and attempted to extend the left main gear using the emergency extension procedure, which was also unsuccessful. The flight returned for landing, and during the landing roll, the left main landing gear collapsed.

Post-Accident Inspection

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was notified of the accident on July 21, 2008. The mechanic who inspected the airplane after the accident found a cracked aluminum tube in the left hand nacelle. The tube was cracked beneath the sleeve at the flare for the B-nut which attaches at the inboard side of the left engine nacelle. The tube was supported by one phenolic block about midway along its length. Additionally, all hydraulic fluid was drained from the primary stand pipe reservoir. The tube, part number 6790246-101, identified as Tube Assembly Hydraulic Pressure, was removed from the airplane and sent to the Safety Board's Materials Laboratory in Washington, D.C.

Examination Findings

Examination of the tube by personnel from the Safety Board's Materials Laboratory revealed that the majority of the crack was perpendicular to the surface and contained faint crack arrest positions consistent with fatigue cracking. Small ratchet marks were noted in the central portion of the crack adjacent to the outside diameter surface, indicating that initiation of the crack was from multiple origin areas at the beginning of the flared end. No evidence of material defects or mechanical damage was noted in the origin area. The flared end of the tube adjacent to the fracture surface showed evidence of use but did not contain large amounts of deformation. The flared end at the opposite end of the tube was out-of-round. Further examination of the tube revealed a circumferential wear area approximately 4 inches from the middle radius of a 90-degree bend near the cracked end of the tube; the wear was consistent with being made by a loose clamp. A second area of wear was noted near the first but on the opposite side of the tube. The tube also exhibited gradual bends that were not consistent with discrete bends associated with a newly manufactured tube.

Personnel from the airplane Type Certificate Data Sheet holder reported that the cracked tube is required to be supported within 6 inches of the tangent point of each bend; therefore, a minimum of two clamps are required. Inspection of the tube for condition is specified in the 100-Hour inspections.

Maintenance Records

The operator reported that the total time on the tube is the same as the airplane total time, or 18,153.9 hours. Additionally, the mechanic reported the airplane is maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's inspection program, and the last Annual/100-Hour inspection occurred on April 30, 2008. The airplane total time at that time was 18,092.3 hours.

Contributing factors

Causes

Fatigue/wear/corrosionIncorrect service/maintenanceMaintenance personnel

Other contributing factors

Inoperative